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BY THE SAME AUTHOR: 


Logical Praxis - - - $i oo 


The Principles of ^Esthetics 2 25 


The Elements of Psychology 1 50 


The Science of Ethics (In Press). 


G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York. 



the 



SCIENCE OF ETHICS 



AN ELEMENTARY SYSTEM 



THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL MORALITY. 



BY 

HENRY N. DAY, 

Author of "Psychology," "Logic," "./Esthetics," "Art or 
Discourse," etc. 










NEW YORK : 
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, 

182 Fifth Avenue. 
1876. 









COPYKIGHT, 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS. 
1876. 



PREFACE 



It has been the controlling design in the prepar- 
ation of this work simply to introduce to ethical 
studies. After a careful analysis of an act of duty 
by which the essential constituents of duty are as- 
certained, the science is unfolded in the light of this 
analysis, with logical exactness, into a full presenta- 
tion of its principles and truths in their due relations 
to one another — into a well-grounded, comprehen- 
sive, and organic system of theoretical and practical 
morality. The elementary character of the work 
has precluded the introduction of the historical and 
critical discussion, by which ethical literature is so 
generally characterized. The peculiarities of the 
treatise are to be found mainly in the analysis of the 
concrete act of duty which furnishes the fundamen- 
tal principles of ethical science ; in the systematic 
development and arrangement of these principles ; 
in their application to the particulars of ethical prac- 
tice ; and the more full and detailed presentation of 
the practical part of ethics. The results attained in 
the introductory analysis of duty are supposed to be 



IV PREFACE. 

accepted generally without question. The recogni- 
tion throughout of the essential constituents of duty 
attained in the analysis as co-ordinate and comple- 
mentary, and, therefore, characterizing all duty, has 
seemed to the writer to give to the treatise a solid 
and unquestionable basis, together with thoroughly 
logical harmony and completeness — the characters, 
in other words, of a truly scientific treatment. As 
was requisite, however, in an elementary work, the 
presentation has been didactic rather than argumen- 
tative ; — the principles and truths being left for the 
most part to appear in their own light. 

New-Haven, April, 1876. 



CONTENTS. 



INTRODUCTION.— § i. Ethics Defined. § 2. 
Founded on Psychology. § 3. One of the Three 
Great Departments of Mental Science. § 4. 
Method. 



BOOK I. 

THEORETICAL MORALITY THE NATURE OF DUTY. 

CHAPTER I. — Analysis of an Act of Duty. — § 5. The 
Duty of Regulus to return to Carthage. 

CHAPTER II.— Subject of Duty— A Moral Person.— § 6. 
Moral Person Denned. §§ 7, 8. An Essentially Active Being. § 9. 
Endowed with Sensibility. § 10. With Intelligence. § II. With 
Free Will. § 12. The Moral Faculty — Practical Reason, Moral 
Sense, Conscience. § 13. Threefold Function of Conscience — 
Discriminative of Right and Wrong, Obliging to Action, Approv- 
ing or Disapproving. § 14. Conscience as Source of Pleasure or 
Pain. 

CHAPTER III. — Object of Duty.— § 15. Object of Duty 
Defined. § 16. A Person. § 17. Rights Correlative to Duties. 
§ iS. Good Essential Attribute in a Duty and a Right. § 19. 
Duties Classified — (1) to Self; (2) to Fellow-men ; (3) to God. 



VI CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER IV.— Moral Action.— § 20. Moral Action De- 
fined ; implies Love in Subject of Duty, Good in Object of Duty, 
and Rectitude in its Essence. § 21. Systems of Morality on Each 
of these Elements. 

CHAPTER V. — Love as Principle of Duty. — § 22. Love 
Necessary in all Duty. § 23. Fulfils the Whole Law of Duty. 
§ 24. More Exactly Defined. § 25. Its Three Stages. § 26. The 
Opposite of Love, or Hate. § 27. Unsympathetic Spirit Opposed 
to Duty. 

CHAPTER VI. — Goodness or Beneficence.— § 28. Good the 
One Result of all Perfect Moral Action. § 29. Different Senses of 
the Term Good ; Good in itself as Happiness, the Primary and Ul- 
timate Good ; Good as means, the Secondary and Mediate Good. 
§ 30. Good in itself the Gift of God alone ; Secondary Good the 
only Possible Immediate Effect of Human Effort ; Secondary Good 
either Good of Character or of Condition. § 31. The Highest and 
Largest Good Required by Duty. § 32. Summary of Doctrines 
Respecting Good. § ^. Relation of Moral Action to its End 
§ 34. Evil, the Opposite of Good, either Physical or Moral 

CHAPTER VII.— Rectitude.— § 35. All Perfect Moral Ac- 
tion must be Right. § 36. Rectitude Respects an Action. § yj- 
Particularly the Relation in an Action between its Source and its 
End. § 38. Implies a Natural Fitness or Conformity in this Rela- 
tion. § 39. An Unswerving Directnesss in its Movement. § 40. 
And a Parallelism with all Specific Right Acts. § 41. Wrong the 
opposite of Right. 

CHAPTER VIIL— Motives.— § 42. Motive Defined as Object 
of the Will. § 43. Two Classes of Motives— Those of Character 
and those of Condition. § 44. The Three Subordinate Species of 
the First Class. § 45. Three Species of the Second Class. § 46 
Motives as Ultimate or Proximate. § 47. Motives not Morally 
Right or Wrong. § 48. Selection Among Motives — In What Way 
Wrong. 

CHAPTER IX.— Moral Obligation.— § 49. Moral Obliga- 
tion Defined. § 50. Its Ground. 

CHAPTER X. — Moral Law.— § 51. Moral Law Defined. 
§52. Divided into Physical and Moral. §53. Harmonious in its 



CONTENTS. I'll 

Requirements. § 54. Commanding. § 55. Excites Sense of Per- 
sonal Responsibility. §56. Its Sanctions. §57- Merit. Demerit, 
PVaise, Blame. 

CHAPTER XI.— AUTHORITY.— § 58. Authority Defined. § 59. 
Its Seat. §60. How Expressed. §61. Natural Law. §62. Posi- 
tive Law. § 63. The Bible. 

CHAPTER XII.— Casuistry.— § 64. Casuistry Defined. §65. 
Its Leading Principles. 



BOOK II. 

PRACTICAL MORALITY DUTIES AND RIGHTS. 

INTRODUCTION.— § 66. Division of Duties. § 67. Gen- 
eral Recapitulation. 



DIVISION FIRST — DUTIES TO SELF. 

CHAPTER I.— Nature and Division.— § 68. Personal Duties 
Explained. § 69. The Ground of Obligation in Them. § 70. 
Self-Love . § 71. Defined. § 72. Two Classes of Personal Duties 
— in Respect to Condition and to Character. 

CHAPTER II. — Personal Duties in Respect to the Body. 
— § 73- Ground of Obligation in Personal Duties. § 74. Duties 
Enumerated: — I. Of Guarding the Body. §75. II. Of Nourishing 
it— (1) By Food. § 76. (2) By Exercise. § 77. (3) By Rest. § 78. 
III. Of Ruling It. § 79. (1) By Overcoming Sloth. § 80. (2) By 
Regulating Appetite. §81. (3) By Training to Habits of Ministry. 
§ 82. (4) By Subordinating Bodily Wants. 

CHAPTER III. — Personal Duties in Respectto External 
Condition. — § 83. Nature and Divisions of Personal Duties in 
Respect to Condition. § 84. I. In Respect to External Nature. 
§ 85. II. In Respect to Property. § 86. Institution of Property 
Beneficent. § 87. Right to Property Relative. § 88. Relations of 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

Duty to Property. §89. Modes of Acquisition. §90. Personal 
Duties in Respect to Property. § 91. III. In Respect to Station. 
§ 92. IV. In Respect to Friendship. 

CHAPTER IV. — Personal Duties in Respect to Charac- 
ter.-^} 93. Character Defined. § 94. Formation of Character In- 
volves an Ideal, Persistent Endeavor, Principle of Habit, and Use 
of Outward Occasions. § 95. Maxims. § 96. Culture of the Sensi- 
bility. § 97. Of the Imagination. § 98. Of the Intelligence— As 
Activity. § 99. In Observing. § 100. In Reflecting. §101. Of 
the Regulative Faculty. § 102. Of the Free Will— As a Power. 
§ 103. As Dominant. § 104. As Free. § 105. As Finite. 

DIVISION SECOND DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN.* 

PART I. 

DUTIES TO PERSONS. 

INTRODUCTION.— § 106. General Division of Social 
Duties. 

CHAPTER I. — Definition.— § 107. Classification Grounded 
on Constituents of Duty — Love, Good, Right. 

CHAPTER II. — Duties to Persons Determined from the 
subject of Duty or from Love. § 108. Division. § 109. Sym- 
pathy. § no. Kindness. § in. Loving Endeavor. § 112. Re- 
sentment. § 113. Fortitude. § 114. Anger. § 115. Forgiveness. 

CHAPTER III. — Duties of Persons Determined from the 
Object of Duty or from Good. — §116. Divisions. § 117. Cour- 
tesy. § 118. Truthfulness. § 119. Its Two Forms. § 120. Truth 
of the Heart. § 121. Veracity — Its Objects. § 122. Its Sphere. 
§ 123. Trustfulness. § 124. Justice and Beneficence — How Re- 
lated and How Distinguished. §125. Beneficence, as Related to 
Benevolence. § 126. The Crowning Virtue. § 127. Its Specific 
Forms. § 128. Modes. § 129. Measure. § 130. Its One Object 
or End. § 131. Justice Defined. § 132. Its Sphere. 

CHAPTER IV. — Duties to Persons Determined from the 
Act of Duty. — § 133. Two Species of Duties thus Determined. 



CONTENTS. IX 



§ 134. Aim in Duty. § 135. To be Governing. § 136. And True 
to Its P^nd. § 137. Straightforwardness in' Performance. § 138. 
Harmony with Things and Events. 



part 11. — Duties in the Family. 

CHAPTER I. — The Family Institution. — § 139. Family 
Defined. § 140. Rise of Obligation. § 141. A Moral Community. 
§ 142. Seat of Authority. § 143. Classes of Duties. 

CHAPTER II. — Marital Rights and Duties. — § 144. Origin 
in the Marriage Covenant. § 145. Polygamy. § 146. The Parties 
to this Covenant Intelligent and Free. § 147. Sanctity of the Mar- 
riage Union. § 148. How Solemnized. § 149. Rights and Duties 
of Husband and Wife Equal and Reciprocal. § 150. Authority 
Joint and Indivisible. §151. Rights and Duties Complementary. 

CHAPTER III. — Parental and Filial Rights and Duties. 
— § 152. Origin and Limitation of these Duties in the Family Re- 
lation. § 153. Rights and Duties Correlative. § 154. Duties of 
Parents. §155. Duties of Children. §156. Finiteness of the Obli- 
gation. 



57- 



CHAPTER IV. — Fraternal Rights and Duties,- 
Origin and Limit in the Family. § 158. Equal, Reciprocal, and 
Complementary. § 159. Special Duties. 



X 



PART III. DUTTES IN THE STATE. 

CHAPTER T. — End and Moral Nature of the State. — 
§ 160. State Denned. § 161. Its Origin. § 162. Organized. § 163. 
Sphere. § 164. A Power. § 165. Seated in the Free- Will. § 166. 
Working Through Organs. § 167. The End of the State Life. 
§ 1 6b. Its Moral Attributes. § 169. Not a Mere Jural Society 
§ 170. Comprehensive Duties of the State as Moral. 

CHAPTER II. — The Rights and Duties of a State in 



X CONTENTS. 

Relation to Itself. — i. Existence. — §171. Enumeration. §172. 
Right of Existence. § 173. Origin of States. §§ 174, 175. Three- 
fold Duty in Self-Preservation. § 176. Support. § 177. Right to 
Property and Service of Citizens. § 178. Taxes. § 179. Direct 
Taxes. § 180. Capitation Taxes. § 181. Excise Duties. § 182. 
Imposts. § 183. Stamps. § 184. Income Taxes. § 185. National 
Self-Defense. § 186. Maintenance of Authority. § 187. Sanctions 
of Law. § 188. Rewards. § 189. Penalties and their Primary End, 
Prevention of Disobedience. § 190. A Second End of Penalty, 
— Moral Teaching of the Community. § 191. A Third End — Re- 
formation of the Offender. § 192. Modes of Punishment. § 193. 
Degrees of Penalty Vary with the Nature of the Offence. § 194. 
With Facility of Detection. § 195. With Number and Strength of 
Offenders. § 196. With the Moral Sentiment of the Community. 

CHAPTER III.— Political Autonomy. — § 197. Autonomy 
Defined. § 198. Ground of Right. § 199. Duty. § 200. Spheres. 
§ 201. Organic Laws. § 202. The Legislature. § 203. The Judi- 
ciary. § 204. Legal Rights and Equities. § 205. The Executive. 

CHAPTER IV.— Political Growth.— § 206. Right and Duty 
of Growth. § 207. Spheres. § 208. Maxims. § 209. Rights and 
Modes of Territorial Extension. § 210. Increase of Population. 
§ 211. Internal Strength. § 212. Public Improvements. § 213. 
Weights and Measures. § 214. Money Defined. § 215. Standard 
and Unit of Value ; Material. § 216. Elements of a Sound Mone- 
tary System. § 217. Postal Facilities. $ 218. Development of 
Resources. § 219. Classes of Industries. § 220. Relation of the 
State to its Productive Industries ; — Limitation of its Duty. 
§ 221. Modes of Fostering Private Productive Industry. § 222. 
Free Trade and its Limitations. § 223. Public Health. § 224. 
Public Education. § 225. Degree of Public Education. § 226. 
Modes. § 227. Public Morals — The Duty of the State to Promote 
Morality. § 228. Modes. 

CHAPTER V.— The State and the Citizen.— § 229. Citizen 
Defined. § 23c. Rights of Individuals in the State — to Pursue the 
End of their Being. § 231. Freedom of Thought and Action. 
§ 232. Protection. § 233. Special Help. § 234. Duties of Indi- 
viduals to the State — Loyalty. §235. Obedience. §236. Support. 
§ 237. Self-Expatriation. 



CONTENTS. xi 

CHAPTER VI.^-International Morality. — § 238. Interna- 
tional Law — its Divisions. § 239. Sources. § 240. Peculiarities of 
Internationa] Obligations. §241. Specific Duties — Sympathetic 
Good Will. § 242. Lex Talionis. § 243. Political Retaliation Vin- 
dictive or Amicable. § 244. Comity of Nations. § 245. Rules ot" 
Comity. § 246. Truthfulness. § 247. Justice. § 248. Benefi- 
cence. § 249. International Integrity. § 250. Rights of War. 
§ 251. Recognizable War Must be Public. § 252. Prosecuted by 
Armed Force. § 253. Have Ostensible Ground of Justice. § 254. 
Parties Affected by War — Non-Combatants. § 255. Neutrals. 



DIVISION THIRD DUTIES TO GOD. 

CHAPTER I.— § 256. Nature and Ground. § 257. Will of 
God — How Revealed. § 258. Classification of Religious Duties. 

CHAPTER II.— Personal Religion — Piety Towards God. 
— § 259. Piety Defined. § 260. Religious Gratitude. 

CHAPTER III.— Personal ReliCxIon — Reverence, Prayer. 
— § 261. Reverence. § 262. Prayer — its Constituents. § 263. Its 
Characteristics. § 264. Obligations to Prayer. § 265. Objections 
to Prayer. § 266. Irreverence. 

CHAPTER IV. — Personal Religion — Godly Sincerity. — 
§ 267. Defined. § 268. True Thought of God. § 269. True Ex- 
pression to Him. § 270. Idolatry- § 27 c Superstition. § 272. 
Hypocrisy. § 273. Formality. 

CHAPTER V. — Personal Religion — Religious Trust — 
Obedience and Service.— § 274. Religious Trust. §275. Quali- 
ties. § 276. Obedience. § 277. Qualities. § 278. Service. § 279. 
Qualities. § 280. Vows. 

CHAPTER VI. — Personal Religion — Religious Integrity. 
— § 281. Singleheartedness. § 282. Unswerving Directness. § 283 
In Parallelism with all Lines of Duty. § 284. In Moderation. 

A* 



Xll CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VII.— Social Religion— Family Religion.—' 
§ 285. Spheres of Social Religion. § 286. Obligations to Family 
Religion. § 287. Religious Solemnization of Marriage. §288. Reli- 
gious Ordering of the Household. § 289. Special Duties. § 290. 
Worship. 

CHAPTER VIII.— Social Religion— State Religion.— 

§ 291. Relations of Religion to the Political Community. § 29 2 
Special Religious Duties in the State — (1.) Must not Act Irreligi 
ously. § 293. (2.) Must Protect Citizens in their Religion. § 294 
(3.) May Enlist Religion in Marriage. § 295. (4.) Recognize. 
Religious Seasons. § 296. (5.) Appoint Special Religious Obser 
vances. § 297. (6.) Enlist Religious Sanctions — Oaths. § 298. Four 
Kinds of Oaths. § 299. Interpretation of Oaths. 

CHAPTER IX. — Social Religion— The Church.— § 300. 
Religious Association Natural. § 301. Divers Forms and Rela- 
tions to the State. § 302. Religious Officials. § 303. Sacred Sea- 
sons. § 304. The Sabbath. § 305. Obligations to Observe the, 
Sabbath. § 306. Sacred Places. § 307. Worship. 



INTRODUCTION. 



§ i. Ethics is well defined to be the 
Ethics defined. Science of Human Duty. 

The science has otherwise been named 
Moral Science, Moral PJiilosophy ; also, Deontology, 
from the Greek, signifying science of duty. 

In analogy with other sciences which 
Methods. relate to life and conduct, a system of 

ethical science may look more to the 
principles of duty ; or to the application of these 
principles to practice ; or, still further, to the result 
of this application of principles to practice in form- 
ing character. The definitions have varied accord- 
ingly ; and the respective systems founded on these 
definitions become, characteristically, either sciences 
of the Laws of Duty, or sciences of the Duties of 
Man, or sciences of Human Character. 

While the method of unfolding the science varies 
somewhat with these various modes of regarding 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

the science, the substance of the exposition is not, 
or certainly need not be, materially varied. Ethics 
never becomes, like Arithmetic or Rhetoric, a prop- 
er art ; it does not, by apposite examples and ex- 
ercises, put the learner at the time of the study 
upon the practice of one after another of the par- 
ticular duties which it enjoins, nor upon the specif- 
ic applications of its principles to the conduct. It 
remains a proper science, whether its more imme- 
diate aim be to unfold the principles of duty, or the 
application of these principles to conduct, or the 
character which the principles if applied would 
form. 

Moreover, the exposition of the science must 
cover substantially the same ground whether it 
founds its method more in the principles of duty, 
or in their application in specific duties, or in the 
results in character. 

§ 2. Ethical science is founded direct- 
p S T d jJ ff °" ly on psychology, or the science of mind. 
It accepts thus the enumeration and the 
classification of mental phenomena, together with 
their origin and relations, which psychology teaches. 
It goes beyond that science, inasmuch as taking up 
one of the three great departments of mental phe- 
nomena, or, in other words, one of these depart- 
ments of mental activity as defined and explained 
in psychology, it presents that in respect to its laws 
and its general forms. 

Ethics, accordingly, accepts from psychology its 
doctrine in regard to the human will as one of the 
three great functions of the mind ; its exposition of 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

what its precise function is ; how it is modified in 
its action ; how it is related to the other functions 
of the mind — the sensibility and the intelligence. 
With this doctrine of the nature and relations of 
the will furnished to it by psychology, Ethics pro- 
ceeds to unfold the laws which must govern in a 
pure and perfect act of will, and the forms in which 
the will exerts itself under these laws. 

In the same way, Logical Science takes from psy- 
chology the doctrine of the intelligence — what it is 
in its essential nature and relations — and then pro- 
ceeds to derive its necessary laws and its valid 
forms. As thought is the proper product of the 
intelligence, Logic is defined as the science of 
thought ; or inasmuch as the perfect in thought is 
truth, logic is the science of truth. 

^Esthetical science, also, accepts the psychological 
doctrine of the sensibility — its nature and modifica- 
tions — and then proceeds from this doctrine to un- 
fold its laws and its general modes or states under 
these laws. As it is form which is the sole object 
of the sensibility, aesthetics is defined as the science 
of form. Or inasmuch as the perfect in form is 
known as the beautiful, aesthetics is the science of 
beauty. 

Inasmuch as a perfect act of will in man is duty, 
Ethics is the science of duty. 

., § 3- Ethics, accordingly, with Logic 

Co-ordinate with 3 ° . ' b J ' & 

Logic and JE&- and ^Esthetics, makes up the group of 
sciences founded on the three great de- 
partments of mental phenomena which are present- 
ed in psychology. The three sciences have a com- 



4 INTRODUCTION. 

mon parentage and are related to one another as 
strictly co-ordinate sciences. 

Sir William Hamilton calls them the three nomo- 
logical sciences, which respectively present the laws 
of the three great forms of mental activity, all in 
like manner derived from psychology which pre- 
sents simply the facts of mental activity. 

§ 4. The proper method in ethical 
Method. science will be, first, by a careful anal- 

ysis of an act of duty to ascertain pre- 
cisely what elements necessarily enter into duty and 
make it what it is, and thus ascertain the essential 
principles of duty ; and then to enumerate and class- 
ify the general forms in which acts of duty appear, 
under the manifold modifications of human ex- 
perience. 

When we have ascertained precisely what it is 
that makes an act one of duty — a moral act — then 
we know what must characterize all duty ; what 
characters it must have in order to be duty ; in 
other words, we know the laws of duty or the prin- 
ciples of right action. And when we have ascer- 
tained the general forms in which the free-will ex- 
erts itself in acts of duty, by a careful exploration of 
the field of human experience so far as it is char- 
acterized as moral, we are enabled to apply to all 
these forms the laws of duty which we have ascer- 
tained. We are enabled, in other words, to deter- 
mine in regard to all human action what is truly 
moral in it, and also, on the other hand, to deter- 
mine what must enter into every form of human ac« 
tion in order to make it truly moral. 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

This treatise will therefore present in the first 
book — Theoretical Morality — a full analysis of an 
act of duty, in order to determine its essential na- 
ture ; and in the second — Practical Morality — the 
specific duties pertaining to human life. 



ANALYSIS 01- AN ACT OF DUTY. 



BOOK I. 

THEORETICAL MORALITY THE NATURE OF DUTY. 



CHAPTER I. 

ANALYSIS OF AN ACT OF DUTY. 

§ 5. It was a received tradition among 
instance of duty, the Romans that some two centuries 

and a half before our era, a certain gen- 
eral of theirs, of the name of Regulus, having been 
made a prisoner by the Carthaginians, was sent 
back to Rome to effect an exchange of prisoners 
under an oath that he would return to Carthage in 
case of failure ; that Regulus failed in this errand, 
but resolutely and against the protestations of 
friends, kept his oath, and returned to Carthage to 
certain torture and death. Cicero tells us that such 
was the sentiment of the age in regard to the in- 
violable sanctity of an oath, that Regulus would not 
have been allowed to do otherwise. 

The tradition may have been authentic or not. 
However this may be, the story exemplifies what 



8 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

will be recognized by all as an act of duty. It was 
the duty of Regulus to return to Carthage in fulfil- 
ment of his oath ; he at least recognized it as such ; 
his return was an act of duty. He did that which 
was due to the Carthaginians — that which was owed 
to them ; for the term duty, derived to our language 
from the Latin through the French, means simply 
that which is owed. Or, at least, he owed it to him- 
self — to his self-respect, to his conscience — to keep 
his oath. By returning, he simply discharged a 
debt. 

It is immaterial how the debt was contracted ; 
how the obligation was created. It is enough that, 
in a proper sense of the word, Regulus owed his re- 
turn to Carthage, and his act of returning was, con- 
sequently, an act of duty. 

If now we scrutinize this act of Regulus, 

ekmente. we discover three elements in it which 
are very prominent, and which imply 
one another, so that the supposed removal of either 
one would essentially change the character of the act 
and would also involve the removal of the other ele- 
ments. They are (i) a person owing — Regulus ; (2) a 
person or persons — the Carthaginians — or at least 
himself — to whom there is something due ; and (3) 
the act discharging what is owed — the return to 
Carthage. It is plain, moreover, that these three 
elements are the exhaustive elements of this order 
or class in the act. There is no other. They are 
complementary elements. 

We have thus given us on the bare inspection 
of this act of Regulus, the three essential elements 



ANALYSIS OF AN ACT OF DUTY. Q 

— a personal agent owing duty, a person or persons 
to whom this duty is owed, and an act discharging 
this duty. We use language correctly in denomin- 
ating these elements respectively a moral person or 
agent ; a moral end or object ; and a moral action. 

We shall proceed to unfold in order, in separate 
chapters, these several elements and the several con- 
stituents of each. 



IO THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



CHAPTER II. 

SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. 

§ 6. A moral person may be defined 
Moral person t o D e a being capable of duty. 

It is the same thing to say that a 
moral person is a being capable of obligation, — that 
is, a being capable of owing and of fulfilling obli- 
gation — as to say that he is a being capable of 
duty — that is, a being capable of owing and ful- 
filling duty. 

In the present treatise we confine our view to 
human duty ; and thus we speak of moral persons 
so far as subjects of duty only as men. In this re- 
stricted view, the term duty is synonymous with 
virtue, which is a term from the Latin signifying 
manhood ; an act of duty being in the case of men 
simply an act of true or perfect manhood, or an act 
which a true and perfect man would do. 

§ 7. Indispensable to a moral person 
Mental requisites. thus defined as a being capable of duty, 

is the essential attribute of a human 
mind or soul, viz. : — An active nature endowed with 
the threefold function of sensibility, intelligence, 
and free-will. 



SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I I 

§ 8. A moral person is an essentially 
i. Active nature, active being. 

In this statement are involved these 
two particulars : — 

i. That a person is moral only in so far as he is 
active ; and 

2. That his very nature impels him to act. 

The proof of the first of these two particular 
propositions is found in the very notion of duty, 
as already indicated. A duty is an act. So far as 
it is owed it is an act to be done : and when it is 
fulfilled, it is fulfilled only by an act. 

All morality, hence, respects an active nature. 
Every moral person must be one capable of acting 
or one who is acting or who has acted. If we speak 
of a moral state, or a moral condition, of a moral 
habit or a moral disposition, of moral character, 
or moral responsibility, there is necessarily im- 
plied in the expression, a nature capable of ac- 
tion, or acting, or that has acted. Simple and 
clear as this is, ethical theories and ethical discus- 
sions have run into pernicious error by dropping 
out of view this essential element of activity which 
must exist in everything that is moral. 

Secondly, every moral person is by his very 
nature impelled to act. It is as natural for him to 
act, and of course, to act morally, as it is for a stone, 
when unsupported, to fall to the ground, or for a 
plant to put forth stalk and leaf, or for an animal to 
take food. He may within certain limits act in this 
way or in that, but he cannot refrain from acting in 
some way. He may act feebly or he may act with 



12 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

energy ; — he may, to some extent, control the de* 
gree of activity which he will put forth ; but he 
must act in some degree. Indolence is never ab- 
solute inaction. 

§ 9. One of the three general and essen- 
2. sensibility. ^ m \ functions of a moral nature is Sensi- 
bility. 

Regulus felt himself bound by his oath to return 
to Carthage. Without this feeling, his return could 
not possibly have been a moral act : so far as any 
personal morality on his part is concerned, he might 
as well have been returned a corpse or in a state of 
utter unconsciousness. Duty to be fulfilled must 
be felt to be owed. 

The analysis of this feeling of duty, as psychology 
teaches us, gives as its constituent elements, (1) the 
impression made upon the sensibility of Regulus by 
the memory of his oath ; and (2) the impulse or in- 
stinctive tendency occasioned by this impression to 
fulfil the oath, by returning to Carthage. His 
memory kept pressing on his sensibility the idea of 
his oath and this kept alive the impulse to fulfil it. 
The complex feeling, consisting of the impression 
and this kind of impulse, is known as desire. 

In the case of Regulus, as in common instances 
of duty, desire to fulfil duty is mingled with desires 
or tendencies in an opposite direction. Regulus, 
doubtless, felt a strong desire to avoid the ignominy, 
the torture, and the cruel death which threatened 
his return to his enemies who would be infuriated 
by his failure to bring the prisoners ; a strong de- 
sire also to gratify the earnest wishes of his coun- 



SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I 3 

trymen, of his friends, of his family, to remain in 
Rome. But with these desires, there was also the 
desire of fulfilling duty. It was this desire that 
prevailed over the others ; at least, it was this desire 
which was the occasion of his determining- to return. 
Without that, such a determination is inconceivable 
as a moral action. 

§ 10. The second general function es- 
3. intelligence, sential in a moral nature, is Intelligence. 
Regulus knew his duty as well as felt it. 
Nor could there be duty or fulfilment of it without 
such intelligence. He must have known his oath. 
As his memory recalled it, he recognized it as real, as 
binding, as involving certain acts which he under- 
stood very well. Had he been without any knowl- 
edge of any such oath ever having been made, or of 
its having any binding force upon him, or of the 
acts which it required of him, there could have been 
no fulfilment of duty, no morality, even if he had 
in some way been taken back to Carthage. 

Intelligence or knowledge of duty, thus, is essen- 
tial in all morality. This knowledge respects the 
three general attributes of duty : — 

First, That it is real — that it exists ; 

Secondly, That it is in its essential character 
binding or obligatory ; and 

Thirdly, That it involves action, which action, 
also, is intelligible as to its particular attributes. 

Among these attributes of the particular action 
which must be recognized in all duty or morality 
are : — 

First, The end or object of the action ; 



14 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

Secondly, The particular activity to be exerted in 
accomplishing this end ; and 

Thirdly, The mode of exerting this activity. 

It is plain that a person is incapable of duty un- 
less he is capable of knowing it in respect to all 
these attributes. 

§ ii. The third general function es- 
4 Free-will sential to a moral nature is Free-will. 

Regulus determined to return to Car- 
thage ; and determination in such a case is known 
as volition or act of will. His determination was 
a true act of will before he left Rome ; before 
he took leave of family and friends and Senators ; — 
before he had taken a step in his journey. These 
were but the so-called executive volitions by which 
his determination was carried out. Had he been 
suddenly struck down with mortal disease before 
he had left the Senate Chamber in which he had 
uttered his inflexible purpose to return to Carthage 
and in this way or in any other way had been pre- 
vented from returning, this unexecuted determina- 
tion would, nevertheless, have been moral, — would 
have been a fulfilment, so far, of duty. Even if he 
had afterwards changed his mind and refused to re- 
turn, the first determination, if sincere, would have 
been moral. It might have been too weak ; it might 
not have drawn into it the strength from feeling, 
from intelligence, from vigor of soul, that it should ; 
it was yet a true, if imperfect, act of duty. His 
falterings, for any cause, in putting forth any of the 
subsequent executive volitions, in taking any of the 
steps involved in his return, may have been each 



SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I 5 

immoral in themselves ; they could not have altered 
the moral character of the previous sincere deter- 
mination to return. 

This determination was free ; it was an act of 
free-will. Freedom, as psychology teaches, is an 
essential attribute of the human will. It is equally 
essential in all duty — in all morality. Regulus 
might have been prevented from taking a single 
step towards carrying out his determination to re- 
turn ; this did not reach back to the determination 
itself. No irresistible force hindered that. None, 
indeed, compelled him to determine to return ; — he 
could have yielded to the importunate entreaties of 
his friends and determined not to return. He was 
free in this respect — that, while the alternative of 
determining to go or not to go was before him as 
an active being, one of whose essential functions is 
that of free-will, and one or the other determina- 
tion he was compelled to make, he was as truly 
capable of the one determination as of the other. 
In all probability the determination not to return 
was the easier in a certain sense : the predominance 
in strength of inducement may have been, in a cer- 
tain sense, in that direction ; but he proved him- 
self to be free in his determining, notwithstanding, 
to return to Carthage. 

Free-will thus is an essential element in all moral- 
ity. An act of duty, a moral act, is inconceivable if 
this element be wanting. Free-will implies, first, 
the general capability of choice — of determination ; 
and, secondly, the inherence in the moral person 



1 6 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

himself of this capability beyond the compulsory 
constraint of any external force. 

§ 12. This activity, which in its three- 
Ef ulty fold function is concerned in all duty, is 

known as the Moral Faculty. 
The Moral Faculty may accordingly be denned 
to be that endowment in man which makes him 
capable of duty. It embraces the three-fold func- 
tion of sense, intelligence, and free-will. 

The Moral Faculty differs from the intellectual 
faculty in this : that in its exercise, duty is promi- 
nently concerned, while in the exercise of the intel- 
lectual faculty, knowledge is prominently concerned. 
The same act may be amoral act and a knowing act. 
In truth every act of man, so far as it is rational, is 
both a moral act and a knowing act — is both moral 
and intellectual. It is denominated the one or the 
other simply because the one or the other is more 
prominent, or because the one or the other is select- 
ed at the time for consideration to the temporary 
suppression of the other from view. The moral 
faculty differs from moral feeling only as a faculty 
differs from a capacity. The one is active ; the 
other is characteristically passive. But every ration- 
al act of man has its active side and its passive 
side, and is denominated an act or a feeling only be- 
cause the one or the other is made more prominent 
to view either in fact or for contemplation. 

The expression, Moral Faculty, has been 
Synonyms. in a narrower sense used as synonymous 

with Practical Reason, Moral Sense, 
Conscience. In this narrower use it embraces only 



SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I 7 

the feelings and the intellectual states concerned 
with duty or with acts of free-will, and does 
not include the free-will itself. An act of duty may 
be so analyzed as to give these two parts : (i) The 
free-will itself ; (2) the combined feeling and intel- 
ligence which ever accompany this act of free-will. 
To this second constituent, the term Moral Faculty 
has sometimes been applied, as also the other de- 
nominations — the Practical Reason, Moral Sense, 
Conscience. 

The first of these designations, Moral Faculty, is 
founded on the general nature of the mind as an 
activity. It denotes that part of the mind's activity 
which is concerned with duty — in knowing it, in 
feeling it, in doing it. 

The designation, Practical Reason, is founded in 
the characteristic of man as rational, distinguishing 
him from the brute creation. It denotes that de- 
partment of rational activity which is concerned in 
duty. It includes all moral feeling, however, as 
well as all moral intelligence. 

The designation, Moral Sense, is founded in the 
nature of man as feeling, as impressible by the 
idea of duty, and as capable of impressing it on 
the free-will. It denotes simply sensibility so far 
as concerned in duty. It includes, however, the 
intelligence associated with it in an act of free- 
will. 

The term, Conscience, is but the consciousness 
limited to the moral sphere. It denotes all that in- 
telligence and feeling of which a man is conscious 
in an act of duty. 



15 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

m . , , , $ 13. Conscience, as an act or state of 

Threefold func- ° J . 

tion of con- a moral person, includes three principal 

functions, all present in it, either one of 
which, however, may be contemplated separately 
from the others. The first function of conscience 
is to recognize and feel duty. 

When a moral action is brought before 
1. Sense of duty, us, whether it be our own or another's, 

or whether it be already done or only 
proposed to be done, we immediately and, if our view 
be turned towards this attribute of it, necessarily feel 
it to be right, to be a duty, an action that ought to 
be done, or the contrary. Every act of duty, every 
moral act, has this attribute, which accordingly can 
always be recognized and felt. Conscience always 
includes this recognition and feeling whenever it 
contemplates an act of duty. 

A second function of conscience con- 
force bhgmg templating a proposed act of duty, is to 

impel or oblige to the performance of it. 
Conscience has a peremptory, commanding, con- 
straining character. We attribute to it an author- 
ity. Its purpose may be overborne by other in- 
fluences, its authority may be resisted ; but so far 
as it has existence it presses to duty. 

This impelling or constraining force of conscience, 
is of the nature of an instinct. It is, like the im- 
pulsive or constraining force of appetite, seated in 
our very being. It is, however, the strongest and 
most commanding instinct of our nature, for it 
is seated in the highest department of our being. 
It is, unlike the appetite, authoritative, because its 



SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I 9 

constraining force bears immediately on the free- 
will, which by reason of its freedom becomes capa- 
ble of obedience or disobedience, and accordingly 
subject to authority. 

Conscience, thus, is properly denominated the 
sovereign of the soul. It is the sole function of the 
mind by which authority can be recognized, or felt, 
or imposed. Every command, as every obligation, 
coming from whatever source— from our own being, 
from our fellow men, or from our creator, — reaches 
us only through the conscience. To it belongs the 
rightful supremacy in the soul over all other facul- 
ties and capacities. It is the lawgiver, either 
through its original nature and by its working as 
left to itself, or as organ and medium of all external 
authority ;-— it is either sovereign by right of nat- 
ural constitution, or is vicegerent of all external 
sovereignty. 

But conscience is law-giver, not doer of the law ; 
its function is legislative, not executive. It pre- 
scribes law ; it is the free-will that obeys or dis- 
obeys. 

This function of conscience has a passive as well 
as an active side. It feels as well as acts. When 
viewed on this side it is often called sense of obli- 
gation. 

The psychological analysis is obvious and is ex- 
actly analogous to that which is applicable to most 
concrete mental states. An action is proposed to 
the free-will. Every such action possesses the at- 
tribute of right or wrong, which is discernible just 
as the attribute of bright or round is discernible in 



20 SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. 

the sun. The soul is impressed by this attribute, 
that is, feels it. But the impression or bare feeling 
continues in the form of an idea of right or wrong, 
which is kept before the intelligence as before the 
free-will. The intelligence recognizes the attribute 
of right or wrong as real, as belonging to the action, 
and the like. In this feeling from the sensibility 
and this light from the intelligence, the free-will by 
the very force of its nature is constrained to act by 
choosing or refusing. But the legitimate tendency 
of this activity is to the doing of the action if felt 
and recognized to be right, or refusing to do it, if 
felt and seen to be wrong. This tendency is felt 
also, and in this feeling of the force pressing to 
duty consists the sense of obligation. 

The third function of conscience is to 
Same aiSe and praise or blame ; to approve or con- 
demn. 

We cannot contemplate a moral action in its full 
light and character without recognizing and feeling 
that it is to be praised or blamed. We praise 
Regulus for observing his oath ; while we should 
have severely blamed him if he had, when under no 
obligation and without any occasion, freely exposed 
himself to torture and death by returning to 
Carthage. 

Such is the threefold function of conscience : 
(i) to recognize and feel duty ; (2) to oblige to the 
performance of it ; and (3) to praise or blame. 

§ 14. To this threefold function of 

Somccofjoyor conscience must be added & £ ourth> |f 

conscience be extended to include the 



THEORETICAL MORALITY. 21 

pleasure or pain that naturally attends all right or 
wrong action. Good usage sanctions this extension. 
But it is to be remarked that this function of con- 
science immediately and properly respects only one's 
own acts, never those of others. It differs there- 
fore in this respect from the three other functions 
named. There is a propriety, therefore, in main- 
taining the threefoldness of the functions of con- 
science. This fourth function deserves, however, 
a distinct and marked consideration in Ethics. 

The fulfilment of duty brings along with it by 
the law of a moral nature a certain satisfaction, a 
pleasure. We say conscience is satisfied with it, is 
pleased with it. If the act is only proposed to be 
done, this pleasure or satisfaction is expected as 
certain to be felt in the doing of it or when it is 
done. If the act be that of another person, we un- 
hesitatingly believe that it brings to him the same 
pleasure or satisfaction. 

This pleasure is precisely analogous to that which 
attends the legitimate exercise of the intellect or of 
the sensibility. It is only higher, more intense, be- 
cause the moral nature is the higher, more predom- 
inating nature in man. 

On the other hand, the violation of duty brings 
in, by the very constitution of our moral being, dis- 
satisfaction, pain, which, to distinguish it from the 
pain from other causes, is called remorse. 

This pleasure of a good, that is of an approving, 
conscience, and this pain of a disapproving con- 
science, regarded in relation to the law which 



22 SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. 

imposes duty, constitute in part the sanctions of the 
law ; the rewards of right or wrong action. 

The doer of the action, moreover, is said to be 
deserving of the reward or penalty. His action 
places him in a certain relation to the pleasure or 
pain naturally attending it, which we call desert or 
meiit. This relation to wrong action is called ill- 
desert or demerit. 

It will have been observed that conscience in- 
cludes an exercise both of the intelligence and of 
the sensibility. It involves perception or intuition 
and judgment on the one hand, and feeling on the 
other, both as impression and also as natural pleas- 
ure or pain. Much confusion and disagreement 
have arisen in ethical discussions from the exclusion 
of one or the other of the two elements. Those 
writers who have regarded conscience as the same 
as the Practical Reason have inclined to shut out 
of view the element of feeling ; and the advocates 
of a Moral Sense, on the other hand, have depressed 
from view the intelligence side of conscience. 



OBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. 23 

CHAPTER III. 

OBJECT OF DUTY. 

§ 15. By the object of duty is meant 
Object of duty th e person to whom duty is owing. 

Our analysis gave the three essential 
elements in an act of duty as a subject of duty, or 
a person owing and fulfilling the duty ; a person to 
whom this duty is owed and fulfilled ; and the ac- 
tion itself of fulfilling the duty. Regulus owed the 
duty of return to the Carthaginians, who were ac- 
cordingly the object of this duty. 

§ 16. Only persons can be objects of 

Ever a person, dlltv. 

Regulus was bound in duty not to the 
city walls of Carthage ; not to the prison from 
which he was taken ; not to any law or principle ; 
but to the Carthaginians, and certainly to himself 
as a man. The duty of returning was owed to 
them, or at least to himself. 

Duty cannot properly be said to be owed to a 
stone. It is certainly a duty not wantonly to break 
or otherwise destroy a precious gem. In a loose 
sense we may speak of its being due to the gem as 
a thing of great value that it be kept from injury. 
But the duty here is properly due to the maker of 
the gem, that his creative design be not frustrated ; 
to the owner of the gem from whom so much value 
would be taken by its destruction ; to one's self 
whose moral nature would be harmed by an act of 



24 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

reckless waste. The stone can know no duty to 
itself. It can put up no claim. It can receive no 
redress from a withholding of its due. 

Nor, any more, can duty properly be said to be 
owed to a plant. It would undoubtedly be wrong- 
needlessly to trample under foot a beautiful flower, 
or to withhold the care which may be necessary for 
its preservation or for perfecting its growth. But 
this duty is not properly due to the plant, but only 
to Him who made it, to those who can enjoy its 
beauty, to one's self to whom it is due that his own 
nature be not marred by an act of wanton destruc- 
tion or of inexcusable neglect. 

Nor, still further, can duty properly be said to be 
owed to mere animal nature. We say in loose 
language that the horse is a noble animal and care 
and kindness are due to it. But these duties are 
not properly owed to the animal, but to the Creator, 
to them who can be benefited by it, or to one's 
self, to whom wanton cruelty is forbidden. The 
animal cannot be sensible of any duty owed to 
itself ; cannot exact or be sensible of proper re- 
dress. The animal, as such, has no rights. 

§ 1 7. The correlative of duty in a moral 
Aright. subject is, in an object of duty, a right. 

What was his duty in Regulus, viz. : 
his return, as owed and fulfilled to the Carthagi- 
nians, was to them their right. Rights are the cor- 
relates of duties. The one implies the other. There 
can be no duty where there is no right ; to every 
right there must be a corresponding duty. Every 
creature has a right to reach the end for which i 
was made ; and so we say with reverence, it is due 



OBJECT OF DUTY. 25 

from its Creator that he enable it to reach this end 
of its being. The creation shows its own perfect- 
ness in this that the means are furnished to the 
creature of fulfilling the ends of its being. This at 
least is the general truth ; the modifications of the 
statement are to be found only in the case of crea- 
tures made subservient to the ends of other beings. 
Creatures, moreover, so far as parts of a universe 
affecting one another, owe mutual duties to one 
another, and accordingly have respectively rights 
to which such duties correspond. The same act is 
a duty in respect to the subject of duty, which is a 
right in respect to the object of duty. The return 
of Regulus to the Carthaginians, as stated, is his 
duty, and their right. 

§ 18. The essential character in every- 
Good.in dut y thing which can be conceived of as 

and right. ° 

duty or as a right is, that it is Good. 

By good here is meant good that lies in experi- 
ence ; good that is felt. In other words, by good 
is meant happiness — blessedness — or that which 
occasions it. 

The good which is thus to be rendered in the 
fulfilment of duty and which is claimed in the exac- 
tion of every right, may be only good in estimation, 
not necessarily a real good. The return of Regulus 
might have proved a real evil to the Carthaginians ; 
but it was to them a good, fitted in their estimation, 
perhaps erroneous, to occasion to them happiness. 
His return doubtless was a satisfaction to them. 

The good in duty and in a right may be indirect 
or remote. The only good expected by the Car- 
thaginians might have been that it would deprive 



26 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

Rome of her ablest general, and save them from 
their most formidable enemy, or it might be the 
good there might have been in the revenge which 
they would be quick to execute on their victim 
when he should return into their power. 

A good, real or supposed, immediate or remote, 
thus enters essentially into duty and into its cor- 
relative right. A duty that, fulfilled, should work 
no conceivable good in any way, and a right that 
satisfied brings no good, are alike inconceivable. 

§ 19. Human duties are most conveni- 
ciassification ently classified in reference to the ob- 

01 duties. J 

ject of duty. Inasmuch as human duty 
from its nature as pertaining to an act, can exist 
only where human action can reach, the only ob- 
jects of duty to man are those beings which this 
action can affect. 

A man's acts affect himself most nearly and 
directly. By the law of his being every legitimate 
exercise of his powers brings a kind of pleasure — 
is a good. His acts, directly and also indirectly, 
affect his fellow-men. They also, in a certain way, 
reach to God. They may reach, moreover, other 
beings, as the world of angelic and of disembodied 
spirits ; but this relation of human duty is suffi- 
ciently illustrated in the light of the other relations 
and, therefore, requires no distinct treatment. The 
three great classes of human duties, accordingly, 
which the object of duty gives us, are : — 
I. Duties to Self ; 
II. Duties to Fellow-men ; and 

III. Duty to God. 



MORAL ACTION. 2J 



CHAPTER IV. 

MORAL ACTION. 

§ 20. A moral action is a performance 

Moral action or fulfilment of duty. 

defined. J 

More particularly, a moral action is 
the action of a subject of duty by which he fulfils 
or discharges what is owed to the object of duty. 

A moral action implies an agent and an ob- 
ject, as also the movement of the agent to or to- 
wards the object. It implies, moreover, a certain 
kind of agent, a certain kind of object, and a certain 
kind of movement, each of which may properly be 
denominated moral. It follows from this that a 
moral action may properly be characterized in ref- 
erence to the agent, or in reference to the object, or 
more exclusively in reference to the essential nature 
of the act itself. 

We may thus characterize a moral action in refer- 
ence to the agent ; and if, in seeking to do this, 
we inquire what it is in a subject of duty which 
makes his action moral, we find the answer to be 
love. Every perfect moral act must be a loving 
act. 



28 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

We may in like manner characterize a moral ac- 
tion in reference to the object of duty ; and we find 
that, as good in the object is that which a moral 
action aims at, so every perfect moral action must 
be a good action. It must be good in the sense of 
being beneficent. 

Characterizing a moral action simply in reference 
to its own intrinsic nature, in a similar way, we say 
it is right. Every perfect moral action is a right 
action. 

If we analyze a perfect moral action thus we find 
it includes the three elements of love, goodness or 
beneficence, rectitude, essentially related to one an- 
other. It must, proceeding from a moral subject, 
be a movement from love. As resulting in amoral 
object it must be a movement that is beneficent, 
bringing good as its proper result. As an action 
from such a subject towards such an object, it must 
be direct in its movement from starting-point to 
goal, and so be characterized as right. 

§ 21. It follows from this exposition that 
Diversely de- with a certain correctness a perfect 

nominated. l 

moral action may be denominated as an 
act of perfect love ; or as an act of perfect goodness 
or beneficence ; or as an act of perfect rectitude. 

It also follows that love as fulfilment of 
ments cssenthi duty cannot be except as both benefi- 
cent in its proper result and right in its 
movement. Nor, any more, can any moral good- 
ness or beneficence be conceived of apart from love 
as its source and rectitude as its procedure. Nor still 



MORAL ACTION. 29 

further is any right action possible or conceivable 
without love or without goodness or beneficence. 

It follows, still further, that in the discussion of 
moral questions, while the principles of human 
thought and human speech allow the designation of 
a perfect moral act, either as an act of love, or as an 
act of goodness or beneficence, or as an act of recti- 
tude ; if yet either element be excluded from view, 
error must be the inevitable result. 

Hence a perfect system of morals may 
Threefold sys- b e founded either on love, on goodness 

tern of morality. _ 

or beneficence, or on right, as its prin- 
ciple, provided always due regard be had to its re- 
lation to the other co-ordinate principles. 

There may thus be a system founded on 

nfo S ve mmded love which sha11 have ful1 validity, and 
also completeness. It may plant itself 
on a moral action and turn its view to the subject 
of duty concerned in it. As morality cannot reach 
beyond the endowments of the agent whom it re- 
spects, a system of morality which reaches to the 
entire nature of a moral subject must be complete. 
It may be valid and authoritative, inasmuch as it is 
founded in the very attributes of a moral subject. 
Love is obligatory on man because his is a loving 
nature. He is endowed with the faculties of love 
and is made to love. It is hence the law of his 
being that he love. 

Again, a system of morality may be founded on 
the principle of goodness or beneficence — on the 
good that the subject of duty may effect in the ob- 
ject of duty. Such a system may take its stand in 



30 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

a moral action and direct its look to the object or 
end of the action. This principle, unfolded in the 
full light of the co-ordinate principles of love 
and rectitude, may give a system of morality at 
once valid and complete. It must be valid, for 
as all moral action respects good as its end 
and object, and as ' man as a creature of God 
is made for this end — to work good — this end or 
object must contain in it the law of life, just as the 
destined end of a journey prescribes the progress 
to be made and the way by which it is to be made. 
It will, also, in a certain sense, be complete if it 
embrace the entire good in the object of duty which 
can be effected by the subject of duty in the way in 
which he must work to this end. 

Once more, a moral system may be founded on 
the principle of right and be both valid and com- 
plete. It may take its stand-point in a moral action 
and turn its view in the direction of the essential 
nature of such an action. It may be valid, because 
its foundation is in the essential nature of an act of 
duty — a movement of love to good as its end. It 
may be, in a certain sense, complete, because it may 
comprehend the entire movement of a moral sub- 
ject in reference to the end of all his action. 

Systems of morality have accordingly been con- 
structed on each of these principles respectively. 
There are systems founded on love which unfold the 
law of love in its nature and its applications to human 
conduct. There are systems founded on good — on 
happiness or blessedness — which unfold the law of 
benevolence in its nature and application to the 



MORAL ACTION. 3 I 

life and conduct. There are, moreover, systems 
founded on rectitude, which unfold the law or the 
rule of right in its nature and applications. None 
of these systems fail in their validity and com- 
pleteness because founded on a wrong or unreal 
principle ; but only as they fail severally to recog- 
nize the co-ordinate validity of the other systems, 
and to develope their respective laws or supreme 
rules in due regard to the others. In other words, 
their failure, so far as it exists, is to be found in 
the omission to recognize the principle on which 
they have been founded, as but one of those 
principles which are essentially concerned in all 
morality. The reason is plain. As there can be 
no morality where there is not a moral agent, a 
moral end, and a moral action proceeding from this 
agent to this end, so no system of morality can 
be in the fullest sense perfect and entire, which 
does not recognize the relationship between these 
elements of duty as co-ordinate and co-essential in 
all morality. 



32 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



CHAPTER V. 

LOVE AS PRINCIPLE OF DUTY. 

§ 22. We have found that we may, in 
2&&D*. an act of duty, view it as an act pro- 

ceeding from a moral subject ; and that, 
so regarded, it must be an act of love. In other 
words duty, regarded in the light of the subject 
performing it, appears as love. Duty, moreover, 
inasmuch as it necessarily implies a doer, that is, 
a subject of duty, must ever be pervaded through 
and through with love — with the loving disposition 
and soul of the doer penetrating it. 

§ 23. Love is not only necessary in all 
Fulfils obiiga- dutyj but it is the fuifining of the law 

of duty so far as it respects the subject 
of duty. 

All that the subject of duty can put into the acts 
of duty is love ; for this is all that appears of the 
doer in such an act. This love, which fills out the 
measure of duty, so far as the subject is concerned, 
must have, it is true, the characteristics of a perfect 
love. It must be intelligent, else it could not be 
the love of a rational being. It must be sincere, 



LOVE AS PRINCIPLE OF DUTY. 33 

and, in this sense, disinterested, having for its end 
the good of its object, and not looking beyond that. 
It must be in due measure and degree. It must be 
simple and direct, moving unswervingly to its end. 
With these characteristics of a true and perfect 
love in a being like man, it fulfils all duty ; all that 
can be morally required of man. 

§ 24. Love, as a principle of duty, may 
Love defined, accordingly be defined to consist in a 

sympathetic endeavor, put forth directly 
for the good of the object of duty. 

In order to love, therefore, that in the object of 
duty which alone can be regarded in a moral act, 
his good, must first be brought before the instinc- 
tive sympathies of the soul, and then the action be 
put forth which the securing of that good shall 
require. Love must be in sympathy throughout, 
and must be active in obedience to that sympathy. 
It must be borne in mind that in an act of duty, 
either one of the three elements, love, good, right, 
may so predominate as to throw the others rela- 
tively into the shade. We speak of duty thus as 
often truly done, when there is no consciousness of 
love — when there seems to be absence of all affec- 
tion, while yet the act relieves a want, as bread 
thrown to a beggar ; or discharges an obligation as 
in the payment of money to an exacting creditor. 
The act in such case may be so far morally imper- 
fect ; or the love may be actually present, but is 
not consciously noticed. It still remains that there 
can be no morally right act without a loving 
intention. 



34 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

§ 25. The term love is applied to each 
stages. of several stages of experience. Of 

these, three are particularly to be dis- 
tinguished, respectively characterized as a mere 
natural affection, a grace, or a virtue. 

The first and lowest of these stages is 
affec5on r . al mere instinctive sympathy, or natural 

affection. The sensibility of man is 
sympathetic, inasmuch as he is not only impressible 
by the condition of his fellow beings, but is 
instinctively disposed either to the same feeling 
which that condition awakens in them, as in proper 
sympathy ; or to some responsive feeling, as in 
gratitude answering to kindness. This sympathy 
may exist independently of any immediate control 
of the will. So far, accordingly, it is not moral. It 
is mere natural affection. If the affection give 
pleasure, it takes the name of complacency ; if pain 
or dissatisfaction, of displacency or dislike. 

The second stage is that in which the 
2. As a grace, affection is the predominant character- 
istic, but yet the free-will enters as a 
directing or controlling element. Just so far as the 
natural affection is thus reached by the will, either 
in simply allowing it, or by selecting its object, or 
regulating itself, it becomes moral. But inasmuch 
as the feeling predominates over the free-will in 
giving it character, this stage of love is called & grace 
in distinction from a virtue, in which the will 
predominates. 

The third stage is that in which the 
wiii Asactof free-will gives the character to the 



LOVE AS PRINCIPLE OF DUTY. 35 

exercise, not only awakening and directing the sym- 
pathy, but leading it forth in appropriate action 
towards its object. This is love in its fullest sense. 
This is the love which fulfils duty. 

§ 26. The opposite of love is hate. 
its opposite, Hate is, like love, marked by three 

distinguishable stages — simple dislike ox 
displacency ; misanthropic or unloving spif it allowed 
or cherished by the free-will ; and positive malevo- 
lence appearing in acts of evil to others. 

§ 27. Inasmuch as man's nature is essentially 
active, and therefore must go out in positive action, 
duty admits no neutrality and therefore disallows all 
disposition or action which does not seek positive 
good. Not to sympathize is therefore wrong. An 
unsympathetic spirit, so far as sustained or cher- 
ished by the free-will, if not so heinous, is as truly 
opposed to duty as positive hate and ill will. 



$6 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



Good the end 
of all duty. 



CHAPTER VI. 

GOODNESS OR BENEFICENCE. 

§ 28. All action, in so far as it is moral, 
aims at good in the experience of the 
object of duty as its one comprehensive 
result. 

Every act of an infinite and perfect being, as of 
God, must not only aim at, but actually effect, good 
and good only. Perfect love can seek only good : 
and as God is perfect love and can accomplish all 
he seeks, all his actions must result in good. Per- 
fect goodness or beneficence accordingly charac- 
terizes all he does. 

The action of a finite and dependent being cannot 
in itself always assure the result which it seeks. 
But his endeavor must seek that result and that 
result only. This is implied in good, as the only 
end or result of love as an act, and as thus its 
correlative. Love and good imply each other — one 
being the source of action, the other its result. In 
more general terms the only end or aim of the 
human will is good, as truth is the only object of 
the intelligence. All volition, whatsoever object it 



GOODNESS OR BENEFICENCE. 37 

may respect, whether act or pursuit, or plan, or 
thing, chooses its object only so far as it is, or at 
least appears to be, good. It is in strictness of 
thought, the good in it with which alone the will is 
concerned. Even a wrong will, a sinful choice, 
seeks a good ; and the wrong and the sin lie in the 
choice not of pure unmixed evil, but of an inferior 
good or of the wrong kind of good. Even 
malignity itself moves to the good there is in 
gratifying its hate ; and, but for that, could not 
move at all. 

§ 29. The term good is used in a 

Twofold sense • i 1 i 

of good. primary and also a secondary sense ; — 

to denote (i) good in itself, that is, 
happiness, blessedness, or enjoyment ; and (2) what 
works or occasions good, that is, the agent, means, 
instrument, or condition of this good in itself. In 
the latter sense it is applied to an agent or means ; 
as God is good, that is, works good ; water is good, 
that is, is a means of health and so of enjoyment. 
In the former sense it is applied to a state of 
experience, as he is reaping the good of his virtuous 
conduct, that is, is experiencing the happiness that 
attends his virtuous conduct. 

Moralists have thus distinguished three kinds of 
good ; — the good of pleasure, the good of interest, 
and the good of virtue. The first named, the good 
of pleasure, is good in itself — happiness. The last 
two are means or occasions of happiness ; the good 
of interest being that which is instrumental of 
happiness, and the good of virtue or character 
being that which is naturally attended by happiness. 



38 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

S 30. It will be evident on a little re- 

Happiness not ° 

immediate end flection that man cannot be said in strict 
use of language to work or produce good 
in itself or happiness immediately and directly, 
that is, otherwise than instrumentally and mediate- 
ly, either in himself or in others. 

He can bestow a favor — can give bread to a hun- 
gry man, and the reception of that favor may re- 
lieve a want and awaken gratitude. The relief of 
the want, the taking of the bread, may give its ap- 
propriate happiness, and the exercise of the grate- 
ful spirit may give its peculiar joy. But the giver 
of the bounty has only furnished the means or the 
occasion of the happiness. In the same way, a man 
cannot directly create happiness for himself ; he 
can at best only secure the occasions or means of 
happiness. He can acquire treasures in health, 
reputation, character, outward possessions ; from 
these, the happiness comes which his creator has 
connected with them. He can contemplate his 
blessings, and the contemplation may bring joy ; 
still it is not the joy, but the contemplation which 
is the immediate object and effect of his endeavor. 
He can form a perfect character ; he may give 
himself to virtuous pursuits ; he may do noble 
deeds ; this character, these pursuits, these deeds, 
are through the laws of his nature attended by hap- 
piness, by the pleasures, the joys of an approving 
conscience, by the happiness immediately waiting 
on all lawful exertion. Character, virtue, is a 
means only of happiness. But it obviously stands 
in a closer relation to happiness than property, 



GOODNESS OR BENEFICENCE. 39 

friends, and other outward good. This outward 
good is means or occasion of virtue ; and this vir- 
tue is the immediate occasion of the happiness. 

There is no other good conceivable besides these 
— good in itself or happiness, and good as means 
or occasion of happiness. This latter species, how- 
ever, is distinguished into the two varieties, (i) out- 
ward good, as property and the like ; and (2) in- 
ternal good, as character, virtue, action in accord- 
ance with the laws of man's being. Of these vari- 
eties, it is to be remarked that the first or outward 
good can effect happiness only through the second 
or internal good. 

§ 31. The inquiry, what is the chief 

Summum t . i 1 1 , 1 

bonum. good — the stimmnm 00 num. — has greatly 

engaged the attention of philosophers, 
who have been far from harmonious in their 
answers. It is apparent that much at least of the 
difficulty has arisen from the ambiguity of the term 
good, and from overlooking the fact that while on 
the one hand it is not within the province of man 
to produce happiness immediately, but only mediate- 
ly and instrumentally, still the secondary or instru- 
mental good which he may produce is good only by 
reason of the happiness which it brings. If the 
meaning of the inquiry be, what is the chief good 
in man's nature, then certainly the answer must be, 
the highest happiness of which that nature is ca- 
pable. Accordingly w T hen it is asked what is the 
chief end in the creation of man by his maker, it 
must be replied, the fullest and highest happiness 
of man. For to suppose that it is the perfecting of 



40 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

that nature — a perfect character — is to exclude 
from the act of God in creating man all love, and to 
reduce man to the rank of a mere machine or a 
plant. We can indeed conceive of a creature en- 
dowed with sensibility, with intelligence, with free 
power, who should be insensible of all happi- 
ness ; and such a creature might be conceived to 
advance from comparative weakness to a perfect 
maturity of capabilities. But we should be con- 
strained in reason to rank such a being infinitely be- 
low man, and deny to it any proper moral nature. 
The chief good then in man's nature is his capabil- 
ity of the highest and completest happiness, and the 
chief good in man's experience is such happiness. 

If it be asked what is the chief good for man to 
desire, the answer must be the same. He was 
made not ultimately and chiefly to be a perfect ma- 
chine, but to be supremely blessed ; and it is the 
instinct of his nature to desire this end of his being 
as his chief good. 

But if it be asked what is the chief good which 
man is to seek to effect as the immediate product 
of his endeavor, the answer is, first, to perfect his 
character as a man, and, secondly, in connection 
with this, to perfect his condition. For this is all 
he can do directly, perfect his own capabilities and 
place them in the right relation to all those things 
which can minister to his welfare. Character — the 
most perfect virtue — is indeed the most important, 
perhaps, in a certain sense, the highest of the two. 
But condition is as needful of his pursuit. In order 
to happiness, he must have not only character, but 



GOODNESS OR BENEFICENCE. 4 1 

also right position to the objects which the virtues 
of that character respect. And this right position, 
this needful relation to those outer objects, is as 
truly, if not as fully, within the reach of his deter- 
mination as character. Property, friends, and the 
like, are a good to man ; indeed are a good in such 
sense that character cannot be without them. 

The truth remains, however, that good in itself 
or happiness is not within the power of man direct- 
ly to produce. The best, and indeed all he can do, 
is to produce that which under the appointments of 
his creator will bring in this good in itself or hap- 
piness. Man's effort ends ever with secondary or 
instrumental good. 

The highest good — summum bonum — is thus, 
either a good of experience, which consists of 
blessedness and is the sole gift of God as creator 
and ruler, or a good of attainment in character 
or condition, which is the result of effort and 
is the occasion of that blessedness which is the 
direct gift of God. Between this right char- 
acter and condition as possible to be attained by 
man, and this blessedness as possible to be ex- 
perienced by man, the creator has established a 
necessary relation — a relation designated some- 
times as worthiness to be blessed. This worthiness 
expresses, however, it will be observed, no essential 
attribute of perfect goodness or rectitude, but only 
a mere relative attribute — a mere relation between 
character and blessedness. 

• We are enabled in the light of this general survey 
of the subject to advance the distinctions and pro- 
positions that follow. 



42 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

§ 32. Good as the end in all duty is of 
Two kinds. two kinds : 1, good in itself, or hap- 
piness ; 2, good as means of happiness. 
Good in itself — happiness — is the pri- 
r. Goodin itself, niary and ultimate good. It is the im- 
mediate product of the creator alone. 
Good as means is secondary and mediate or in- 
strumental. It is good only as the means or instru- 
ment or condition of good in itself. 

Secondary good is the only good which 
me£s! d aS tne effort of man should aim to effect ; 
which nevertheless he should aim to ef- 
fect only because of the ultimate good in itself 
which it may bring under the ordinance of heaven. 
Secondary good is of two varieties, which are dis- 
tinguished from each other by their being more or 
less immediately productive of happiness. They 
may be denominated the good of condition and the 
good of character. 

The good of condition embraces all the 
w dofc ° ndl " objects, occasions, means, or helps of 
any legitimate energy in man — every 
thing which can occasion or facilitate or enhance 
any exercise of any of the faculties or capacities of 
man's nature. 

The good of character embraces all the 
aSer ° f Char ~ g°°d which springs from the energies 
of man's nature, whether habitual and 
so forming character, or only specific in single acts 
or states, so far as they are naturally and imme- 
diately followed by happiness. 

Exemplifications of this last variety are such as a 
virtuous habit. Beneficence, or the habitual exer- 



GOODNESS OR BENEFICENCE. 43 

cise of a loving spirit, is a source of joy and hap- 
piness. Even when it is not in special exercise, but 
only cherished as a fixed governing principle of the 
soul — the beneficent spirit itself when not working 
out special deeds of charity — sheds a light and a 
cheer over a man's experience. In contemplation, 
or in directing a particular act of kindness, this 
light and cheer often brighten and warm into a joy 
and delight that is as rapturous as it is pure. It is 
the inheritance of virtue that cannot be taken away_ 
Another exemplification is such a special act of 
kindness itself. The consciousness of the act gives 
a legitimate pleasure, and, it may be, a more in- 
tense delight ; but a virtuous act by the very con- 
stitution of our nature brings happiness, even if it 
be not taken up into distinct consciousness. Even 
acts that in themselves have no special moral char- 
acter, as the exertions of power or skill, physical or 
mental, the exercises of any of our faculties or ca- 
pacities, are followed by pleasure. The active man 
is a happier man than the idler or the sluggard. 

§ 33. We may now set forth more exactly and 
definitely the relation of moral action to its end or 
result. 

The ultimate end and object of all moral action 
is happiness. No action can be regarded as moral 
the last end of which is not to be found in hap- 
piness. 

As happiness is the immediate gift of God alone, 
the more immediate end of all human action, so 
far as moral, must be found in some secondary or 
mediate good either of character or of condition. 



44 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

To aim to produce happiness, accordingly, direct- 
ly and not through character or condition, is for 
man ever vain and futile. To attempt it is to usurp 
the prerogative of heaven. Man can only produce 
happiness mediately and instrumentally. His ac- 
tion to be moral must ever seek this ultimate re- 
sult of happiness only by securing that in which 
this happiness rests as its necessary condition. 

Perfect moral action must aim at the highest 
good in the object of duty which is practicable in 
the case ; — must aim at that highest perfection of 
character or condition to which the Creator has at- 
tached the highest blessedness. 

For the same reason that all free action should 
seek to work good in its object, it is bound to seek 
all the good, the highest and largest good, that is 
practicable. 

Inasmuch as happiness is of divers grades or 
ranks, the highest grade of happiness is to be 
sought in preference to any lower kind. And inas- 
much as an act may by the doer be determined or 
shaped to work a larger or smaller amount of good, 
duty requires that the largest amount should be in- 
tended, rather than a lower amount. The rule of 
duty is : the highest and largest good must be the 
designed effect of all moral action. 

§ 34. Evil is the opposite of good. 
Evi] Like good, evil is either natural or 

moral. 

Natural evil is evil in experience, as pain, 
suffering, unhappiness. 

Moral evil is wrong moral action. 



GOODNESS OR BENEFICENCE. 45 

To work natural evil, that is, to produce unhap- 
piness as the ultimate end of the action, is ever 
wrong. 

It is a perversion of the proper design and ten- 
dency of the natural faculties of man, which are 
designed to work good only. It is directly opposed 
to the character and will of God, who works good 
only, and constituted all his creatures to work good 
only. It is, in the object of an action, the correla- 
tive of malevolence or hate in the subject or doer, 
and possesses consequently the same moral char- 
acter. 

To produce unhappiness as the designed means 
and condition of a higher and larger happiness is not 
necessarily contrary to duty. On the other hand 
it may be, for the time, the most imperative duty. 

The amputation of a limb by which life may be 
saved and pain relieved, although itself for the time 
causing immediate and severe pain, may be an act 
of love, and often is an imperative duty. No hap- 
piness arising from condition, as from wealth, fame, 
friendship, is unmingled with evil. Even under 
the rule of perfect love armed with infinite wisdom 
and power, evil exists. We may be unable to con- 
jecture why it was not excluded, or why it is not 
prevented ; but we must recognize the fact that it 
exists under this perfect rule. We may reasonably 
presume that its existence may be justified in con- 
sistency with perfect love and infinite wisdom and 
power. We must at the same time believe that 
the permission of evil is a necessary condition of 
the highest and largest good. 



46 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



Right as ele- 
ment of duty. 



CHAPTER VII. 

RECTITUDE. 

§ 35. All moral action, so far as per- 
fect, must be right in its procedure. 
All action has a direction as well as a 
source and an end. All perfect moral action, as we 
have seen, proceeds from love as its source to good 
as its end. This procedure in a perfect moral ac- 
tion has the attribute of Tightness or rectitude. The 
term rectitude, accordingly, as applied to moral ac- 
tion, respects immediately this procedure — the ac- 
tion itself — so as relatively to repress from view for 
the time the doer and also the object of duty. 

The idea of right is so extremely simple that it 
baffles effort to explain it. The best that can be 
done is to set forth the leading attributes that be- 
long to it as it is applied in morals. 

§ 36. First, moral rectitude always re- 
z io im P ]iesac- spec ts a n action. 

To conceive of an absolute right as 
independent of all action is impossible. It is an 
attribute, and an attribute of action. 

§ 37. Secondly, moral rectitude always 

action!^' " ° f respects the relation of an action — the 

interior relation of its source to its end. 



RECTITUDE. 47 

As has been already stated, moral rectitude re- 
spects the relation of love to its end in good. It 
has this feature of relativeness always attaching to 
it. It includes, of course, as involved in this rela- 
tion, the proper proportion between the love in the 
subject and the good effected in the object of duty. 
§ 38. Thirdly, moral rectitude implies 
3. Fitness. that there is a natural, a fitting move- 
ment in the action from its source to 
its end ; and it denotes properly and strictly this 
naturalness or fitness in the relation of an action 
between its origin or seat and its end or result. 

The moral nature of the soul is its loving nature, 
and the end for which it is designed and fashioned 
to act is good. Its action is right so far as fitting 
this nature and end. Rectitude is thus so far cor- 
rectly conceived as consisting in fitness. 

Rectitude is also correctly conceived as consist- 
ing in conformity to rule or law ; for conformity to 
rule can mean nothing else than conformity to the 
nature of the soul, and to that of the end for which 
it was designed by its maker. 

The objection to such definitions of rectitude is 
that they are interpreted and applied to rectitude as 
if it were an absolute or independent entity, sub- 
sisting of itself separate from action and from an 
agent. But we can as easily conceive of an abso- 
lute love without an object in good to be effected by 
the love, as of an absolute rectitude. It cannot be 
too frequently declared that love, good, right, are 
inconceivable as independent separable entities ;* 
they necessarily imply one another in all cases. 



48 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

Right is absolute, accordingly, only in this sense : 
that, given the action and the conditions in which 
it is to be exerted, there is. a mode of action which 
is universally and necessarily to be recognized as 
right. It is the same when the same subject, ob- 
ject, and circumstances are given, always, and every 
where. It will be pronounced right in the same 
way by every mind equally informed of all the ele- 
ments in the case. It is in this sense a necessary 
idea. The mind is necessitated to recognize the 
right when the action with its subject, object, and 
circumstances are given. 

The idea of right is absolute, universal, and neces- 
sary, in the same sense as the idea of the angularity 
of the triangle. The triangle cannot be without 
angles. The angularity does not exist before the 
lines are constructed into the triangle ; but "it at- 
taches necessarily to the triangle as it is formed. 
The sides as mere lines have no angularity ; but 
constructed or put together in a certain way the 
angularity exists. No construction can exclude it. 
§ 39. Fourthly, rectitude implies an 
4. Directness, unswerving procedure in the action from 
its source to its end. 

We may conceive of a perfect love and a perfect 
good intended and effected by its expression, while 
its movement is irregular, circuitous, indirect. So 
far moral action is imperfect. 

When, as is often the case, we limit our consider 
ation to the movement of love towards its end, leav- 
ing out of our view for the time the source and the 
result, this direction of the action, whether direct 



RECTITUDE. 49 

or circuitous, whether, in other words, the fitting 
direction for love to take in the case, is the feature 
that determines to our judgment whether the action 
is right or wrong. In a similar way, we pronounce 
the solution of a mathematical problem to be im- 
perfect, if it does not proceed in the directest way 
to the result, even although the principles on which 
the solution starts and the result itself are correct. 
§ 40. Fifthly, all specific right action 

5. Parallelism ? ^ / l ° 

with all other is parallel with all other specific right 

duty. 

action. 

This characteristic of right is founded in the as- 
sumption that the universe is a perfect creation, so 
that all beings in it are exactly fitted to their own 
ends, and also each is in harmonious relation to 
every other. All rectitude consequently is har- 
monious ; right can never cross, or trip, or oppose 
right. In the eternity of consequences of perfect 
moral acts, no clashing can ever occur. All their 
movements in the flow of eternal consequence are 
in parallel lines. 

§ 41. Wrong is the opposite of right. 
Wrong. It respects an action and the relation 

between its source and its end. It im- 
plies a fitness or conformity in this relation which is 
not regarded in the action, and consequently an 
indirectness in the procedure which necessarily 
crosses and disturbs the lines of rectitude. 

It should be observed that the term right is fre- 
quently used in the sense of perfect, and the term 
ivrong in the sense of imperfect, in whichever of 
the three elements in all morality — subject, object, 



50 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

and action of subject in relation to object — the im- 
perfection may exist. Action is equally pronounced 
wrong if the love is imperfect ; if it be too feeble 
or too strong, or if the object be an improper one, 
or if in effecting it, a devious way be pursued. 
Sometimes, moreover, only the incidental manner 
of the action is regarded and the act is recognized 
as right or wrong, according as that is perfect or 
otherwise. Thus good counsel may be imparted in 
blunt words ; there maybe true love prompting the 
counsel, a real good aimed at, but the manner of 
carrying the love into its effect may be imperfect 
by reason of previous defective culture, and the act 
may be judged so far to be wrong. Strictly, how- 
ever, the act should be recognized as right ; only 
the manner wrong. The morality of the manner 
attaches only to the culture which has failed to 
furnish a proper body of words in which loving ac- 
tion is to be embodied. 



MOTIVES. 5 1 



CHAPTER VIII. 

MOTIVES. 

§ 42. By motive is to be understood 
Motive defined, the good which, as apprehended by the 
mind, is the object of the free-will or 
the end to which the action of the will tends. 

The term motive, properly signifying that which 
moves, is employed in ethical discussions, in a 
modified sense. It denotes not the physical cause, 
but rather the occasion of the mind's action. It 
denotes the occasion of such acting, however, in 
the peculiar sense of an object or end so related to 
the mind as to invite and call forth its endeavors. 
It is thus not merely the necessary negative con- 
dition of a moral action, as a weight is necessary 
condition to the act of lifting a weight, but is so 
related to the mind as positively to attract or pro- 
voke its action. It is of course in moral discus- 
sions used only as it can be viewed in relation to 
the action of the free-will. 

The only possible object of will, the only end to 
which the will can be moved, as we have already 
recognized, is good. As essentially active the free- 
will must act ; and as made for good only, it can 



52 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

act only in reference to good as the object or end of 
its action. 

This good, however, in order to be an end to the 
free-will, must be apprehended by the mind. It is 
only as so apprehended that it can be chosen. It 
must be brought to the mind through the mind's 
capacity of receiving external objects ; it must be 
felt ; it must not only be felt, but felt as good. In 
other words, there must be sympathy with it ; there 
must be instinctive tendency towards it ; there 
must be desire for it. It must also be apprehended 
by the intelligence ; it must with this feeling be 
perceived, be known as real, as attainable by the 
will. Only as so apprehended by the mind through 
its sensibility and intelligence can any good be a 
motive. 

It should be observed, moreover, that the good 
which is proper object or end to the will, may be 
only a supposed or believed good. It must be 
apprehended as good by the mind ; but this appre- 
hension may be a mistaken one. The object 
addressed to the sensibility may be a phantom ; it 
may be erroneously perceived or known in its 
character and also in its practicability. The imper- 
fect mind of man often pursues unreal objects, 
unattainable ends. But it fancies its objects and 
its ends are good and also attainable. So far as 
mere motive is concerned, it is what is apprehended 
as good only, whether that apprehension be well 
grounded or not, which gives it its effect on the 
will. 

Still further, as we have found, the primary good 



MOTIVES. 53 

— good in itself, happiness — is immediately of God 
alone. The only good that man can effect is the 
secondary good, the means of good, which lies 
either in character — that is, in perfecting the 
faculties and capacities of his nature, or in condition 
— that is, in securing the objects or occasions for 
the exercise of these faculties and capacities. 

§ 43. Motives, accordingly, are of two 
Two classes. classes : — i. those which have their end 

in character ; 2. those which have their 
end in condition. 

As character is to man more than condition, as 
the energy, the capability of acting is more in 
itself than the object on which the energy is to act 
or the occasion of its acting, the motives of the 
first class are generally of a higher nature than 
those of the second class. The highest duty to 
man is accordingly to perfect his nature ; to train 
and mature his faculties and capacities to their 
highest and largest perfection, so as to bring in by 
their exercise the fullest good in itself, the com- 
pletest happiness for which he was destined and 
fashioned by his creator. In this good of perfect- 
ing character, is to be found the highest motive by 
which human action is to be determined. 

§ 44. Each of these classes of motives 
toter ' m ^ subdivided into lower classes. 

Those of the first class — those which 
respect character — may be distributed into the 
three species of 1. those which lie in the training 
and developing the moral nature ; 2. those which 
lie in the culture of the intelligence and the sensi- 



54 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

bility ; and 3. those which lie in the regulation of 
the animal nature. 

These three species stand in rank relatively to 
one another in the order in which they are stated. 
Those motives, that is, those ends or objects to be 
pursued by the free-will which lie in the moral 
nature, are of the highest rank and should be taken 
in preference to determine the action and the life. 
They should be kept nearest and most constantly 
before the will. He that thus ever sets before him 
as the end which he will pursue in preference to 
all things else, this perfecting of character, will 
secure the highest good possible to him to secure ; 
he will, in other words, put the object of duty 
•whether himself or his fellow men, in the state or 
condition to which his creator has attached the 
highest welfare, the fullest blessedness. 

The ends which lie in the perfecting of the 
other departments of the spiritual nature of man 
— his intelligence and his sensibility both as feeling 
and as imagination — are subordinate to the first 
named and are properly conditioned to them. To 
place these first is to degrade man's nature and so 
far to hinder the attainment of the highest good. 
The predominant culture of the intellect and the 
taste, is therefore an immorality. To make it the 
chief and commanding motive in action, whether 
for one's self or for others, is wrong, because exalt- 
ing to supremacy what should be subordinate. 

The ends which lie in the perfecting of the 
animal nature of man are lowest in rank. To pur- 
sue them otherwise than in subordination to the 



MOTIVES. 55 

other species is contrary to morality — is sinful. It 
is most effectually to hinder the attainment of the 
highest good. 

§ 45. The motives which have their 

con^tionf m encls in perfecting the condition of man 

so as to make it most serviceable to his 

faculties and capacities, are of three species, as they 

are found in persons, or in things, or in relations. 

It should be a motive or end in life to place 
ourselves in such relation to other persons as that 
they may, as objects of duty, both invite right 
action in reference to them and also facilitate it. 

Hence arises the duty of friendship, of compan- 
ionship, of society generally. Only as a man is 
within reach of others can he exercise towards 
them the faculties and capacities on the exercise of 
which his highest good depends. He cannot other- 
wise be beneficent ; he cannot be in sympathy ; he 
cannot receive good. To provide objects of duty 
is a leading end, a prominent motive in a well 
ordered life. 

Things are helpful and sometimes indispensable 
conditions of acting. All those objects accordingly 
which can minister to right action, are within the 
scope of man's lawful pursuit. They furnish le- 
gitimate motives or ends to pursue. Hence the 
duty of industry, of care and economy in acquiring 
and preserving ; for possessions are needful condi- 
tions of acting. 

Not only persons and things in themselves thus 
furnish motives or ends of pursuit, but certain 



56 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

relations to them are to be sought as furnishing 
worthy motives. 

Rank, thus, and station are often conditions of 
beneficence ; and remotely of respect and gratitude 
and trust. Positions of control and direction in the 
administration of authority and of power in any 
way, are legitimate objects to be sought. In them 
men are placed in relations favorable to that activity 
on which their highest good depends. 

§ 46. Motives are classed, moreover, in 
PrSdm t a e te nd reference to one another, as ultimate 
and proximate, according as their ends 
are final, or only subservient to other ends. 

The ultimate motive relatively to all others, or 
that to which all others should be subservient, is for 
man the highest and fullest development and 
exercise of his faculties ; in other words, the 
perfection of his character. 

There can be no higher end to a creature of 
perfect wisdom and goodness, than to fulfil the end 
for which it was made. The nature of man as a 
spirit is essentially an active and, at the same time, 
a growing nature. As an activity capable of 
growth, the ultimate end for which he was made 
must be found in the fullest development of his 
powers for the action to which they are designed. 
His creator can design or expect nothing beyond 
this. In this man most perfectly " glorifies *' his 
creator, by realizing the end of his creation. The 
joy or happiness which comes from this perfecting 
of his character, it is his creator's to bestow, not 
man's to create, except by furnishing the condition 



MOTIVES. 57 

on which it is bestowed in this perfect character. 
We may accordingly make this distinction : God's 
ultimate end in the creation of man is man's 
blessedness ; man's ultimate end under this creation 
is to become and do what his creator designed. 
The absolutely ultimate motive for man is therefore 
the perfecting of his character, implying not only 
the full development of all his capacities, but also 
the full exercise of these capacities under the law 
of their nature. 

But there are relatively ultimate motives. They 
are all subordinate to the one absolutely ultimate 
end — perfecting of character, but to. them other 
ends may be subservient. 

Wealth, thus, may be a proximate motive as 
subservient to health, to usefulness, to the best 
character. But it may be ultimate, in reference to 
other subservient motives, as, among many others, 
punctuality, order, temperance. 

§ 47. Motives in themselves are not, 
not^morai^ 63 strictly speaking, morally right or 
wrong. 

Right and wrong belong only to actions ; but 
motives are only prompting occasions of actions. 
But the free-will can, by virtue of its very freedom, 
adopt and pursue any one of divers ends presented 
to it. Regulus had before him two ends or objects 
to be pursued ; both true motives, being each a 
good, and each being a worthy good to be pursued, 
each being, therefore, a proper motive ; — the good in 
home and country on the one hand, and the good 
in fidelity to his promise on the other. His free- 

3* 



58 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

will tastened on the latter good. It is conse- 
quently in the selection among divers motives of 
action, that we are to find the proper morality or 
the right or wrong in the case. A motive can only 
be regarded as right or wrong, in so far as it is the 
proper motive to be selected or otherwise, and so im- 
plies that the action of the will in the selection was 
morally right or wrong. To adopt and pursue a lower 
end in preference to a higher is against morality. 

§ 48. There are three ways in which 
tion? ngSeeC " the- selection among divers motives 

may be wrong. 

1. The end may be sought immediately 
acte or mtlns™ 1 wnich should be sought only through 

other ends. 
To seek good in itself or happiness directly and 
not through character primarily, and condition 
secondarily, is wrong, because only God gives hap- 
piness itself, and man can obtain it only by placing 
himself in the state to which his creator accords it. 
In the same way to seek intelligence without the 
labor of study, or wealth without industry, is against 
morality. 

2. A subordinate end may be adopted 

nat? f ends 0rdi " as the chie£ and governing end. 

To make condition thus predominate, 
as to seek wealth without subordination to the 
higher end of character or ability to use it aright, 
to amass for the sake of having, with no reference 
to a better doing, is a sin against a pure morality. 
It debases the higher nature of acting, and thus 
hinders the higher good. 



MOTIVES. 59 

3. The end, rightly selected and subor- 
3. Excess. dinated, may be pursued to excess. 

The wrong here is really but an incom- 
plete subordination. Food, thus, is a condition of 
a healthy body, which is itself a condition of the 
highest spiritual character. But food taken in 
excess is wrong, because although taken for the 
sustenance of the body, yet its limitations being 
transcended, the very object in taking it is defeated 
or impaired. 



60 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



CHAPTER IX. 

MORAL OBLIGATION. 

§ 49. By Moral Obligation is meant 
tYondefiner that attribute of duty by which it holds 

and draws to its fulfilment. 
We have recognized the fact that when certain 
actions are presented to us we feel ourselves bound 
to perform them ; such actions are duties. All 
duty has thus an obliging force ; it holds the soul 
and draws to the performance of it. The soul feels 
itself bound, as both held to it and also impelled to 
perform it. 

Of this obligation it may be said, first, that it is 
inherent in the very nature of duty and inseparable 
from it. As well may the sun be conceived with- 
out figure or brightness as duty without obligation. 

Duty and obligation are accordingly 
of diit tnbute use d interchangeably to a certain extent, 

just as the sun and the luminary. To 
fulfil or discharge duty is the same as to fulfil or 
discharge obligation. They are, however, distin- 
guishable in meaning. Obligation is best conceived 
of as being an essential attribute of duty regarded 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 6 1 

as a concrete — as an essential attribute of a right 
action. 

In the next place, obligation is inexor- 

2 . inexorable, able in its demand. 

It holds till the duty is discharged by 
performance, or till it is abrogated by the authority 
which imposes it. 

In the third place, obligation has a cer- 

3. impelling tain power drawing to its fulfilment. 

This has been included in the defini- 
tion ; obligation draws to duty. No one who has a 
sense of duty or feels obligation fails to experience 
a certain impulse from within to do it. 

In the fourth place, obligation is resist- 

4. Resistible. ible 

This follows from the very nature of 
duty which ever respects freedom of will in the agent. 
As free, by very virtue of this essential attribute 
of freedom in the will, the soul is superior to all 
outward force. So soon as an irresistible necessity 
arises which destroys the possibility of performing 
an act, or which constrains performance without 
the free consent of the will, duty disappears, obliga- 
tion ceases. 

§ 50. The ground of obligation is to be 
its ground. found ultimately in the nature of man 

and his relations to other beings and 
things. 

Several perplexing questions have been raised in 
regard to the ground of obligation which are easily 
resolved when the obscurity and ambiguity involved 
in the use of words are removed. It is asked thus : 



62 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

why am I bound to do right ; to be virtuous ; to 
love other beings ; to do good to them ? These 
questions are generally to be interpreted as equiva- 
lent to the question — why am I bound to duty. If 
to be understood in any other sense, they are to be 
answered each according to its own special sense in 
the application which is made of the language, and 
may be answered in terms showing their re- 
lation to this one common element — that of duty 
— involved in them. Thus : I am bound to do 
right, because duty obliges me to do good in 
hearty love in the direct way of nature — to ex- 
press my love in beneficence to others in the 
way proper to my nature and theirs. I am bound to 
be virtuous because duty obliges me to be what I 
was made to be, namely — a true man. I am bound 
to love other beings, because duty obliges me to act 
out my loving nature Jo them. I am bound to do 
good to others, because duty obliges me to work 
good in all my free action. If these questions are 
equivalent to the question, — why am I bound to 
duty, and respect merely the ground of obligation 
the one answer is : such is my nature in relation to 
other beings and things ; this is what I was made 
for. Duty is loving beneficence to others in the 
way in which it can most directly be done. I have 
a nature which is essentially loving, which, there- 
fore, seeks the good of others ; and a way is opened 
to me by which this love can go out and effect this 
good ; therefore am I bound to duty. Or, in other 
words : I was purposely created lovingly to do good 
to others and was placed in a condition in which by 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 63 

following a certain course I might act thus. Or, 
still again : I am bound to duty because all duty is 
essentially grounded in the nature of the subject of 
duty in relation to other beings and things. The 
objective ground of duty, and, consequently, of obli- 
gation, for, as we have seen, duty has obligation for 
its essential attribute, is to be found thus in the 
nature of man and his relations. 

The doctrine that duty is ultimately grounded in 
the fitness of things, differs from this view only in 
its being less comprehensive ; as it seems to look 
only at the one phase or element in a perfect moral 
action, its rectitude or the relation between the 
loving subject and the benefited object of duty. 

The doctrine that all duty is grounded in love 
equally founds duty in the nature of man, inasmuch 
as to love is what he was made to do. It only so 
emphasizes that element of duty which is given in 
the subject of duty as to overshadow the other two 
elements given in the object of duty and the rela- 
tion between love and good. 

That doctrine, once more, which grounds obliga- 
tion in good, grounds itself in the nature of man as 
made for good, and is faulty only as depressing from 
view the other essential constituents of duty — love 
and rectitude. 

The objective ground of human duty, then, is ul- 
timately to be found in the nature and relations of 
man. The question ; why am I bound to duty, re- 
ceives the only answer of which it is capable in any 
proper meaning of the words, in this statement. 
The subjective ground of duty in the narrower sense 



64 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

of the phiase, as presented in the question : how do 
I come to have a sense of duty, or why do I feel 
myself under obligation, demands a slightly modi- 
fied answer. The subjective ground of obligation in 
this sense is in the rational nature of man, as 
capable of apprehending duty. I come to have a 
sense of duty, by my natural capacity of feeling 
duty when it is properly brought before me, just as 
I come to have a sense of warmth when a heated 
object is brought properly to me : it is my nature to 
feel in both cases and therefore I feel. 

There is a twofold function in man's rational 
nature carefully to be recognized. First, there is 
the sensibility or capacity of being impressed, and 
then, there is the intelligence or faculty of perceiv- 
ing and judging. This twofold function of feeling 
and knowing can be called into exercise only on 
condition of its proper object being furnished to it. 
Duty must then first be presented ; that is, a moral 
action, either done or to be done. When thus pre- 
sented, there is first the impression or the feeling ; 
then the perceiving with a discrimination of attri- 
butes ; and finally recognition followed by the feel- 
ings that such recognition produces. Necessarily 
in this way when an act of duty is presented, there 
is, through the impression which it makes, a recog- 
nition of the attribute of obligation as essentially 
belonging to it. Just as the presentation of the 
sun through the outward sense to the mind is follow- 
ed by the recognition of the attribute of brightness 
— that it shines — so is the presentation of an act of 
duty necessarily followed by the attribute of obli- 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 65 

gation belonging to it — that it obliges and so that 
the subject of duty is bound to it. The discernment 
of obligation thus is intuitive. We recognize obli- 
gation when an act of duty is brought before us 
simply by contemplation — by intuition, not at all by 
any reasoning from antecedent truths. The obli- 
gation belonging to all duty may, indeed, be proved 
by a form of reasoning, because all truth is consist- 
ent with itself and one lower truth implies other 
lower truths. Thus, a basis of argument may be 
found in other truths ; just as I can prove that the 
sun is bright from many facts, as for instance, from 
the fact that plants modify their growth under 
the effect of its light. But just as I know that the 
sun is bright primarily because I see the sun, so I 
know duty is obligatory because my reason im- 
mediately discerns it. 

This intuitive recognition of obligation is followed 
by appropriate feelings, among which is prominent 
that of an impulse to fulfil it. This is the obliging 
function of conscience, as we have recognized it. 



66 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



CHAPTER X. 



MORAL LAW. 



§ 51. Law is well defined to be a rule 

Law defined. f action. 

Such is the definition of law in its 
widest sense and largest application. In this sense, 
law applies to all things that are made. "All things 
in heaven and earth do her homage ; the very least 
as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt- 
ed from her power." 

The law of everything that exists is written in 
its very nature and its relations to the universe of 
being around. We read this law in the respective 
attributes that belong to existing things. The stone 
falls to the ground, the tree grows, the bird flies, 
because gravitation, growth, flying, are the respec- 
tive attributes of these objects. 

These are all attributes of action. Law is read in 
these attributes rather than in the so-called attri- 
butes of quality belonging to simple being. Law 
more immediately respects action. The compre- 
hensive law of every being is nothing else in its 
content than the sum of the attributes which con- 



MORAL LAW. 6j 

stitutc it regarded as an acting thing. Quality is 
regarded in law only indirectly and impliedly. We 
say the law of the crystal of common salt is that it 
be cubical, by which we only mean that in the ac- 
tion by which it comes to exist, it must, according 
to its nature, assume this form. The law of this 
action — the law of crystallization in the case of this 
salt — is that it be cubiform. This attribute, 
although one strictly of quality, yet implicitly looks 
back to the action that forms it. Law thus properly- 
respects action. 

Farther, law respects a mode of action and pre 
scribes that it be in this rather than in that particu- 
lar way. The stone falls to the earth — does not of 
itself move along the surface : falls, if left to itself, 
directly not in zigzag lines to the earth ; falls with 
a certain accelerated velocity. The tree grows up- 
ward, not downward ; it grows by an inward force, 
not by mere accumulation or by adding on part to 
part from without. The bird flies by the action of 
its wings, not by leaping; forward not backward. 
When it is said it is the law of the stone, of the 
tree, of the bird, that they respectively fall, grow, 
fly, it is meant that these are the prescribed or es- 
tablished modes of their action. 

Once more, law implies a lawgiver. The very 
term signifies that which is laid down or establish- 
ed ; and thus imports a being that lays down or es- 
tablishes. 

§ 52. Law is conveniently distributed into phys- 
ical law and moral law. The former respects 
physical action ; the latter, moral action. 



68 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

Physical Law comprehends and is 
Physical law. rea<a i n t h e attributes that belong to all 

things in nature, that is, to all things 
outside of the properly moral world. Its essential 
character is what is denominated necessity. As a 
thing cannot be other than its attributes, it is neces- 
sary that the law which is read in these attributes 
remain an unchanging rule. Otherwise, the attri- 
butes, more or less, cease to be and the being to 
which they belong likewise so far ceases to be. 

The whole natural world, the universe without and 
all of men within, save only his freedom or moral 
nature, conceived of as a creation, is thus under the 
law of the Creator which is established and pre- 
scribed in the respective attributes with which he 
has endowed whatever he has made. The law of 
the physical world is, in fact, thus but the expres- 
sion of the creative will. Accordingly, almost of 
necessity, against their inclinations, the men of 
science whose sphere is bounded by the world of 
mere phenomena, the mere modes and sequences of 
things, are constrained to speak of the attributes 
of the several things of which they treat as laws, 
because things are what they are by reason of 
the will of their Creator ; and hence the essential 
attributes of these things, which it is the province 
of science to discover and to disclose, are very 
laws ; being expressions of a will, even of that 
will which gave them being and made them what 
they are. 

Moral Law is the law of moral action, 

Moral law. t } iat j Sj f c ] utv> 



MORAL LAW. 69 

It ever respects action that is free — free in this 
sense, that the action which it prescribes may be 
withheld. The action prescribed is not necessary 
to the being of the agent, because unlike the 
physical world, the essential attribute — the law — 
of the free-will is an alternative of action — doing 
or refusing. 

Everything in man, accordingly, except this free- 
dom of action in doing or refusing, is under physical 
law. Man gravitates to the ground, grows, moves, 
breathes, under the law of necessity. The happi- 
ness that attends on right action and the unhap- 
piness that attends on wrong action are equally 
under the law of necessity ; they are not alterable 
at his pleasure, except through the action which is 
free to him. This happiness that waits on the 
legitimate use of his endowments is beyond his con- 
trol otherwise than thus mediately. It is as wrong, 
therefore, as it is idle for him to attempt to control 
it except thus mediately. 

The Creator has invested man with the attribute 
of freedom — the alternative of doing or refusing. 
The action of the free-will is necessary in so far as 
that it must act, and must act by choosing or refus- 
ing ; but it is free in this respect that it may choose 
or it may refuse. The law, however, reaches to this 
alternative so far as to prescribe one as well as the 
other. The law of man's nature is, as we have 
seen, the law of loving beneficence in the way of 
rectitude, rather than of malignant ill-doing in the 
way of evil. This is his nature : for this he was 
made and constituted ; this is his distinguishing at- 



yO THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

tribute, that he be freely thus beneficent; and in 
this attribute is read the will of his Creator. 

But man is but a part of a universe. As but a 
part he is constituted to act only as a part — in har- 
monious relation to the universe of which he is a 
part. And this attribute of his nature implies two 
things ; first, that his action respect other beings so 
as to further the end of their creation — that is, their 
well-being or happiness ; and secondly, that this 
action go out without disturbing the harmonious 
relations in which all the parts of the creation have 
been established by the one perfect will. In this 
light we discover the essential elements of all moral- 
ity, of all perfect moral action. Man in himself was 
made to love ; but as a part of a universe his loving 
action must respect the good of others in it ; and 
lastly, this action must be in accordance with the 
established relationships of the universe. Love, 
beneficence, rectitude, are the constituent elements 
of all morality. 

We are brought thus both in physical 
An expression anc [ [ n m oral law, to the recognition of 

of will. ° 

the innermost characteristic of law that 
it is the expression of a will. No truer doctrine can 
be found than this grand utterance of Hooker, that 
" of law there can be no less acknowledged than 
that her seat is the bosom of God ; her voice the 
harmony of the world." 

Physical law expresses the will of the Creator that 
the things which he has made be what he has made 
then and so act as he has constituted them to act. 

Moral law expresses the will of the Creator that 



MORAL LAW. 71 

the beings he has endowed with freedom, in the use 
of this freedom choose ever the end for which they 
were made — loving beneficence ; that, as active, in 
this freedom they ever do good ; and that as parts 
of a universe they act in harmony with all the other 
parts. 

§ 53. Inasmuch as the one Creator has 
Harmony f one a n_ CO mprehensive end in his crea- 
tive work, making all things in their 
legitimate action to conspire harmoniously towards 
this end — the highest good of his creatures — all law, 
physical and moral, must be consistent and har- 
monious with itself. 

All the specific diversities of action which the 
creative law prescribes must accordingly flow on to- 
gether in one peaceful current, never hindering nor 
disturbing the movement one of another, but rather 
each aiding on every other, just like drops of water 
in one stream, since all are subject to the one law 
bearing all to the same sea of love. The loving bosom 
of God being the one seat and source of all law for 
every creature he has made, his creative word which 
is the voice or utterance of this word is the har 
mony of the world. 

§ 54. Law as thus implying and presup- 
its obliging posing a personal will as its ultimate 

power. x ° L • 

seat and source, gives at once to the 
sense of obligation the character and force of com- 
mand. 

The feeling of obligation ever carries with it the 
feeling of an imperative. Conscience, which is the 
organ through which God makes known his will, 



72 THEORETICAL .MORALITY. 

not only holds to duty and draws to it, but com- 
mands duty. It speaks with the voice of authority. 
It utters a will back of the action, back even of the 
obligation ; or, rather, it utters a will penetrating 
the obligation and the action so as to make it im- 
perative duty. 

§ 55. Law, as presupposing a personal 
L n iTty. SreSP ° n ' will as its seat and source, gives to the 

sense of obligation the character of re- 
sponsibility. 

The fact that this feeling of responsibility natu- 
rally accompanies the feeling of obligation, is unde- 
niable. It is witnessed by universal experience. 
The recognition of duty gives not only a sense of 
an imperative obligation, but carries with it, or 
rather bears in it, the feeling that there is a power 
back of duty that in prescribing it will enforce it ; 
and that to this power, the subject of duty must in 
some way be accountable. This character of re- 
sponsibility comes into duty and obligation and 
law, from the presence of the personal will that 
makes law what it is. A will pressing on in resist- 
less might to its purposed end must sweep along 
every obstacle with it. The drop in the mighty 
current that should refuse to flow on or should seek 
to move up the stream or across and away from its 
prescribed direction, must inevitably be crossed and 
borne down. 

In the necessity of things, therefore, the law of 
the universe, bearing -the personal will of its creator, 
moving to its end in good, must bring every crea- 
ture into its current. Man, created with freedom, 



MORAL LAW. J2> 

while created to gravitate in the same current to 
good as his end, yet, as free, capable of withholding 
this gravitating movement or opposing or crossing 
it, cannot but experience the consequences of such 
opposition or resistance. He is made capable of 
discerning these consequences as appointed by the 
creator and necessitated in the divinely instituted 
order of things. He cannot, therefore, when he free- 
ly contemplates duty, but recognize and feel himself 
subject to these prescribed consequences ; in other 
words, feel himself responsible to a personal will to 
the creator and disposer of the universe of which he 
is a part ; who will certainly, as he is true to him- 
self, enforce his will in some suitable way. 

§ 56. That element of law by which it 
Sanction of law. enforces itself upon the subject of duty, 

is called its sanction. 
Law not only prescribes, not only commands ; it 
also enforces. The sanction of the creative law is 
discovered legitimately and primitively in the con- 
sequences experienced by the subject of duty who, 
in his freedom, disobeys its command. These con- 
sequences consist primarily in the defeat of the end 
for which he was made. As he was made for good, 
to do and to enjoy good, the inevitable consequence 
of disobedience to the fundamental law of his being 
is that he fails so far of the end of his being — fails 
of good. He fails of good both in doing and in 
enjoying it. The consequences are not, however, 
merely negative, consisting merely in the loss of the 
good which his fulfilment of duty would have 
brought. But the whole tendency of his active 

4 



74 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

nature, being under the beneficent law of his crea- 
tion to perfect happiness as the immediate and 
necessary result of his obedience, is by this disobe- 
dience crossed and opposed by the entire flow of the 
universe. Positive unhappiness or misery is thus 
experienced. 

This result is the effect of the creator's will. It 
is what he purposes, what thus he effects. It is the 
fulfilment of what he implicitly declared in the very 
creative law which made things as they are. The 
fundamental law of the universe contains thus both 
precept and sanction. 

It is, however, a very low, a very unworthy and 
erroneous conception of the relations of the creator 
to his creatures, that he creates them with certain 
attributes and relations and then dismisses them to 
experience the sunshine or the storm, the favoring 
breezes or the desolating gales, which may befall 
them on their voyage towards the haven for which 
he made and destined them. Reason forbids any 
other notion than this, that he as truly concerns 
himself personally with the action of his creatures 
as he did with their creation ; that he superintends 
that as truly as he effected this ; that he brings by 
his own direction the happiness that attends every 
act of obedience, as well as the unhappiness that 
waits on disobedience. 

The truest notion, therefore, and the only one 
which reason sanctions, is that the consequences of 
fulfilling or resisting duty express the feelings of 
the creator himself, and that these feelings are those 
of satisfaction and approval in the one case, and of 



MORAL LAW. 75 

displeasure and disapproval in the other. We are 
to remember here that man is utterly impotent to 
produce directly any happiness ; that the most he 
can do is to effect that action on which his creator 
has made happiness to depend. We are to remem- 
ber, also, that approval of another's acts is naturally 
expressed and can be appropriately expressed only 
by return of good, of happiness. There is, more- 
over, no conceivable way in which any action or 
line of conduct can be enforced on a free being, save 
through the governing appetences of his nature, 
which in man at least are comprehensive for good — 
save through his desire for good and his corre- 
sponding aversion to misery. The inevitable con- 
clusion is that the sanction of moral law is the 
happiness or unhappiness declared by the lawgiver 
to wait on obedience or disobedience, as the expres- 
sion of his approval or disapproval, and for the sake 
of enforcing compliance with his law. 

The sanctions of moral law are the good attending 
on obedience and the evil waiting on disobedience. 
They are also called the rewards of moral action. 

The sanctions of law enforce obedience through 
the hope of the good that follows right action and 
the fear of the evil that follows wrong action. 

§ 57. The relation of the subject of 

Merit and de- duty tQ the sanct i ons f J aw J s that Q f 

merit or demerit. 

Merit, otherwise named desert, is that relation 
in which the obedient subject of duty stands to the 
good promised to obedience. 

Demerit, otherwise named ill-desert, is that rela- 



76 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

tion in which the disobedient subject stands to the 
evil threatened to disobedience. 

Praise and Blame are the expressions 
Blame. and °f tne lawgiver through the sanctions 
of the law — the expressions of his ap- 
proval of obedience and disapproval of disobedience. 

Under the perfect administration of God merit and 
demerit are unalterably connected with praise and 
blame. The full expression of approval or disap- 
proval may not be immediate ; but conscience, the 
faithful oracle of God, expresses ever his approval 
or his displeasure, in some degree, thus declaring 
the merit or desert on the one hand or the demerit 
or ill-desert on the other hand, which attaches to 
every moral act. 

The third function of conscience, as before stated, 
is but this recognition of merit and demerit — of the 
relation between obedience or disobedience and 
good or evil. A right moral action reveals to the 
eye of conscience this relation established in the 
very nature of man — the relation between right and 
good on the one hand and between wrong and evil 
on the other. Its voice in praising or condemning 
is the utterance of its creator through it, affirming 
ever the constancy of this relation. 



AUTHORITY. 77 



CHAPTER XL 

AUTHORITY. 

§ 58. By authority is properly meant 
defined ** tne essen tial attribute of a lawgiver — 

that which makes him what he is. 

It includes both the power and the right to make 
and enforce law. 

It consequently gives all its peculiar character 
and force to law. 

It is the immediate ground of obligation. 

It is, moreover, that personal element in law which 
addresses its imperative to the conscience and lends 
to it its commanding power. 

§ 59. The ultimate seat and source of 
its seat. authority is in the creator. 

The power and right to create implies 
the power and right to determine the special end for 
which the creature is made and the faculties and 
endowments by which that end is to be attained. 

The moral perfection of the creator involves a 
like perfection in the creature, to the extent of his 
endowments in so far as there is likeness in natural 
attributes ; so that man, in so far as he is rational 



^8 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

and free, must be made to be like his creator — 
sympathizingly and intelligently loving, beneficent, 
and righteous. Man was in fact thus made in the 
image of his creator; and hence in this creative 
will, determining the end for which he should be 
created and the endowments by which he should 
fulfil this end, is to be found the law of his being. 
The seat of law is in the bosom of God ; in his sym- 
pathizing, intelligent, loving, beneficent, righteous, 
creative will. 

There is nothing below or beyond this creative 
will of a self-existent creator. Only as we can con- 
ceive of a creator of the creator of all things, can 
we conceive of a law in the created universe back 
of the will of God. If, as language sometimes 
seems to imply, there be a standard by which the 
action of God can be judged, such a standard can 
only respect the relation which we think between 
love as source of all his action and good as end of 
all his action. This relation, lying in the action 
itself, which we can characterize only in respect of 
its continuousness, its directness, and parallelism 
with all other right actions, we can conceive to be 
right or wrong in these respects. But as a relation, 
it can not exist in either term of the relation, either 
in the law as source, or in the good as end, and is, 
therefore, in a sense independent of either, just as 
in the equation 2 x 4=8, the equality is not in either 
term — either 2 x 4 or 8 — and is therefore in a sense 
independent of each taken separately. But as it 
would be absurd to conceive of an equality existing 
antecedent to all quantities, so it is equally absurd 



AUTHORITY. 79 

to conceive of a rectitude which is antecedent to all 
action. God is absolutely his own law. The out- 
goings of his own perfect nature, which is love to- 
wards the one end of all his activity, even the good 
of his creatures, are the precedent ground in fact of 
all rectitude, before which all attempted conception 
of a pre-existing rectitude is absurd and self-contra- 
dictory. 

§ 60. The authority of God is expressed 
expression. in a twofold way : first, in the nature 

of the beings that he creates and the 
condition in which he places them ; secondly, in 
some expressed command. 

The former expression of divine authority is called 
natural law ; the latter, positive law. 

§ 61. The natural law is to be inter-. 
1. Natural law. preted out of the nature and condition 

of the subject of law. 
Man, as endowed with sense and reason, is quali- 
fied to read this law of his action. This is an essen- 
tial function of his conscience. It were no more 
necessary to speak forth specific commands or rules 
for all the particular acts of his life than to tell him 
in audible voice every time that he opens his eye to 
the sunlight, "this light is from the sun." 

The facility to read this natural law, as we should 
presume on every ground it would, grows with the 
readiness to obey it. " He that will do his will 
shall know of his doctrine." The reading of the 
law, the knowing of duty, is conditioned, to a great 
extent, as in reason it should be, as from the neces- 
sity of things it must be, on the will to do it. 



80 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

It should be borne in mind that the whole fash- 
ioning of man's nature by his creator is for duty, 
and of course furthering to duty. The impelling 
power of conscience takes into itself to augment its 
own force this created tendency in the way of duty. 
This circumstance prompts and helps to the reading 
of the divine law as it is written in the nature of 
things. It puts upon the right way to discover and 
to interpret it. It aids in detecting mistakes and 
errors. A supposed duty which is hostile to sym- 
pathizing love or to good in its result, or to the 
established relations and harmonies of things, must 
at once be suspected as an erroneous reading of the 
divine will. The promptings of a loving nature 
point to the line of duty. The good resulting from 
an action raises a presumption that it was right — a 
presumption, indeed, too often allowed excessive 
weight, yet a valid presumption and worthy of trust 
when lawfully applied. 

§ 62. The positive law of God con- 
2. Positive Law . sists in those special revelations of 

his will which on particular occasions 
he has made to men. 

That the creator would communicate, as oc- 
casion might require, with his rational creatures in 
a rational way, that is, by means of language, is a 
most natural presumption. It is a presumption 
which there is nothing in his known character or 
works or in their nature or condition to rebut. That 
there might be occasion in their experience for 
fresher, fuller, more articulate revelations of his 
will, than they could well intepret out of the ordi- 



AUTHORITY. 8 1 

nances of nature, is an equally lawful presumption. 
If morally perfect, their imperfection in knowledge 
might reasonably be supposed to furnish occasion 
for some fuller light from him, and their immaturity 
and consequent weakness in will might furnish like 
occasion for the encouragement and cheer which 
comes from expressed sympathy and reiterated ex- 
pressions of his will. It is unreasonable to suppose 
that God would withhold all communion with his ra- 
tional creatures continuing obedient to all his will, 
and especially unreasonable to suppose that he 
would withhold all reinforcements of his authority 
by fresh revelations of his will in the times of their 
weakness and ignorance. If morally imperfect, 
men might reasonably be supposed still more to 
need divine interposition to recover them to obe- 
dience, to reclaim them from their wanderings, and 
guide them back to duty. 

With such presumption in favor of special reve- 
lations of the divine will, only ordinary evidence is 
necessary to convince us of the fact that he has 
made such revelations. Such evidence we have giv- 
en us in the history of the race in a most ample 
measure. His actual interpositions to confirm and 
reinforce the law of nature, and to point out new 
lines of conduct which the changes in their history 
might require, have been authenticated as truly his 
by supernatural signs and works. While it may be 
safely admitted that the proof of such interposi- 
tions without some supposable design or end is im- 
possible, on the other hand, if we can apprehend 

some worthy rational end or design in such inter- 
4* 



82 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

positions, the proof of the fact is as simple, and 
easy, and valid as of any action within the province 
of man which we may happen to know he had de- 
signed or intended. 

§ 63. The Bible is such a special 
The Bible. revelation of the creator's will. 

The Bible is supernatural, inasmuch as 
while it confirms and reinforces the revelations of the 
divine will in the ordinances of nature, it also, in ad- 
dition to this, sets forth other commands which 
could not easily be interpreted out of nature by man 
in his mental and moral weakness, certainly not in 
their fulness and completeness and authoritative dis- 
tinctness. These special supernatural revelations, 
indeed, are all in perfect harmony with all that ap- 
pears in the constitution and on-goings of nature ; 
but these last are only as the enwrapped germs to 
the expanded flowers and the matured fruit. 

The Bible discloses an end and object to be ac- 
complished by its revelations, that is altogether 
worthy of God, and that commends itself to human 
reason. Its revelations are attested by those marks 
and signs which should be expected to accompany 
divine interpositions that they may be identified 
as coming from him and be fully accredited. It is 
supported, moreover, by testimony which, when it 
is admitted that there was a worthy reason for 
divine interposition, should at once command belief 
that he has thus interposed. 

The Bible contains all the special revelations of 
God to man that have been sufficiently accredited 
for man's acceptance. 



MORAL LAW. 83 

The revelations of the divine will in the Bible 
are in the form of express positive precepts or com- 
mands, and also in the form of inspired examples. 

There are manifold precepts given in the Bible, 
to individuals — as to Abraham, to Moses, to the 
prophets — and to communities, as especially to the 
Jewish people through Moses. The life of Christ, 
as the divine incarnate or embodied in the human, is 
an exemplification of the will of God in all the 
specific acts of his which are imitable by men. 
These imitable acts of condescending, self-denying, 
sympathizing, righteous beneficence, are so many 
expressions of the divine will, and thus are laws or 
commands of his, binding the consciences of men. 



84 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 



CHAPTER XII. 



CASUISTRY. 



§ 64. By Casuistry is to be under- 
Casuistry denned, stood the application of the principles 
of morality to particular instances of 
duty. 

The term casuistry has been extensively used in 
a bad sense, to denote a sophistical or perverted 
application of moral principles to action. But it 
has a good sense, and it is in this sense that the 
term is here employed. 

It not frequently occurs that rules of duty seem 
to conflict. In a loose and popular way of speak- 
ing, we say duties conflict. But the line of duty, 
strictly speaking, is ever single and direct. No one 
is ever bound in duty in opposite or diverging di- 
rections at the same time. A weak conscience need 
never be disturbed by the thought that two conflict- 
ing calls of duty cannot be followed. Regulus could 
not listen to the calls of country and of family, and to 
the calls of his oath to the Carthaginians, at the same 
time. When the decision was fairly arrived at 
that the obligations of his oath were paramount, 



CASUISTRY. 85 

his conscience could not reasonably be dis- 
turbed because his country and his friends were 
given up, however much his natural affection may 
have been pained. The field of casuistry is as ex- 
tended as the conflicts of authority, or of rule. 
The law of self preservation seems, sometimes, to 
be in collision with the calls of patriotism bidding 
the soldier to expose his life for his country. The 
command of a parent, or of a superior, sometimes 
comes into conflict with the laws of the land ; or 
either may be opposed to the law of God. It is 
the province of casuistry to resolve such conflict- 
ing claims, and to determine in which direction 
the single duty leads. It fulfils its function by a 
comparison of the rules that seem to come into 
conflict, and a selection of the rule which is of 
paramount obligation in the particular case. 

If it be borne in mind that the life of man on 
earth is ever meeting these conflicts of authority ; 
that, too, a man's character depends greatly on the 
promptness and correctness with which he resolves 
them, as a weak spirit hesitates and falters from 
irresoluteness, while one of low morality mistakes 
or prefers the lower claim instead of the higher ; 
that thus, a great part of the discipline of life con- 
sists in the treatment of these conflicting calls to 
duty ; and, moreover, that there are principles 
which may greatly help to the settlement of those 
conflicts, and which must indeed be recognized and 
acted upon in any right settlement of them, it will be 
understood, how casuistry comes to claim a distinct 
recognition in a system of morality. 



86 THEORETICAL MORALITY. 

It will at once be perceived that it is the simple 
province of casuistry to resolve the doubts as to 
duty when different specific rules call to different 
lines of action. 

§ 65. The leading principles of casuis- 
its principles, try, which help to the solution of 

doubts in regard to duty arising from 
conflicts of authority or of rule, are the following: — 

First, the subordinate authority should, 

authority. 11 ^ 1161 " a11 ° ther thin g S bein g e qual, yield tO 

the higher. 
The rule of parental duty thus is paramount to 
that of neighborly duty ; consequently, all other 
things being equal, the relief of the wants of one's 
own child is binding in duty in preference to such 
relief of the wants of a neighbor. The claims of 
the bodily nature again are to be subordinated to 
those of the spiritual nature. 

Secondly, the higher the source of au- 

2. Higher source, thority, other things being equal, the 

more obligatory the claim. 
The will of an elder brother, thus, is to be sub- 
ordinated to that of a parent ; of the parent to 
the law of the state ; the law of the state to the 
law of God. 

Thirdly, a clear -and definite rule of ob- 

3. clear rule, ligation is to be preferred before one 

that is obscure and doubtful. 

Fourthly, the rule which favors law is 
than free r dom. r safer to follow than that which favors 

freedom, a restrictive than a permissive 
rule. 



CASUISTRY. 8? 

If, for instance, the doubt in conscience arises 
whether a certain amusement should be forborne 
because of evil influence on others, or be allowed 
on the ground of personal freedom and indepen- 
dence, it is safer for conscience to follow the prohib- 
itory principle, because, by reason of the general bias 
of our nature towards indulgence, we are most like- 
ly to err in this direction. 

Fifthly, that line of conduct which im- 
acter av ° r char " P roves character and strengthens virtu- 
ous principle, should be taken in prefer- 
ence to that which degrades or enervates. 

Sixthly, the more beneficent act or 
mof/tnScent. course is to be preferred. 

Seventhly, the line of conduct which is 

to thelnSt. direct t0 the end of a11 virtue or good 
ness or beneficence, is to be preferred 
to that which is indirect or circuitous ; that which 
is parallel with the general current of rectitude to 
that which crosses or is counter to it. 

It should be observed that these very principles 
of casuistry will often come into collision as applied 
to a given case of doubt. It becomes necessary 
then to weigh their respective claims and determine 
which has the preponderance. 



PRACTICAL MORALITY, ETC. 



BOOK II. 



PRACTICAL MORALITY— DUTIES AND RIGHTS, 



INTRODUCTION. 

§ 66. Having, in the preceding book, explained 
the nature of duty, we proceed in this second book 
to enumerate the particular acts of men which come 
under the law of duty. As has been in- 
classification, timated, § 19, we shall classify them in 
reference to the respective objects of 
human duty. This classification gives us at once 
the three general divisions of : 
I. Duties to self ; 
II. Duties to fellow men ; and 
III. Duties to God. 

§ 67. Before entering upon the study 
Recapitulation, of this second part of our treatise, it will 
be of use to recall the several steps we 
have taken in unfolding the nature of duty. 



INTRODUCTION. 89 

Wc defined Ethics or Moral Science to 
Ethics defined. k e the Science of Human Duty. 

The nature of duty was exemplified in 

Duty exempli- ^ fulfilment by R egll l us f his promise 

to return to Carthage. An analysis of 
this act as a duty gave us at once three elements 
of all duty : First, subject of duty ; secondly, ob- 
ject of duty ; thirdly, act of duty. 

A subject of duty, or a moral person, 
Subject of duty, must be a being essentially active, hav- 
ing the three endowments of sensibility, 
intelligence, and free-will. 

Conscience includes the first two of 
Conscience. these three elements — sensibility and 
intelligence. It has a threefold func- 
tion : first, to recognize and feel duty ; second- 
ly, to impel or oblige to the performance of duty ; 
thirdly, to praise or blame. In conscience, more- 
over, is seated the peculiar feeling of pleasure or 
pain consequent on the performance or the viola- 
tion of duty. ■ 

,The object of duty is the person to 
object of duty, whom duty is owing and is ever a per- 
son — that is, a being, having sensibility, 
intelligence, and free-will. 

Rights are the correlative of duties. 

Rights. Rights belong to the object of duty; 

duties, to the subject of duty. * The 

Carthaginians had a right to what was due to them 

from Regulus. 

The essential quality of a duty or a 
Good in duty, right, in the experience of the object 



90 PRACTICAL MORALITY. 

of duty, is good — happiness or blessedness. A 
moral action, as the performance of 
Moral action, duty, includes three necessary ele- 
ments: love in the subject of duty; 
good in the object of duty ; and rectitude in the act 
or doing of duty. In other words, all moral action 
must be loving, good or beneficent, and right. It 
cannot be loving without aiming at good in the ob- 
ject of duty, or without proceeding directly towards 
this result. It cannot be good, except as it pro- 
ceeds from love and moves in rectitude. It cannot 
be right, without being also loving and beneficent. 
Love consists in a sympathetic endeavor 
L 0Ye , directly for the good of the object of 

duty. 
The opposite of love is hate. 

Good as the end in all duty is of two 
Good. kinds : i. Good in itself, or happiness, 

which is the gift of the Creator ; 2. 
Good as means of happiness. This secondary good 
is either the good of condition, as wealth, friends, 
health, etc., or the good of character. 
The opposite of good is evil. 

Rectitude respects the procedure in a moral ac- 
tion, as love regards its source, and good its end or 
result. It accordingly respects the relation in an 
action between its source and its end. This rela- 
tion is that of an unswerving procedure from love, 
its source, to good, its end. This pro- 
Right, cedure must be parallel with all right 
moral action. 
The opposite of right is wrong. 



INTRODUCTION. 9 1 

All right moral action proceeds from a 

Motives. motive which is defined to be the appre- 

hended end or result at which the action 

aims. This end must always be some good. 

Motives are of two classes : I. Those which have 

their ends in character ; 2. Those which have their 

ends in condition. 

By moral obligation is meant that attri" 

Moral obliga- bute Q f duty by whkh it holds and drawg 

to its fulfilment. It is inherent in all 
duty ; it is inexorable in its demand ; it impels to 
the performance of duty, but may be resisted by 
the free-will. 

The ground of obligation is ultimately 
its ground. in the nature of man and his relations 

to other beings and things. 

Law is a rule of action. Moral law is 
Law. the law of duty. It implies a law-giver ; 

it is the expression of his will. It gives 
to the sense of obligation the character of responsi- 
bility. It enforces itself upon the subject of duty 
by its sanctions, which are the good attending on 
obedience to law and the evil waiting on disobe- 
dience. 

Authority is the essential attribute of a 
Authority. law-giver. It includes both the right 

and the power to make and enforce law. 
It is the immediate ground of obligation. Its ulti- 
mate seat and source is in the Creator. 

Casuistry is that department of moral 
Casuistry. science which applies the principles of 

morality to particular instances of duty. 



92 DUTIES TO SELF. 



DIVISION I. 



DUTIES TO SELF, 



CHAPTER I. 

NATURE AND CLASSES. 

§ 68. The first named of the three 
Personal duty, great classes of human duties is that of 

duties to ones self, or, as they have been 
termed, personal duties. 

In this class of duties, the object of the 
Explained. duty is self — the duty is owing to one's 

self. The propriety of such language, 
importing that I am under obligation to myself, will 
be recognized at once if we consider that some of 
our free actions terminate on ourselves. A large 
share, indeed, of our active life has immediate respect 
to ourselves, not to our fellow beings, nor to God. 
Our nature is complex, constituted of manifold ele- 
ments, to any one of which, separately from the 
others, we may direct our care and our endeavors. 
The act of duty finds its end in such case in that 
part or element of our nature. Care is due thus to 
our body that it be kept in health, and to the mind 






NATURE and classics. 93 

that it be instructed and exercised. The aggregate 

of these acts of duty, terminating in specific parts 
of our being or condition, makes up the sum of per- 
sonal duty. 

§ 69. The ground of obligation in the 
Ground of ob- case f personal duty is found in this 

ligation. r J 

complex nature of man capable of re- 
ceiving care and effort in its several parts or ele- 
ments and of his free active nature capable of ex- 
pending this care and effort. 

While the ultimate ground may be traced to the 
Creator's will in forming man with this two-fold re- 
ceptive and active nature, or still more remotely to 
the character of the Creator himself as the ever 
loving worker of good in the line of perfect recti- 
tude, the more immediate ground of obligation must 
be laid in this nature of man hiniself as constituted 
by his maker. 

§ 70. This department of moral activ- 
Seif-iove. ity has been denominated self-love. The 

field of self-love is thus the same as 
that of personal duty, the exercise of proper self- ■ 
love being nothing else than performance of per- 
sonal duty or of duty to one's self. 

Self-love should be carefully distin- 
Seifishness. guished from selfishness. Self-love is 

a proper regard to self, to one's own 
condition and character; selfishness is an inor- 
dinate regard to self. Selfishness is thus an abuse 
of the principle of self-love. 

This principle of self-love is as necessary to the 
best interests of the universe and as fundamental 



94 • DUTIES TO SELF. 

in the nature of man as the principle of love to 
other beings. There is in every one, on the one 
hand, a strong instinct to the exercise of this self- 
love, and on the other, an urgent demand for it. It 
is, accordingly, a law of man's being, ordained by 
his maker in constituting him what he is. In the 
form of self-preservation, this principle of self-love 
is one of the highest and most sacred principles by 
which we are governed. As a creature of God, and 
as subject to wants and having rights, a man is at 
least as worthy to receive the offices of a kind and 
watchful care from himself as from his fellow men. 
Self-love may be defined to be sympa- 
Seif-iove defined, thizing beneficence to one's self. 

Like love generally, it is sympathizing. 
In self-love the soul considers one's personal needs 
and demands ; it suffers itself to be duly impressed 
by those needs ; it cherishes these impressions ; and 
finally it yields itself to be moved by them. 

The action to which in self-love the soul is 
prompted is beneficence — doing good to one's self, 
as one's needs require or his nature admits. The 
good, which self-love seeks, is various, according to 
the variety of a man's needs ; it varies in degree 
and in quality. It is, however, always a secondary 
good ; not happiness itself, but the condition and 
means of happiness. A proper self-love can only 
seek to secure for one's self that character and that 
condition on which the Creator has made happiness 
to depend, and with which he has indissolubly con- 
nected it. 

As love generally, so self-love must ever be in 




NATURE AND CLASSES. OC 

rectitude ; it must move directly to its object — good 
in one's self, and in a line parallel with all perfect 
moral action. Self-love is right in so far as its 
movement is thus direct to its lawful end and just 
in degree, entrenching on no other duty. 

§71. All personal duty is thus under the 
foidkw" threefold law of morality:* 1. It must 

proceed from a sympathizing and kindly 
impulse — from true love to one's self; 2. It must 
seek this single end, the truest and highest good of 
one's self; and 3. It must move unswervingly 
towards this end and thus infringe on no other line 
of duty or of right. It must be loving, beneficent, 
right. 

§ 72. Self-love is of a twofold nature, 
Classes of per- acc0 rding as its immediate end is condi- 

sonal duty. ° 

tion or character. The several classes 
of personal duties may be conveniently considered 
under this twofold division : 

I, Personal duties in respect to condition. 
II. Personal duties in respect to character. 
The first class embraces the two divisions of du- 
ties pertaining to the body and duties pertaining to 
outward possessions. 



90 PERSONAL DUTIES 



CHAPTER II. 



PERSONAL DUTIES IN RESPECT TO THE BODY. 

§ 73. The moral relationship of the body 
Ground of duty. to trie rational spirit, which so far de- 
termines the duties to the body, lies in 
the fact that the body is the medium between the 
soul and all outer things. 

The body is the condition both of all outgoing 
activity of the spirit and also of all receptive capac- 
ity of impression or influence from without. Even 
in the most private personal thought, the brain is 
moved ; it may be that the nerves also quiver ; and 
sometimes, as in remorse or in sense of wrong, the 
heart beats and the blood rushes with strong vehe- 
mence. The soul is bound to the body in fastest 
bonds of dependence. In this is seen the force of 
the great Latin satirist's maxim : Pray for a sound 
mind in a sound body — Orandum est ut sit mens 
sana in corpore sano. The guardianship of the body 
is, to a large degree, entrusted to the mind. Duty 
to itself requires that, to the full extent of the 
guardianship thus entrusted to it by its Creator, the 
mind secure this soundness of body. 



s 



IN RESPECT TO THE BODY. 97 

It is a well established fact that instinct de- 
creases as intelligence rises. Life in the lowest 
order of animals goes on through the force of mere 
natural laws without the need of the guidance and 
help of intelligence. In the higher order, there is 
required intelligent selection of food and of shelter. 
In man, while mere natural constitution does much, 
reason is required to direct, control, and supplement 
the merely automatic functions of the body. In 
childhood and youth, more may be left to instinct 
and impulse ; in advancing age, the appetites and 
the instinctive tendencies need more the supervision 
and direction and active control of the reason and 
intelligence. 

The degree of care and thoughtf ulness due to the 
body is measured by its relation to the soul as being 
simply subservient. The function of the body is, 
as stated, that of medium and condition ; the soul 
lives in it and through it, but not for it. On the 
contrary, the body is for the soul. Hence the rule, 
that the body receive such care only as best to fit 
it for the soul's uses. To guard and nourish the 
body for its own sake, in order to perfect it as a 
mere animal organism, is as truly wrong as to be in- 
different to its wants. As an animal organism it 
has no rights (§ 16) ; to treat it as having rights is 
contrary to morality. For the greater good of the 
soul it may even for the time be thrust out from 
consideration ; it may be left to exposure ; it may 
be allowed to suffer ; even its dissolution may be 
welcomed rather than the soul itself perish. 

§ 74. The duties which the soul thus owes to 



98 PERSONAL DUTIES 

Threefold duty th e body are those of o-uardino- it, noiir- 

to the body. , J ^ ^ ' 

isJiing it, and riding it. 
I. It is the duty of every one to guard 
1. To guard it. hi s own body from all harm. 

This law of duty prohibits suicide. Cer- 
Suidde. tainly never until it can be shown be- 

yond all reasonable doubt that the death 
of the body is necessary to the higher interest of 
the spirit, can suicide be thought of as justifiable. 
But this, it is safe here to hold, can never be done. 
Man is too ignorant of the condition of a disem- 
bodied spirit to assume that death by one's own 
hands can be for the spirit's good. The presump- 
tion is all against it. No pressure of outward evils 
can warrant the destruction of the body ; for the 
rational relief from such evils is through the virtues 
of fortitude and of trust in the wise and beneficent 
ordering of all events. No evils of spirit, as re- 
morse or vicious habit, can warrant it ; for the 
proper relief here is in repentance and trust in the 
forgiving and gracious ordering of all human inter- 
ests. 

The law also prohibits all maiming and 
Mutilation. mutilation of the body, by which it shall 
suffer in its own integrity or in its fit- 
ness as the outer organ of the soul. The amputa- 
tion of an injured or diseased limb is justified when 
needful to save the whole body. That maiming for 
any moral interest can ever be necessary, is not 
susceptible of proof ; and all presumption is against 
it. 

The law prohibits such ascetic practices as are 



IN RESPECT TO THE BODY. 99 

Asceticism. hurtful to the body, whether of positive 
infliction of pain or of abstinence from 
needful food or protection, except under the limita- 
tions stated. The improvement of the bodily or 
the spiritual condition must be made to appear be- 
fore there can be ground and warrant for such viola- 
tions of the natural laws of physical health and 
soundness. Fasting or other " mortifications of the 
body" can be justified only as remedial of other ills 
of body or soul. 

This law of duty, further, requires a 
Positive care . positive care for the body by a sympa- 
thetic attention to its exposures ; by 
vigilance, in discerning and timely effort in avoiding 
clangers that may threaten it ; by vigorous resis- 
tance to violence that assails it. Needless exposure 
to cold or heat or wet, to contagious disease, to 
danger of any kind, is a sin, as real if not as flagrant 
as suicide, or falsehood, or theft. Excessive strains 
on the bodily powers in violent or prolonged labor, 
when no higher law of duty prescribes, are equally 
wrong, whether for curiosity, in idle competition or 
strife, or for heedless sport. Prohibiting indiffer- 
ence, negligence, and recklessness, the law enjoins 
a reasonable care and prudence in regard to all 
bodily needs. 

More specifically, the law requires such 
Shelter and provision of shelter and dress as shall 

dress. L 

secure the highest degree of bodily com- 
fort and well-being compatible with higher inter- 
ests. The provision for these wants must of course 
be measured by one's resources, and be shaped by 



IOO PERSONAL DUTIES 

his surroundings in life. Moreover, it must be 
made in a certain subordination to the demands of 
the aesthetic and moral nature. But both in re- 
spect to the dwelling and also in respect to dress, 
the highest moral refinement and the truest taste 
may be regarded while the physical wants are best 
consulted. 

§ 75. II. It is the duty of every one to 

2. To nourish it. nour i S h his body. 

This is more positive in its character 
than the preceding rule. The particular acts which 
it enjoins include to some extent those that have 
been specified, as the duty of nourishing involves 
that of guarding. 

This rule requires, in the first place, that 
Food. every one provide and use such food as 

the bdcly needs, in kind and in quantity. 
The grand dietetic rule is : choose what is health- 
ful, not what is palatable. The natural appetite is 
a trustworthy guide to a certain extent ; it resents 
too close watching. Its suggestions are worthy of 
heed ; but they must ever be kept subject to 
reason. It is often vitiated, often morbid ; and even 
when sound it is insufficient of itself and is liable to 
mislead. It is subject to change ; artificial appe- 
tites are common among all peoples. As the general 
rule, the most healthful diet will, in time, prove to be 
the most palatable. On the other hand, one of the 
soundest maxims for the promotion of health is : 
forbear all unnecessary anxiety in selecting, taking, 
and digesting food. The function of digestion, like 
those of respiration and circulation, is best left to 



IN RESPECT TO THE BODY. IOI 

itself ; nature takes the care of that into her own 
hands and resents all needless interference. 

The general hygienic rules of food require, I, in 
respect to quality or kind, the provision of such as 
will furnish all the elements that enter into the con- 
stitution of the body to form its bones, its muscles, 
its brains and nerves, and supply its motive force ; 
2, in respect to quantity, so much as will satisfy the 
cravings of a sound appetite ; 3, in respect to time, 
that it be taken at regular intervals and at leisure ; 
and 4, in respect to place and condition, that it be 
in retirement, in relaxation from care and thought, 
in society and with entertaining conversation. 

§ j6. This rule requires, in the second 
Exercise. place, a certain amount of well-regulated 

exercise for the healthy maintenance 
and development of the body. The vitality and 
restlessness of childhood are nature's provisions for 
that activity which is necessary at that period of 
life for the sound and vigorous condition of bodily 
organs. As intelligence advances, this duty of se- 
curing needful physical exercise is left more and 
more to the control of the reason, till old age comes 
on with its infirmities and its indisposition to bodily 
movement, when healthy activity of body is left to 
be sustained almost wholly by the spirit's activity. 
The involuntary functions, indeed, such as those of 
respiration and circulation continue ; and there is, 
besides, the strong force of fixed habit which, if 
right and sound, will go far in maintaining sound- 
ness and vigor of body. Still the bodily organism, 
which in childhood was redundant with life and 



102 PERSONAL DUTIES 

vigor and had no need of spur or goad, but rather 
of check and bridle, becomes in age inert and in- 
disposed to effort and needs nursing and animation 
from the spirit which inhabits it. The case is now- 
reversed in the relations of body and spirit ; in 
childhood the instinctive activity of the bodily or- 
ganism kept the spirit awake and earnest ; in old 
age the great source of activity and life to the body 
is in the spirit itself. 

The relation of muscular exercise to health con- 
sists in this : that sound health depends on the con- 
stancy and amount of the change effected in the 
body by the processes of waste and repair; and it is 
the action of the muscles in alternate contraction 
and relaxation, which acting immediately on the 
circulating organs, starts and sustains these proces- 
ses, supplying thus the force which carries forward 
the whole machinery of life. By this muscular ac- 
tion the blood is propelled in more rapid currents, 
forcing more rapid changes in all the minute cells to 
which it is carried, and thus stimulating the digest- 
ive, the respiratory, excretive, and formative func- 
tions of the living body. It is a force called in by 
the will, supplementing the proper instinctive move- 
ments of the bodily system. Most evidently the 
body was not designed to be left to its own instincts 
so as to take exclusive care of itself ; it is dependent 
on the care of the rational spirit. This care, being 
voluntary, comes under the control of morality which 
prescribes the duty, on the part of the rational 
spirit, to render this ministry freely and faithfully. 
Exercise is thus brought under rational control. 



IN RESPECT TO THE BODY. IO3 

It should be intelligently adapted to the wants and 
conditions of the body in respect of time and of de- 
gree. It should be systematic and habitual, while 
at the same time it should be held to be simply 
subservient to the higher interests of the spirit in 
so far as these interests are involved in the sound 
condition of the body. 

§ 7 7. Together with food and exercise, 
Rest - this general duty of nourishing the body 

involves a due provision for rest. There 
is a tidal character to the bodily life ; it has its ebbs 
and flows. While it demands exercise, it demands 
also responsive rest. Nature has thus ordained 
sleep, in which voluntary action and- communication 
with things without are suspended. The needful 
amount of sleep to the soundest health varies with 
individual natures and conditions. To determine 
this amount for one's self is the task assigned to his 
rational nature. There may be such a thing here 
as excess or there may be deficiency. The rule of 
duty requires that it be intelligently determined in 
amount ; that it be regular ; and that it be brought 
under the control of the laws of sound habit. 

There are other modes of rest needful 
Recreation. f or fa e b est condition of the body. They 

are, for the most part at least, for wake- 
ful life, comprehended under the general denomina- 
tion of recreation. If by this term in its most gen- 
eric application only change of employment be un- 
derstood, it must be borne in mind that for the most 
part the labor to be interchanged with rest is im- 
posed by some law or principle, or necessity from 



104 PERSONAL DUTIES 

without, and that the most effective and most salu- 
tary change must be a change from such activity to 
activity that is free and spontaneous. The highest 
and best recreation, simply as recreation, is thus 
proper play. And as competitive play calls forth 
the highest and freest exertion, games of skill or 
agility furnish the best kind of recreation, particu- 
larly for youth who are yet comparatively strangers 
to the satisfaction that comes, through habit or 
through interest awakened by experience, from 
chosen employments. With the well-trained man 
of mature age, simple change of pursuit wisely di- 
rected, may constitute the best recreation. But the 
need of this rest.by means of recreation or change 
of activity, in order to the soundest physical condi- 
tion, remains the unquestioned fact ; and the law of 
duty requires that it be wisely and of set purpose' 
provided in character and amount to meet those 
wants of the body. 

§78. III. It is the duty of every one to 

3. To rule it. m / e fog own body. 

The union in one being of two such 
opposites as body and spirit makes it necessary that 
one or the other should have the mastery. There 
cannot be two masters here. A divided sovereignty 
is the worst of anarchies. The higher nature of the 
spirit determines that it should wield the scepter. 
The wretchedness of a bondage to bodily appetite 
evinces that the body was never designed by its 
Creator to rule the spirit. Its function and station 
is that of organ and minister. It is the duty of the 
spirit to maintain this relation and keep the body 



IN RESPECT TO THE BODY. 105 

ever in subjection. It is practicable to meet the 
legitimate demands of the body in accordance with 
the true interests of the spirit. The apostolic in- 
junction to eat and drink to the glory of the Creator 
presupposes this practicability of gratifying the 
wants of the body in subserviency to the higher in- 
terests of morality and religion which concern the 
spirit only. The body is adapted in perfect wisdom 
to be the organ of the spirit and its best condition 
is that in which it can serve the spirit best as such 
organ. 

§ 79 The particulars of this rule by the 

1. By resisting spirit over the body are the following : — 

its inertia. , 

I. It is the part of the spirit to resist 
the bodily tendency to inertness — to ease, inac- 
tion, sloth. 

This is the perpetual bent of the body as mate- 
rial, which requires perpetual watchfulness and re- 
sistance. 

§ 80. 2. It is the part of the spirit to direct 

2. By regulating an d regulate the appetites of the body. 

its appetites. ° L x J 

Being planted in our natures, they have 
a lawful position and existence there. They are not 
to be extirpated ; they are to be trained and regu- 
lated in respect to the degree and manner in which 
they are to be indulged. They easily become inor- 
dinate in their cravings, and through unbridled al- 
lowance come to be beyond easy control. They are 
to be indulged also, in entire subordination to the 
interests of the spirit. Hunger, however intense, 
may not satiate itself on anything and everything 

on which it can seize. It must respect the rights of 

5* 



IOO PERSONAL DUTIES. 

others, as well as the decencies and proprieties of 
personal life. They need to be kept in subjection 
to the respective end and design which they were 
created to subserve. The very indulgence of them 
should be not only intelligent, decent, and rightful ; 
it should in addition be made habitually serviceable 
to the interests of the spirit. 

§ 8 1. 3. The body should be trained to 

3. By training it habits of direct ministry to the spirit. 

to right habits. , J 

The senses, the limbs, the body gen- 
erally should be used and controlled for this service. 
In manifold ways and applications may this minis- 
try of the body to the spirit be enforced. The ques- 
tions that press in common upon all men : " What 
shall we eat, what shall we drink, and wherewithal 
shall we be clothed," are not to be held as para- 
mount, but as subordinate to those higher questions 
which pertain to the nourishment, and protection, 
and gratification of the spirit. 

§ 82. 4. The spirit should, in a certain 

4. By being su- sense, live above bodily infirmities and 

penor to its in- J 

firmities. distresses. 

There is such a thing as tranquillity 
and joy even in sickness and anguish of body. 
These conditions may be made to work for the 
spirit's good ; even in them, therefore, the spirit 
may rejoice. Not infrequently Christian submis- 
sion and Christian hope lift the soul to higher peace 
and enjoyment by means of bodily weakness and 
pain. In such cases we recognize the true relation 
of the soul as one of mastery and supremacy to the 
body. 



PERSONAL DUTIES, ETC. 107 



CHAPTER III. 

PERSONAL DUTIES IN RESPECT TO EXTERNAL 
CONDITION. 

§ 83. Every man exists in a moral 
Nature and relationship to other things around him. 
He is a part of a great whole, and must 
recognize himself as such in determining his duties. 
From this relationship, looking only on his side of 
the relation, there are seen to spring obligations 
which may properly be ranked as personal ; while, 
at the same time, in perfect harmony with these 
and in part exactly corresponding to them, there 
are seen, as we look on the things around him, to 
arise on their part claims on his care and effort, 
which take the proper character of social duties. 

Simply because man exists as one member of 
this relation, from a regard to his own being and 
destiny, and irrespectively of all claim of other 
objects on him, there are duties of this personal 
class : — duties owing to himself, arising out of his 
own nature as formed in relationship to other things 
around him. 

These personal duties which respect the external 



108 PERSONAL DUTIES 

condition may be classed under those which respect 
external nature ; property ; station ; and friends. 

§ 84. Personal Duties in respect to 

Nature. 

Man is a part of a system of things with which, 
for his own good, he is bound to keep himself in 
sympathetic and harmonious relation. This system 
embraces objects existing in space and events 
occurring in time. Amid these objects and these 
events his life is cast. He must come in contact 
with them every moment. He is dependent on 
them as well as able to influence them. As all are 
ordered and disposed by the same loving intelli- 
gence, his course among them may, if he order it 
aright, be peaceable, prosperous, happy ; whereas 
if he misdirect his course or his individual actions, 
collision, difficulty, evil of manifold forms, must 
certainly arise. 

The particular personal duties springing 

1. DutyofSym- \ . /. l ? & 

pathy with things out of this relation are the tollowmg : 
1. It is every man's duty to recognize 
himself as placed in this relation to the objects 
around him and the course of events, as a part ; to 
be and to act in them and with them in perfect 
harmony, in cordial sympathy, and in reciprocal 
inter-dependence. The fundamental maxim of 
reason here is : maintain yourself ever in kindly 
sympathy with the order of nature and of 
providence. 

2. It is every man's duty to view and 

2 . Of recogmz- J J . 

in g their bench- treat the order of nature and 01 provi- 
dence, as wisely designed to be in 



IN RESPECT TO CONDITION. IOQ 

perpetual ministry of good to him. The evils that 
come along to be borne in this system of things 
are in consequence of a thwarting of this design 
directly or indirectly by himself or by others ; and 
what there are may be turned to profit, if not 
otherwise, at least through the better furtherance 
of higher spiritual interests. In the ordering of 
affairs the wise and beneficent power that created, 
ever holds the sceptre, and is ever out of seeming 
evil educing a higher good. It is man's own fault 
if all things do not work together for his good. 

3. It is every man's duty to uphold, so 

3. Of furthering . J J . l ' 

their end or de- tar as he may, and to improve and 
perfect the disposition and condition of 
things in nature and the general course of events. 
This disposition of things and course of events 
have a good end and design. Every thing exists 
or occurs for some good. Every plant that grows 
has a nature and an end of its own. It is every 
man's duty, not to destroy, not to waste, not to 
prevent, but rather, as in the case of his body, to 
nourish and protect. Crystalline symmetry, vege- 
table beauty, animal grace, are to be admired, 
enjoyed, improved, not maimed or marred. 

4. It is every man's duty to make the 

4. Of profiting . ' J 

by their minis- order of things and events subservient 
to his own highest uses, and not be 
servilely ruled by it. He may not be able in 
manifold respects to change or break up this order ; 
but he can direct and control its influence upon 
himself so as that he shall, after all and in the 
whole, be the master and not the slave. 



iio personal duties 

§ 85. Personal Duties in respect to 

Ground of right p T , npFTx >TV 
to property. x KurLki x ' 

While there are some things existing 
about us which cannot be appropriated, as for the 
most part air and light, there are others which 
may be held as property — as one's own, and not 
another's. Corresponding to this is the instinct, the 
desire of property, founded in man's nature. This 
is the ultimate ground for the rights and duties in 
regard to property — the constitution of things in 
which on the one hand are objects to be appro- 
priated or held as one's own, and on the other hand 
the instinct to possess such objects. This is the 
foundation for the general right of property only, 
however, and is not the foundation for the right to 
hold any specific object or property. That I have 
a right to hold property is proved from the nature 
of things around me and of my own person ; that I 
have a right to hold this house or this book, or any 
specific property, depends on something besides this 
general, absolute right of property founded in my 
nature. 

§ 86. The institution of property is one 

Uses of prop- of the wisegt beneficence> This prop _ 

osition remains true although it should 
be conceded that the history of property, of the 
working of the greed for gain in self-torture and 
degradation, and in wrongs and distresses to others, 
in frauds and thefts and robberies, and quarrels, 
and wars, makes up a great part of the history of 
evil among men. These evils are but the abuses 
of the native instinct for property in man. The 



IN RESPECT TO CONDITION. I I I 

great evil in the abuse proves the great good lying 
in the right use. The beneficent working of this 
institution of property is seen in the immediate 
effect on the individual, keeping him awake and 
vigilant, careful and prudent, earnest and enterpri- 
sing, frugal and industrious, keeping him thus from 
vicious sloth and recklessness ; and on the general 
welfare in increasing the supply of necessaries and 
of comforts for the good of the race, as well as 
of those things which minister to the elevation and 
refinement of mankind. In the expressive language 
of Chancellor Kent : " The sense of property is 
graciously bestowed upon mankind for the purpose 
of raising them from sloth and stimulating them to 
action. It leads to the cultivation of the earth, the 
institution of government, the establishment of 
justice, the acquisition of the comforts of life, the 
growth of the useful arts, the spirit of commerce, 
the productions of taste, the exertions of charity, 
and the display of the benevolent affections." 

§87. The right to property in any 
^otJrtyrda- specific thing is ever only relative. 
tive. My r ight to my house may be perfect 

as against my neighbor ; but my ownership is not 
absolute, for the state may rightfully take it from 
me on occasions of its necessity. The house, which 
is mine to the fullest extent as against all other 
individuals, may be destroyed to stop a general con- 
flagration without any consent on my part ; it may 
be removed if standing in the way of a great pub- 
lic improvement ; it may be appropriated for the 
government's uses in pestilence or in war. So if I 



112 PERSONAL DUTIES 

have found money in the highway, it is mine as 
against any other person, except the owner or his 
representative, or the public officer ; no other one 
has a right to take it from me or to interfere with 
my treatment of it, except in the simple interest of 
the loser or of the public. Farther than this, all 
rights of property in man are but the rights of 
stewards, holding all subject to the higher and all 
embracing ownership of God. The right of property 
thus is ever relative, not absolute. 

§ 88. There are three relations of right 
tionship! d rda " an d duty in which man stands to prop- 
erty: — of acquisition, holding, and dis- 
posal. Man brought nothing into the world ; he 
carries nothing out. He must acquire whatever 
he comes to hold ; he holds only for a time ; he 
must sooner or later dispose of all he ever holds. 

§ 89. Property is acquired in the several 
q^ion! aC " wa Y s oi: I. Appropriation of what is 
common or unappropriated, as of new- 
discovered land ; 2. Labor, as by imparting new 
value to material or extracting new values from 
the earth by mining or by culture ; 3. Exchange of 
one commodity for another ; 4. Gift, or inheritance 
from others. 

§ 90. The personal duties in respect to 
quM^U'ty. Property are the following : 

I. It is man's duty to acquire property. 

The law of instinct as to property he should 

obey for his own good — for the cultivation of all 

those manifold and most important virtues which 

arc fostered in the right acquisition and use of 



IN RESPECT TO CONDITION. 113 

property and the avoidance of all those vices which 
spring from a disregard of this instinct. He 
should obey this law of his nature for the good of 
others, that he may be more capable of minister- 
ing to their welfare. This is the general rule of 
duty, that he seek to increase the general stock 
of goods that may be held as property by men, 
avoiding all unnecessary waste and destruction of 
property. 

2. It is man's duty to acquire, hold, and 
in subordination. use Property only in strict subordination 

to higher principles. 
Property, wealth, is to be considered and treated 
only as a means, not as an end. Not for itself, but 
for what it may occasion or effect, is it to be sought 
or held. It is to be acquired and held, moreover, 
in conformity with principles of equity, and in 
deference to the higher claims to it of the state and 
of God. It is to be sought and managed so as to 
promote the virtues in character with which it is 
so clearly associated, such as those of wakefulness, 
enterprise, industry, prudence, economy, benefi- 
cence. It is to be pursued in moderation, subject 
ever to the duties of personal health and capacity, 
to other interests of the body and spirit, as well as 
to the interests and rights of others. It is to be 
disposed of wisely and usefully, as a most important 
trust, so as on the one hand to nurture the spirit 
of self-denial and of beneficence, and on the 
other hand, particularly in the final parting with 
it, so as to save from waste and misappropria- 
tion. 



114 personal duties. 

§ 91. Personal Duties in respect to Sta- 
tion. 

Under the comprehensive term station, is here 

included all that in a man's condition which gives 

him power and influence over others. It includes 

the distinctions of family, of personal 

Distinctions in re- ,1 n ■> ••.•, r • i • ,• -. 

spect to station, worth and ability, of social position, and 
of civil rank and office. 

There is in human nature this instinct 
l Sctive P ° Wer of ambition— of desire of power and 

influence over others, and men are so 
constituted as to be susceptible to this influence. 
The very notion of a social nature in beings, like 
men, involves this relation of influence and depend- 
ence. The proper culture and regulation of this 
instinct is thus imposed on man by his very nature 
and his relations to his fellow men. 

The desire of power, like the desire of wealth, is 
an instinct of man's nature, giving rise thus to a 
peculiar species of personal duty. It differs widely 
from that desire in respect to the character of its 
object : the desire of property fastens on things 
that have no rights ; the desire of power is directed 
towards men endowed with rights. We do not 
hold men as we hold property. We can manage 
property with no regard to any claim inherent in 
itself to be respected ; we can manage men right- 
fully, only as free beings, only as having rights 
equally with ourselves. We may lawfully desire 
the power to influence their condition, to mould 
their opinions, to draw their affections, to determine 
their actions ; but only in the way in which free, 



IN RESPECT TO CONDITION. I I 5 

intelligent, and loving beings are to be influenced 
and in accordance with all the principles of social 
duty. Emphatically no true or lawful ambition can 
ever seek power over others by lowering or crip- 
pling them in any way. In its lawful workings, 
ambition can only aim at the advancement and 
elevation of the condition of others. 

The evils rightly attributable to wrong or false 
ambition, are to be paralleled in extent and severity 
with those that have flowed from the evil thirst for 
gain. Such evils are to be regarded as the results 
of the abuse of this principle. On the other hand, 
the blessings to mankind, which are traceable to 
this instinct, may well be set over against the evils 
from its abuse. The elevation of the individual, 
the advancement of society, the promotion of all 
industrial and elegant arts, the extension of science 
and learning, the furtherance of freedom, the 
accumulation of the blessings generally which make 
up our idea of a true civilization, could hardly be 
conceived of as attainable, except through the labor 
and sufferings of men actuated by a worthy 
ambition. 

To be without any aspiration for the esteem, the 
confidence, the gratitude, the respect of others, on 
which a lawful ambition must ever rely as the con- 
dition of its proper power to bless them, and, 
moreover, to be without any aspiration to be able to 
influence favorably their welfare, is to be without 
one of the noblest endowments of man. His own 
perfection, irrespectively of the effects on others, 
demands the recognition and the careful culture of 



Il6 PERSONAL DUTIES 

this instinctive desire of power. It is to be cul- 
tivated, however, only in moderation, that is, in 
due subordination to other principles of our own 
nature and to the rights and needs of others. It 
is to be exercised, moreover, as well as cultivated, 
in strict regard to all those principles which 
regulate our actions towards our fellow men. 

§ 92. Personal Duties in respect to 

Friendship. FRIENDSHIP. 

In conjunction with the desires for 
property and for power, we find in man's nature the 
desire for friendship. This instinct finds its fitting 
objects in society. 

We discover at once a line of personal duty 
leading from this natural relationship. Its signifi- 
cance to human life is well likened by Cicero to 
that of the sun to the external world. 

Like property and power, friends are to 
dutST^ b e acquired, and held, and treated, under 

certain clear and familiar moral princi- 
ples. The particulars of personal duty here may be 
thus summarily enounced : 

1. The spirit of friendship is to be considerately 
nourished and developed. 

2. The acquisition of friends is to be effected by 
a right regard to the conditions of friendship. 
Friendship is a reciprocity ; it cannot exist except 
as what is required shall be freely given, of confi- 
dence, esteem, forbearance, good-will. We win 
friends only by being friendly : we gain the 
confidence and esteem of others by trusting and 
esteeming them. The selection is to be governed 



IN RESPECT TO CONDITION. II7 

by considerations of fitness, congeniality, moral wor- 
thiness, and helpfulness. 

3. The maintenance of friendship is to be sought 
through the faithful discharge of the friendly 
offices, not with self-seeking, but in disinterested 
affection. True love, here as everywhere, is so far 
a setting aside of self as object. Charitable con- 
structions of fault, and forbearance towards imper- 
fections, are eminent duties in the maintenance of 
friendship. 

4. The particular rights and duties of friendship 
are to be determined in intelligent consideration of 
the general principles of morality. Friendly feeling 
and acting are to be held in due moderation. They 
should never be allowed to transgress the funda- 
mental laws of truth and justice, of patriotism and 
piety. 



I I 8 PERSONAL DUTIES 



CHAPTER IV. 

PERSONAL DUTIES IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. 

§ 93. By character, as the term is 

Character v -, , i i • • r 

defined. applied to a moral being, is meant a iorm 

of spirit, and by a perfect character is 
meant a perfect form of spirit. 

The moral relation of a man to his character lies 
in the fact that as a free being he is charged with 
the shaping of his own character under the condi- 
tions in which he is placed. He has a certain in- 
stinct of character — an innate desire to be perfect. 
This instinct, unrepressed and unperverted, prompts 
towards an ideal of excellence both in regard to 
character generally, and also in respect to particular 
actions, the aggregate of which constitutes char- 
acter. It is thus a law of man's nature that he pre- 
fers perfection in everything that he does or is. 
His sense of freedom causes him to feel that the 
formation of his own character is, under certain con- 
ditions, in his own hands. He feels, consequently, 
that he is responsible for what he is and may become, 
so far as his moral nature is concerned. He is free 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. I IQ 

to choose his ideal of character ; he is free to bring 
his actions under this ideal ; he is free to observe 
the conditions by which his particular activity may 
go to nourish up and shape a perfect character. 

Personal duties in respect to character fill out a 
great part of the whole field of personal duty. The 
duties of condition arc, in fact, subordinate and sub- 
servient to the duties of character. And all relative 
duty is harmonious with duty here, and also, in fact, 
subservient. Every right act goes to form a perfect 
character ; as every wrong act mars or enfeebles it. 
The consciousness of perfect character, in connec- 
tion with the divine favor, which is indeed the life 
of such a consciousness, is the condition of the 
highest possible blessedness. 

§ 94. There are several things involved 
inStesT m tne formation of character which may 

advantageously be separately presented. 

First, the formation of character implies 

1. An ideal. an ideal — a model — to which the spirit 

is to be developed and shaped. 
Secondly, it implies also a well-directed 

2. Endeavor, and persistent endeavor to mould the 

spirit into this ideal. 

Thirdly, it presupposes the principle of 

3. Habit. habit as the condition of spiritual growth 

and shaping, and involves compliance 
with the laws of habit. 

The nature of habit and its necessary laws may 
be exhibited very summarily thus The most 
essential attribute of the human spirit is activity. 
We accordingly most perfectly represent it to our- 



120 PERSONAL DUTIES 

selves under the ideas of motion. The activity of 
the spirit moves toward an end ; and of this motion, 
as of all motion, the two comprehensive views are 
those which respect its direction or tendency and 
its momentum or intensity. We seek, accordingly, 
as the first things in a perfect character, first, a right 
tendency or disposition, meaning by this a right 
direction in the general activity of the spirit ; and 
secondly, the putting forth the full energy of the 
spirit in this activity. 

The two great principles of habit are, accordingly, 
first, that the spirit moves in the direction and with 
the energy given it by any and every impulse on its 
activity ; and secondly, that it holds on in this given 
direction and with this imparted energy till impressed 
by a new force. 

Fourthly, it presupposes such a wise 
aid Pr0Vidential ordering of things and of events in the 
world around it as to further the forma- 
tion of a perfect character. 

This outer world presents the chief objects and 
occasions which call forth the activity of the spirit. 
On a priori grounds we must suppose that the in- 
finite wisdom and goodness of the Creator and Ruler 
of the world would frame and govern it so as to 
work harmoniously and helpfully in respect to the 
spirit's growth and perfection. Actual scrutiny re- 
veals to us the truth that the influences from with- 
out ourselves either are positive helps or they are 
hindrances which, with the divine help, may be 
overcome, and so, through the very struggle which 
they occasion, be made helpful. The actual expe- 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. 121 

rience of men demonstrates the practicability of 
perfecting character in the gracious conditions which 
are thus furnished to them. 

§ 95. The general maxims by which we 
character * are to be governed in- the formation of 

character may be derived from this sum- 
mary view of what it implies : 

First, keep ever before the forming 

1. ideal. spirit the highest and most perfect ideal 

of character. 

This ideal is to be formed by contemplation of 
examples or models of excellence ; by study of the 
divine will as revealed in his acts and ways, but 
especially in his word ; and by reflection on our own 
capabilities. This ideal, it is to be borne in mind, 
will in the progress of experience be ever rising, 
enlarging, perfecting itself. To it as it is formed, are 
to be conformed all the free movements of the spirit, 
so that its whole activity shall be shaping it into the 
proposed ideal. 

It is the proper function of the imagination to 
shape this ideal, and also to keep it before the 
spirit. Its province here will be more fully pre- 
sented under the culture of that faculty. 

Secondly, yield freely to every right 

2. impulse. impulse from within or from without, 

and vigorously resist and overpower 
every impulse in a wrong direction. 

The nature of habit instructs us that every im- 
pression on the mind and heart, as well as every 
exertion we put forth in thought, or in feeling, or in 
purpose, sets the spirit further on its way, or turns 



122 PERSONAL DUTIES 

it back or aside. Not an impression, not a thought 
or feeling, is without its effect on the spirit's condi- 
tion and character. A wrong influence, an evil 
yielding, may be afterwards thrown off or repented 
of ; but the spirit remains different from what it 
would have been had the resistance been effectual 
at the beginning. All received truths or errors, all 
pure or corrupt affections and desires, all good or 
evil purposes, enter into character and leave inef- 
faceable traces in it. All the indiscretions, the 
vices, the sins of earlier life, unite to make up and 
disfigure the character of mature age, as does every 
just thought and pure desire and kind endeavor 
leave its impress on the permanent state of the 
spirit. The omniscient eye reads in the actual con- 
dition and character of the soul's moral nature its 
whole past moral history. And this history, re- 
corded in the very condition of the spirit, makes 
practicable a just retribution for every past thought 
and deed. 

Thirdly, maintain a cheerful faith in the 
3. Trust. general helpfulness of all influences 

from without — from the world of objects 
and events around, from fellow men, from God 
himself. 

The positive aids are abundant and ample. The 
seeming hindrances turn to helps when rightly met 
and trusted. All true virtue in man presupposes 
struggle. Temptations to evil resisted and over- 
come are the chiefest conditions of advancing virtue. 
The power for good is greater than all the forces of 
evil, and controls them all. 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. 1 23 

Fourthly, Cultivate with special and 
4- Culture of separate care the three great depart- 
ments of spiritual activity — the sensibil- 
ity, the intelligence, and the free will. 

§ 96. The particulars of duty in the 
*;,;j^ sive culture of the sensibility are, first, in 
respect to the passive sensibility, that 
the soul be kept in wakeful, responsive sympathy 
with the world around — with the objects and beings, 
the events and actions, which make up the system 
of things of which it is a part ; that it allow its sus- 
ceptibilities to be engaged by the fitting objects and 
scenes, turning itself away from all that is unworthy, 
and keeping ever right impressions within due 
measure and degree. 

§ 97. Secondly, the duty in regard to 
Of^the imagina- ^g ac ti ve sensibility or the proper im- 
agination, embraces that of keeping it 
active and that of regulating its direction and 
degree. In this department of the mind's activity 
we find the chief instrument of self-culture. It is 
the function of the imagination to put into form all 
the material of character that comes to the mind 
through sense and reflection, and all conscious expe- 
rience. The impression which the outer world 
makes upon the mind, it takes and re-presents, 
more or less modified, to re-impress the soul and 
furnish thus material for ever new forms by which 
to reproduce the impression on itself. Thus the 
feeling of anger which an insult or an injury pro- 
duces, the imagination takes up and re-impresses, 
but now in deeper characters, and so goes on repeat- 



124 PERSONAL DUTIES 

ing the impression, or more truly perhaps, branding 
it deeper and deeper, till the angry feeling becomes 
a passion. All truth, all emotion, all endeavor, the 
imagination thus puts and keeps in form before and 
upon the soul so as to impress it, and ever in its 
continued exercises to make the impression deeper 
and deeper. It is in this way character forms itself 
and grows and strengthens. The spirit takes shape 
from these ideals which the ever active imagination 
is holding up before it and impressing upon it. Its 
character thus is much according to the imagina- 
tion. The vigorous imagination, impressing more 
energetically, develops a vigorous character. An 
imagination that is bright and sunny, and so ever 
holds up forms of hope and cheer before the spirit, 
makes a joyous, hopeful character. An impure 
imagination is ever busy, shaping to low and base 
thought and vicious desire and evil practice. A 
sound imagination, that takes up just and reasonable 
impressions, and represents them again to the soul 
in their harmony, and proportion, and exactness, 
forms the character to reasonableness and fairness 
and truthfulness. 

Thus it is through the whole catalogue of specific 
virtues and vices ; it is the imagination wnich is the 
chief instrumentality that determines their growth 
and so shapes the character which they constitute. 
It is a power that the will may awaken and direct 
and regulate to a degree ; but it works on sponta- 
neously when it is left to itself, with equal power to 
benefit or injure, to mend or mar the character of 
the spirit. A leading maxim, therefore, in self- 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. 1 25 

culture respects the imagination, and enjoins that it 
be kept alive and active, but that it be furnished with 
ideals that are true and pure and beneficent, while 
every impression or thought or act that can debase, 
or distort, or corrupt, are scrupulously kept from 
becoming part of the mass out of which it creates 
its forms and its images with which to impress the 
soul. 

There is a twofold training here imposed. There 
is the training of the mind in respect of its mere 
automatic nature, through which it tends to hold on 
in any activity awakened in it ; and there is the 
training also of the mind through its volitional 
nature, by which particular forms of its activity are 
freshly awakened and determined. A familiar illus- 
tration of the bearing of this principle of self-culture 
is in the training of the mind to the ready repro- 
duction of previous thoughts — of objects, facts, 
truths, words, previously in the mind. This power 
to reproduce the past on occasion of need, in the 
form of a reproductive memory, is mainly the result 
of the observance of two conditions : First, of 
giving what is thus to be remembered deep and 
distinct impression, giving the activity of the mind 
thus a strong, lasting impulse ; and secondly, of 
practicing the mind in formal exercises of recalling 
what has thus been received. The usefulness of 
committing to memory, and then of frequently re- 
peating passages in discourse that are rich in senti- 
ment, or beautiful in expression, or animating in 
effect, exemplifies and enforces this general prin- 
ciple of self-culture. 



126 PERSONAL DUTIES 

The obvious maxims accordingly of self-culture 
here, are : First, in respect to impressions received, 
keep the soul free only to pure and just and true 
impressions, and let the best impressions be deepest 
and strongest. Secondly, keep the highest and best 
ideals from these impressions of truth and nobleness 
and energy most before the spirit, and practice 
much the voluntary reproduction of these ideals. 

§ 98. The particulars of duty in the 
Seiii-ence. the culture of the intelligence respect the 

several operations of the mind in know- 
ing. There is, however, -first of all, and ever to be 
borne in mind, the fundamental duty here of keep- 
ing the intellect or faculty of knowledge awake and 
active, with due observance of its needs of rest — of 
absolute rest for a time from all voluntary intellec- 
tual exertion or of relative rest, recreation, by change 
of intellectual activity. 

§ 99. The primary operation of the in- 
Observation, telligence is that of observation, or, as it 

is technically named, of perception and 
intuition. The duty in self-culture here is to exer- 
cise and train the faculty of observing. ■ There are 
two sides in this operation — the passive side of 
receiving impressions from objects, and the active 
side of noticing or perceiving them. The two 
should be kept in responsive relation to each other, 
so that the perception or the intuition shall ex- 
actly answer to the impression on the sense, 
whether the outer or the inner. It is needful that, 
as has been indicated, the soul should train itself 
to be in wakeful sympathy and impressibility to- 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. \2J 

wards all that concerns it, and receive true and full 
impressions from these objects and occurrences, 
and then that the mind perceive these impressions — 
that the intelligence actively apprehend them both 
in respect to kind and degree. The specific maxims 
here are : Cultivate and train the instinct to know, 
developing a well directed curiosity — seek to knozv. 
Conform the perception accurately to the impres- 
sion, avoiding the confusion of impressions from 
divers objects and taking in the full impression — 
perceive as you feel. Make quick, accurate observa- 
tion a habit, that knowledge may be fed up and 
grow spontaneously and without labor of will, and 
at all times and in all occupations — observe habitu- 
ally. The intelligence may thus be trained to a 
constant and perpetual growth, which shall be main- 
tained in the engrossment of active life, as well as 
also in the lassitude or weakness of fatigue and 
sickness, and the heaviness of old age, so long as 
there can be sense to be impressed from without or 
from within. 

§ ioo. The second stage of intelli- 
Thought. gence is the reflective — the stage of 

proper thought. Perception is compar- 
atively worthless except it lead to reflection. Ani- 
mals observe ; it is the attribute of man to reflect. 
Observation is not thinking ; it is, however, the 
indispensable condition of thinking, and naturally 
leads to thinking. 

There are three stages in reflection or thought, 
presenting so many forms of our knowing activ- 
ity, to be separately and systematically cultivated. 



128 PERSONAL DUTIES 

judging. The first is that of simply judging — of 

recognizing, in what we observe, a sub- 
ject with its attribute. Every object of our knowl- 
edge presents to our thought that of which we 
think — the subject of our thought — and also that 
which we think of it — the attribute which we con- 
nect with this subject. 

The second stage of thought is the 
Classing. grouping of objects that have the same 

attribute — the logical generalization, or 
its counterpart, the grouping of attributes belonging 
to the same subject — logical determination. 

The third stage of thought is the deri- 
Reasoning. vation of one thought from another — 

logical reasoning. 
The duty in intellectual self-culture is thus com- 
prehensively that of training to ready, systematic, 
and accurate habits of judging, of generalizing and 
determining; and of reasoning. The principles ap- 
plicable to all training prescribe that in this intel- 
lectual self-culture these forms of thinking be sepa- 
rately recognized and practiced and regulated, so 
that habit shall keep the mind ever active in free, 
spontaneous, and therefore unwearying thought. 
In this lies the secret of great intellectual power — 
the result of wise and careful culture in a habit of 
ready, free or spontaneous, and accurate thought. 

§ 101. The third stage of intelligence is 
function 6 tne directive or regulative. Man is not 

only a reflective being ; he is also rational. 
That is, he is made to observe and reflect in refer- 
ence to some intelligent end or aim. Without this 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. I 29 

aiming intelligence, observation and reflection lead 
to no useful results ; they amount to little more than 
empty dreamings. The two stages in this form of 
intelligence are the selective and the proper regu- 
lative. 

First, in all observation and in all group- 
Seiectbn. ing of subjects or attributes — all logical 

generalization and determination — and 
all reasoning, the end or aim in respect to which 
the observation or the grouping or the reasoning is 
made, is to be consciously determined upon. 

Secondly, the actual observing, and gen- 
Regulation, eralizing, and reasoning, must be intel- 
ligently directed in reference to this 
selected end or aim. 

The duty in intellectual self culture here, then, is 
thus shaped and particularized : I . Have consciously 
an end or aim in all observing and thinking ; 2. 
Select the true and proper aim in the case; 3. Gov- 
ern the whole movement of the intelligence in 
subordination to this selected aim ; 4. Make this reg- 
ulative mental action habitual, so that it shall spon- 
taneously take place and properly direct in all 
intellectual effort. 

§ 102. The particulars of duty in the 
£eeS° f the culture of the free-will are suggested 

by the leading attributes of this func- 
tion of the mind. 

First, the free-will is essentially a power. 
1. As a power. It is, accordingly, to be cultivated as a 

power by supplying to it the suitable 

occasions for its exertion, and by actually exciting 

6* 



I3O PERSONAL DUTIES 

it in conformity with its nature, and to the highest 
degree. Human life offers ample occasions for the 
exercise of choice— determination. These occasions 
are to be sought, and such as are best fitted to the 
culture of the spirit selected. One may throw 
himself into a condition where there is little call 
for selection or decision, where all is stagnation, or 
quiet, changeless drift ; or he may place himself 
where there is call for determination and effort. 
All choice involves responsibility ; but to shun oc- 
casions for free determination in shrinking from the 
responsibilities which attend it, is a mark of weak- 
ness, and inevitably stunts and dwarfs character. 
Strength grows by use. That the free-will as a power 
may increase, it must be judiciously exercised. This 
is the first injunction of duty in self-culture, so far 
as it respects the free-will. 

§ 103. Secondly, the ' free-will is the 
2. As sovereign, dominant element in man. Its proper 

culture must train it to the maintenance 
of this sovereignty over the rest of his being. It 
must rule the body in its appetites and propensi- 
ties and tendencies, and never suffer itself to be 
overpowered by them. It must rule the sensibility, 
keeping it awake to its duty, sympathetic, and im- 
pressible by the objects around it, and never suffer 
it to be swept away in any torrent of temptation or 
of evil influence. It must rule the intelligence, 
keeping it active, quick-sighted, reflective, and mov- 
ing ever in the line of principle or rational aim and 
purpose, and never suffer itself to be overborne 
and lost in the accumulations of learning. It must 



IX RESPECT TO CHARACTER. 1 3 I 

rule ever the culture of all the other capacities and 
powers, both enforcing this culture and controlling- 
its direction and its proportionate degree in the 
several departments of man's nature. It is to rule, 
and in order to maintain its rule must actually ex- 
ert its sway, and act out its ruling power. It is 
to train itself to this habitual sway over the whole 
being in order to secure its highest perfection. 
Duty in self-culture enjoins that the free-will be 
trained to rule as sovereign over the whole man. 

§ 104. Thirdly, the will is free. Free- 
3. As free. dom is of the very essence of the will. 

Its originative and determining power 
is to be recognized and put in exercise in order to 
its proper growth. There is meaning and force in 
this direction : be determined ; — be determined in 
particular acts of will, in particular choices and de- 
terminations ; be determined as a habit ; seek to 
make it a settled thing, that determination is de- 
termination ; that it is one's self that determines 
and not another, and that each determination 
shoulders the full responsibility that properly at- 
taches to it ; that each determination is sovereign 
for the whole mind and body. In this recognition 
and culture of the will as free, it must not be for- 
gotten that, like the whole active nature of man, 
the will is truly automatic — that is, that once im- 
pelled it keeps on its action, as thus impelled in 
direction and force, till a new determination comes 
in to change its course or energy. Without this au- 
tomatic attribute, it could not be subject to any 
true culture, it could attain no proper character. I 



132 PERSONAL DUTIES 

determine thus to walk to a certain spot ; the deter- 
mination, by virtue of this automatic characteristic, 
acts on, moving my steps with no necessary fresh 
act of consciousness, bending my course along the 
determined way, bringing me to the purposed des- 
tination, with no necessary repetition of the deter- 
mining act. The path of human experience is 
ever forking, and so calling for true selecting and 
determining action. To train one's self to habits 
of quick and just resolve, in all these experiences, 
is one of the most important parts of self-culture. 
A resolute character, while it is the result of judi- 
cious and faithful training, is one of man's highest 
attainments. A weak, hesitating, vacillating, irres- 
olute spirit has none to blame but itself for what 
it is. The dictate of duty here, is : Train the 
free-will to be really free in all free action, uncon- 
strained by any force foreign to its nature or its 
sphere. 

§ 105. Fourthly, the human will is 
4. As finite. finite. It begins its action in weakness, 

and has in its own nature the limits of 
its particular exertions and of its attainments of 
power. Its nature is that of dependence. It is 
dependent for every occasion of its exercise, with 
the small exception, perhaps, of what is furnished 
by its own previous acts. It is dependent on the 
other mental functions — the sensibility and the intel- 
ligence. It can act only as it feels and has its ob- 
ject presented before it in suitable form by the 
imagination ; and only as it acts intelligently, in 
the light of the properties and relations of its ob- 



IN RESPECT TO CHARACTER. 1 33 

jects. At least the free-will can never act as it 
should, except under the lead and prompting of 
the enlightened sensibility. True freedom is not 
arbitrariness, nor obstinacy ; it is rational, — that is, 
sympathetic with things around and moving in 
light and knowledge. When it sinks to dogged- 
ness or mulishness, it sinks from rationality to ani- 
malism. A finite, rational free-will, such as is that 
of man, is accordingly believing. It is animated by 
a true depending faith on objects and powers with- 
out itself. It accepts the occasions for its exercise 
which are offered to it, and makes no quarrel with 
fate, as assured that in its high prerogative of free- 
dom, under the rule of a gracious Providence, it de- 
termines its own destiny, of perfectness or of ruin. 
The rule of duty here is : Train the free-will to 
habits of trustful dependence. 

We have thus the summary of maxims for the 
culture of the free-will : i. Exercise it in sought 
occasions ; 2. Let it rule, and ever be the domi- 
nant power of the soul ; 3. Be freely determined, 
and grow to a resolute habit ; 4. Depend with a 
trustful faith on nature, and on Providence. 



DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN. 



BOOK II. 



DIVISION II. 



DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN. 



INTRODUCTION. 

§ 1 06. The general division of duties 
Classes. to our fellow-men embraces those 

which respect men individually or sim- 
ply as persons, and those which respect men collec- 
tively or as united in society. This latter class 
includes the two species of duties, which arise un- 
der the two great social organizations established 
among men — the family and the state. 

We have thus the several sub-divisions of the 
duties to our fellow-men, as follows : — 
I. Duties to Persons ; 
II. Duties in the Family; and 
III. m Duties in the State. 
We will consider them in this order. 



DUTIES TO PERSONS. 1 35 



PART I. 



DUTIES TO PERSONS. 



CHAPTER I. 



CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES TO PERSONS. 



§ 107. Classifications of duties to per. 
v5bn Ple ° f dl ~ sons ma Y Properly be grounded on either 

one of the three constituents enter- 
ing into all duty — love in the subject of duty, good 
in the object of duty, and right in the act of duty. 
In fact, duties are named in common speech, accord- 
ing as one or the other of these constituents is 
made prominent. It should be ever borne in mind, 
however, that there can be no instance of duty in 
which is not to be found each of these constitu- 
ents — love, good, right. In the classification of du- 
ties, which we shall adopt as seeming to be most in 
accordance with the requirements of true science, 
each of these three constituents will be recognized 
as a principle of enumeration. It is necessary, 
however, to -caution against the possible notion that 
a duty mentioned in one class does not embrace 
the constituent, which is the principle in another 



I36 DUTIES TO PERSONS. 

class — against supposing, for example, that vera- 
city excludes sympathy, or that benevolence excludes 
justice. There cannot be, in the possibility of 
things, moral veracity without a loving subject, nor 
moral benevolence without rectitude. But, as gen- 
erally in the case of mental phenomena, the partic- 
ular act is characterized by the predominant feature 
in it. 



DUTIES TO PERSONS, ETC. 137 



CHAPTER II. 

DUTIES TO PERSONS DETERMINED FROM THE SUB- 
JECT OF DUTY. 



Threefold divi 
sion. 



§ 108. Duties to persons founded on 
the principle of love in the subject of 
duty are distinguishable into three clas - 
ses, in respect to the three stages or degrees in 
which the moral nature of the subject is engaged : — 
loving sentiment, appearing in the duty of sym- 
pathy ; loving disposition, appearing in the gener- 
ic duty of kindliness ; loving act, appearing in the 
generic duty of benevolence. 

§ 109. It is the duty of every man to 
1. Sympathy, cherish a sentiment of sympathy with 
all his fellow men. 
They are entitled to this sentiment by virtue of 
their being men ; it is one of their rights. Pagan 
and christian morality, alike, recognize this duty. 
The classic sentiment that to man as man nothing 
of human concern can be foreign to his interest ; 
Homo sum ; Jinmani nihil a me alienum puto, is 
embodied in the christian injunction to " rejoice 
with them that do rejoice, and weep with those that 



I38 DUTIES TO PERSONS. 

weep." The fundamental duty of man to his fel- 
low man, as determined by his very nature, is that 
he sympathize and cherish a true and ever growing 
sympathy with every true interest of his fellow man. 

This duty of sympathy is universal. It is owing 
to man as man. 

The degrees and the forms of this sympathy vary 
with the degrees of relationship, and with the con- 
ditions of men as affording occasions for this 
sympathy. 

It is variously modified, also, in respect to the 
object of sympathy. The English language 
abounds in works derived from the Greek, the 
Latin, and the vernacular Ang]o-Saxon, signifying 
the divers degrees or forms of this affection. We 
have thus condolence in reference to persons in sor- 
row ; compassion, commiseration, pity, in reference 
to persons in suffering need ; mercy, clemency, leni- 
er.cy, in reference to the ill-deserving. There are 
also corresponding words, signifying the negative 
or opposite of these graces of character, such as ; 
hard-hearted, inhuman, rancorous. 

§ no. It is the duty of every. man to 
2. Kindliness, embody this sympathetic spirit in the 
active instincts of his nature, thus form- 
ing a proper disposition which unites to the funda- 
mental sympathy, desire and tendency to expres- 
sion. This is the general duty of kindliness, of 
being genial. 

This class of duties embraces the divers modifi- 
cations expressed in such terms as liberality, gen- 
erosity, charitableness, bounteousness, and the neg- 



DETERMINED FROM SUBJECT OF DUTY. 1 39 

atives or opposites of the disposition, such as : 
illiberal, churlish, grudging, jealous, envious, and 
those denoting the different forms of selfishness, 
as miserly, niggardly, sordid, mercenary, greedy, 
and the like. 

§ in. It is the duty of every man, 
3. Benevolence, still farther, to carry out this sympa- 
thetic disposition into positive act on 
every occasion that may properly invite — to put his 
kindly disposition into actual expression, in loving 
endeavors or benevolence. 

The comprehensive maxim in this general divis 
ion of duties to persons, is : Be habitually loving 
to all men. The specific maxims, founded on the 
several distinguishable stages of development of 
the principle of love, are : Be sympathetic ; be 
kindly or genial ; love all men. 

§ 1 1 2. Under this general duty is inclu- 
Resentments. ded a species of duties which are in their 
nature responsive, and are by this char- 
acteristic distinguished from the rest of the class. 
They are proper resentments — in the old and more 
comprehensive meaning of the word, denoting 
properly, feelings back or in return for what we have 
experienced from others. This species includes the 
several duties arising in response to good and to 
evil experienced from another. 

§ 113. Gratitude is the duty respon- 
Gratitude. sive to the reception of good. It is an 

instinctive impulse of man's nature to 
be thankful for kindness. 

Gratitude is a sentiment, the cherishing and ex- 



140 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

pression of which not only meets a demand of con- 
science, but gives itself a peculiar joy ; the good, the 
blessedness, for which man is made, is, in large part, 
to be secured by the exercise of gratitude. The 
obligation arising from favors can often be dis- 
charged only by a grateful spirit. Our great poet 
well says : 

A grateful mind, 

By owing, owes not, but still pays, at once, 

Indebted and discharged. 

But gratitude is not merely a grace — a sentiment 
cherished in the bosom of the recipient of favors, 
or merely expressed in words ; it is a virtue also — an 
outward act of good to the benefactor in appropri- 
ate ways and measures. The simple law of grati- 
tude is that for every good received, a correspond- 
ing good be returned to the benefactor. 

As a moral exercise, gratitude is due only to in- 
tentional benefactors. It is due only to moral per- 
sons ; and is due to them only so far as they act 
morally, that is, intentionally. The good that comes 
to us through others acting without intention as 
mere occasions, calls for gratitude only to the ben- 
eficent Disposer of all things. For this good, in- 
asmuch as it is unceasing, gratitude as unceasing is 
due to Him. Hence, one of the most fundamental 
and comprehensive duties of man is an habitually 
grateful spirit. 

§ 114. The resentment responsive to 
Anger. ill received takes a two-fold form : that 

of anger prompting to retaliation, and 
that of forgiveness. 



DETERMINED FROM SUBJECT OF DUTY. I4I 

Anger is an instinct of man's nature, arising at 
once and spontaneously, on receiving an injury 
from another. 

So deeply implanted in man is the feeling that 
evil comes from a person, and that all suffering 
comes from a wrong-doer, that in children and in 
uncultivated men anger is freely exercised towards 
brutes and inanimate objects when occasioning pain 
or suffering, where there cannot be supposed to be 
any intention. But anger properly respects only 
persons intending the evil which awakens it, and is 
in fact but the natural sentiment of justice in re- 
spect to a wrong-doer. 

In selfish natures, like man's, the duty in refer- 
ence to anger is chiefly that of moderating it, so 
that it shall only be exercised towards real wrong- 
doers and shall never be allowed to be excessive, 
either in respect to the evil which arouses it or the 
character and condition of the sufferer. The retal- 
iation to which anger naturally prompts in man, is 
not, necessarily, a retaliation to be inflicted by his 
own hands, but only a retaliation which the rightful 
Avenger of wrong may administer. The main uses 
of anger in man are, accordingly, that it prepares 
for a free recognition and expectation of the divine 
justice, which redresses all wrong, and for free ser 
vice as his instrument when bidden to that minis- 
try. A vindictive spirit is inhuman ; it is a usurper 
of divine prerogative : " Vengeance is mine," saith 
the Lord. 

§ 115. Peculiarly fitting for man in his 
Forgiveness. present condition is the other resent- 



142 DUTIES TO PERSONS. 

ment of this species — -forgiveness, in which the evil 
received is resented in good returned. 

In this form of duty, the instinct of angry re- 
sentment is suppressed ; the instinct of generosity 
and good-will becomes sovereign ; the suffering is 
borne in meekness ; the injury is forborne ; the 
blessing overmasters the wrong. To forgive does 
not necessitate entire forgetfulness, but only ex- 
tends so far as suppression of the spirit of retalia- 
tion. We need to remember even to forgive. As 
consciously needing forgiveness, man should be for- 
giving, for the just rule is that only as he forgives, 
can he be forgiven. Penitence and acknowledg- 
ment with redress of the wrong are not always to 
be exacted as conditions of forgiveness with men, 
however it may be with the divine administration. 
There is this wide difference between their relations 
to offenses and His : they need forgiveness them- 
selves, and their wrongs He will amply redress. 
The rule for men, therefore, is to bear, to forbear, 
to forgive, even although the wrong-doer persists 
in his malice — to bless when he curses and despite- 
fully uses them. A tranquil trust in the sufficien- 
cy of the divine rule, a proper sense of one's own 
imperfections, and the growth of the spirit into the 
divine fulness of mercy and forbearance, all enforce 
on man the duty of cherishing a forgiving spirit. 



DUTIES TO PERSONS, ETC. 1 43 



CHAPTER III. 

DUTIES TO PERSONS DETERMINED FROM THE OBJECT 
OF DUTY. 

§ 116. Duties to persons founded on the princi- 
ple suggested by the object of duty are 
Three species, distributed into three species, corres- 
ponding to the three departments of his 
personal nature — those of couttesy, which more im- 
mediately respect the feelings ; those of truthful- 
ness, which respect the intellectual nature ; and 
those of trustfulness, beneficence, and justice, which 
are respectively founded in the proper moral nature 
of man, as interdependent, as made for blessedness, 
and as having rights. 

It is true that to all duties there are correspond- 
ing rights, and that, accordingly, as it is man's duty 
to be courteous to his fellow man, so it is each one's 
right as a man to be treated with courtesy ; still the 
closer scrutiny of these three classes of duties will 
evince that they severally respect more directly and 
immediately the several departments of our per- 
sonal being which have been named. 

§ 117. Courtesy respects more directly the out- 



144 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

i Courtesy ward carriage and deportment by which 
the sensibilities of others are im- 
pressed. 

The essence of the duty lies in this : that the 
form of our intercourse with our fellow-men should 
be such as befits man towards man ; that this form 
of our behavior by which he is affected be loving, 
right, benignant. 

The obligation to courtesy is founded 
Obligation. m tne s °cial relationship of man to man. 
On the one hand is the acting spirit 
made to impress favorably, and, on the other hand, 
the recipient spirit to be thus favorably impressed, 
the two made for each other, to act reciprocally on 
each other. Man is made to be courteous ; and 
also to be blest by courtesy. 

The sphere of courtesy lies properly 
Sphere. within that of good manners. The syn- 

onyms by which the duty is denominated 
point to the condition of social intercourse, and to 
the highest degree of that condition, as that in which 
this grace of character is best developed. Such 
synonyms are courtliness, urbanity, civility, good 
manners, and the like. 

The forms of courtesy vary with the 
Forms. relative condition of the subject and the 

object of the duty. Towards superiors, 
it takes the form of respect, reverence, homage, 
worship ; towards equals it appears as comity ; 
towards inferiors, as gentleness, suavity, affability. 
The vices of character here or the 
Discourtesy. forms of discourtesy are such as those 



DETERMINED FROM OBJECT OF DUTY. 1 45 

of insolence, irreverence, incivility, rudeness, arro- 
gance, haughtiness, scornfulness. 

Although courtesy looks more immediately to the 
outward form of conduct, yet it necessarily engages 
the heart — must be loving ; since to be insincere or 
hypocritical, or to endeavor to seem what one is not, 
is radically immoral ; and, moreover, all assumed or 
pretended courtesy will betray itself, and therefore 
can never be as true courtesy to the hearts of others. 
Still, as the acts of courtesy engage less or more 
the inward feeling and disposition, it is variously 
characterized in language which sometimes points 
more to the inner nature or spirit of a man and de- 
nominates him as bland, sunny, gracious, friendly, 
or, on the contrary, as austere, sour, testy, cross ; or 
more to the outward expression, and designates him 
as polite, refined, urbane, courtly, complaisant, or as 
rude, unmannerly, rustic, surly. 

Courtesy sustains this important relation to other 
duties to persons that it is generally needful in or- 
der to their perfect effect. The manner of doing 
affects the doing itself in its essential character. 
Acts of beneficence and kindness lose much of their 
moral worth if done in violation of those principles 
which regulate the forms of our intercourse with 
our fellow men. Good intent acted out in a savage 
way is well exemplified in the fable of the lion that, 
in gratitude for the healing of his wound, strikes a 
heavy blow at the fly that disturbs his benefactor's 
rest ; he kills the fly but crushes his master's face as 
well. 

§ 118. Truthfulness is a duty which is root- 
7 



I46 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

2. Truthfulness. ec ^ m tne intellectual nature or the men- 
tal faculty of the true, as courtesy is 
more immediately seated in the sensibility or men- 
tal capacity of form. It may be defined as the 
duty of conforming ourselves to the truth in our 
thoughts and feelings, and in our expressions of 
them. 

The obligation to be truthful both in 
Obligation. thought and in expression is founded in 
the nature of man as related to other 
men in the harmonious system of things. The truth 
of things is the harmony of things as parts of one 
whole. A disturbance of the truth of things works 
disharmony in the system of things, and so far as it 
extends, is the frustration of the divine end in 
creating. The active nature of man must act thus 
truthfully, or the machinery must so far move dis- 
orderly and ill. In being truthful, man only acts 
out himself just as he is, in respect to other beings 
or things as they are. His fellow-men depend 
on this truthful expression of himself as one wheel 
in a well constructed machine depends on the true 
play of the other wheels in connection with which 
it moves and performs its function. The unper- 
verted tendency of man's spirit is to truthfulness in 
thought and expression on the one hand, and to a 
trustful dependence on what is expressed as true 
on the other ; it is a perverse will that is at the bot- 
tom of all' untruthfulness. The very end of man's 
being must fail if he is not truthful himself, or can- 
not move in trustful dependence on others as truth- 
ful to him. The obligation to truthfulness, as 



DETERMINED FROM OBJECT OF DUTY. 1 47 

founded in the duty to form a perfect character, is 
well implied in the apostolic direction to grow up 
into perfection by the one means of " speaking truth 
in love," in the general sense of observing and con- 
forming to truth in the spirit of love. And the ne- 
cessarily fatal result to blessedness — to all good in 
experience — if truthfulness were disregarded and the 
lives and actions of men were but phantoms or lies, 
is but too apparent. The social nature of man 
would be, but for truth, a cheat and a curse. 

§ 1 19. Truthfulness, as implied in what 
Twofold. has been said, is either internal, con- 

formity to the truth of things in the 
shaping of our feelings, our thoughts, and our en- 
deavors — "truth in the inward part" — truth of 
heart ; or external, conformity to truth in expression 
— truth of the lip. This second form of the general 
duty is more specifically known as veracity. 

§ 120. The virtue of inward truthful- 
t. inward truth- ness involves, first, candor, or perfect 

fulness. ' ' ' r 

freedom from all bias, from all distorted 
or discolored apprehension of the words or acts or 
condition of our fellow-men ; and, secondly, impar- 
tiality, or the free reception into our view of all the 
particulars which should affect our judgment in the 
case, and the fair allowance to each of its own weight 
and importance. 

Not only have our fellow-men a right to the ex- 
ercise on our part of this candor and impartiality, 
but, as already intimated, the perfect working of the 
social system of which they and we are integral 
parts enjoins these duties. Still further, our own 



I48 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

highest perfection and interest require them. It is 
not well for man to hold a lie. 

§ 121. The objects to which veracity 

2. Veracity— due j s ( j ue are ac tual persons, 
to persons. l 

As animals have no proper rights by vir- 
tue of their own natures, but only by reason of the 
persons to whom they are related and by virtue of 
that relation, (§ 17,) so there can be no obligation of 
veracity to them. Traps, snares, scare-crows, are 
designed to deceive ; but they are not necessarily 
forbidden by any principle of morality. So men, 
who have lost their proper personality, as the insane, 
are not objects to which veracity is properly due. 
In so far as their rational nature remains to them, 
and, it should be noted, seldom if ever is insanity 
the wreck of all rationality, the obligation may sub- 
sist, but no further. To men, moreover, who so act 
as for the time to forfeit the rights of persons, as 
robbers and assassins, it is certain that they can set 
up no claim that others, to whom they have for- 
feited this right, observe the truth in communica- 
tions to them. The highwayman clearly cannot 
enforce the moral obligation of speaking truth in 
the interest of his wicked purpose. Whether it be 
morally right to deceive for the purpose of saving 
life, or generally of preventing wrong, is a question 
of casuistry that it has been found very difficult to 
resolve. Generally, if not always, the circumstances 
in which the question may actually arise will be 
such as to evince either that the deception is not 
absolutely necessary in order to prevent the crime 
or that greater evil might result from the deception 



DETERMINED FROM OBJECT OF DUTY. 1 49 

than from the perpetration of the crime. Martyr- 
dom is not always the worst evil to be suffered. 
We cannot suppose that any deception could be re- 
garded as of doubtful morality in a perfect being 
under a perfect rule. That the Infinite One should 
be untruthful in any way or degree, it is irreverent 
to imagine. It must be difficult to show that de- 
viation from a perfect standard is ever right. Man 
certainly may not seek to prevent evil by doing 
wrong. If deception be not in every supposable 
case wrong, still it is impossible for us to say that 
in any circumstances in which we are placed in the 
ordering of Divine Providence, it is right. We may 
safely conclude that, on the one hand, idiocy, insan- 
ity, wicked intent, can have no rights, and can ori- 
ginate no obligations ; while on the other hand there 
ever exist the obligations to respect our own natures 
and also the perfect rule of God over us. Duty to 
ourselves and to Him may require of us that which 
would not be required of us by beings devoid of 
rationality or of morality. In passing judgment in 
such cases of doubt, it should be borne in mind that 
the moral intent may be right, may be as perfect as 
the imperfections of man's nature will permit, while 
the outward action itself is not that which a perfect 
being in a perfect condition of things would per- 
form. 

§ 122. The comprehensive duty of ve- 
Sphere racity respects both the habitual deport- 

ment and the specific act. 
Every man owes it to his fellow-men to make his 
outward life a truthful expression of his inner spirit ; 



I50 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

to be ingenuous and frank ; to be open and sincere; 
to be simple-minded and straightforward, and care- 
fully to shun the opposite vices of character. His 
own highest well-being and the welfare of society 
demand it of him that his outer life be the fair ex- 
pression of what he is — of what he feels and thinks 
and intends inwardly. The very basis of society is 
mutual trust and confidence, to which disingen- 
uousness, double-facedness, dissimulation, are de- 
structive. If his Creator designed man to be social, 
He designed him to be veracious. 

The specific duties of honest statement,, faithful 
representation, accurate expression in every form, 
are so obviously comprehended in this generic vir- 
tue of veracity that they demand no additional or 
more specific enforcement. 

The obligations of veracity reach to all 
Modes ^he m °d es by which one man commu- 

nicates with another — by the general 
life, by words, by signs, by any expressive acts 
whatever. Lying, vicious deception, may be prac- 
ticed by means of signs as fully as in actual speech. 

These obligations may be violated, moreover, by 
exaggeration or by suppression. Veracity implies 
exactness or accuracy in expression, and forbids both 
overstatement and excess of coloring, as well as also 
all garbling, understating, shading. 

Veracity forbids, moreover, falsification in any re- 
spect of the intention, in representing or expressing 
— forbids all prevarication and quibbling, as also all 
deceptive evasion. 

It forbids, still further, duplicity and equivoca- 



DETERMINED FROM OBJECT OF DUTY. 1 5 I 

tion, all juggling in the use of words, by which the 
expression, although true in a certain construction, 
is designed to lead to false opinion. 

It forbids, once more, all feigning, as well as all 
cloaking of the true — simulation as well as dissimu- 
lation — setting forth what is not as well as disguis- 
ing what is. 

It is ever to be borne in mind that lying involves 
the guilty intent to deceive. A man may utter what 
is untrue, not knowing it to be so ; such utterance 
is not necessarily blameworthy. Even veracity may 
thus occasion false representation, as the utterance 
is of what, although false, is supposed to be true. 
Works of fiction, parables, and romances, are not 
necessarily in violation of veracity, since there may 
be no intent to deceive. 

Moreover, the obligations of veracity are not ne- 
cessarily violated by withholding the truth. Re- 
ticence is as truly a duty as utterance. Even eva- 
sion may not offend against veracity, which requires 
only that, if we undertake to speak, we utter only 
truth. We are not always under obligation to tell 
all we know ; but what we tell must be told truly. 

§ 123. Trustfulness is a duty founded 
Trustfulness m tne interdependence of men as con- 
stituent parts of the same moral system. 

Men are made to be dependent one upon another. 
They exist towards each other reciprocally as be- 
ings to trust and be trusted. The good for which 
they were made comes to them in large degree 
through their fellow-men ; they must look to them 
for its supply. They were made also to do good, 



152 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

and their active nature must go out to work this 
good for others. Men honor themselves in trusting, 
and are honored in being trusted. The depravity 
of men has not wholly extirpated these native roots 
of confidence. Honor is found even among thieves. 
As dependence in man is not absolute, is limited 
by reason of his moral imperfection far beyond 
what it should be, so the trust which is grounded in 
it must not be absolute, must be limited. A blind 
trust may be ruinous, inasmuch as dependence on 
man is insecure. But a rational trust is yet the 
duty and the interest of men. Human nature may 
be relied on to a certain extent ; it is safe to trust 
thus far. To trust, to show confidence, begets a 
spirit of fidelity in answer to what is expected. 
The trusting man is less likely to be wronged than 
he who manifestly expects to be defrauded or mis- 
used. To show expectation of evil invites the doing 
of the evil. Even a knave will honor the confi- 
dence that is reposed in him. To trust another nat- 
urally awakens in him sense of responsibility that 
may of itself prevent wrong-doing. The trustful 
spirit is intrinsically bright and cheerful and joyous ; 
distrust saddens and sours. The small losses from 
occasional betrayal of trust are counterbalanced by 
the habitual cheer of a confiding spirit. The col- 
lective interests of humanity are furthered just in 
proportion to the prevalence of a true rational trust 
and confidence between individuals and between 
communities. 
_ . , § 124. Beneficence respects wants ; 

B:neficcr.ce and c ~r x 

justice. Justice respects rights in others. 



DETERMINED FROM OBJECT OF DUTY. 1 53 

These are duties which, still more character- 
istically than trustfulness, respect the individual 
moral nature of man as object of duty. The 
twofold character of the duty thus determined re- 
sults from the twofold view we are obliged to take 
of this moral nature. We recognize man as having 
wants and having rights. As made for blessed- 
ness, the fundamental instinct of his being is towards 
blessedness. This he craves ; it is his deepest, 
broadest want. Duty is owing to him as such crea- 
ture of wants. Every man is bound in duty to do 
good to his fellow man, to be beneficent. But, 

again, being made for blessedness as the 
Distinguished. g reat end of his being, he must have the 

right to attain this end. The observ- 
ance of this right, — in other words, the practical re- 
cognition of man as having rights, — is the duty of 
justice. Beneficence regards wants ; justice re- 
gards rights as the proper natural outgrowth of 
those wants. Sometimes the naked want presents 
itself to our regard, and sometimes the want in the 
garb of a right. Beneficence and justice are, there- 
fore, distinguishable duties. They are, however, 
never in proper contradiction, any more than love 
and goodness, or knowledge and freedom. When 
they seem to be opposed, or when they lead to 
opposite effects in the experience of the object of 
duty, as when justice bids punishment and goodness 
suggests forgiveness, it is where they are determined 
by different relations. In the subject of duty, mercy 
can never conflict with justice, for the right which 
justice respects can be but an embodiment of some 

7* 



154 DUTIES TO PERSON'S. 

want which mercy or goodness could relieve. Be- 
neficence and justice come into conflict, therefore, 
only as they respect different objects or different 
interests in the same moral person. Thus it may 
be justice to society to punish while it is mercy to 
the offender to pardon ; and a son may have a right 
to paternal bounty as a son, while goodness may 
withhold that which he would use only to his ruin. 
Wants crave, rights demand. Beneficence, as a 
duty, responsive to wants, accordingly obliges 
through the nature of the subject of duty as loving. 
Justice, on the other hand, obliges through the na- 
ture of the object of duty. The claims of the two 
come to the conscience by those opposite directions. 
Beneficence is by its nature, thus, as ever respec- 
tive of a want, entreating, soliciting, persuasive. 
Justice, as respecting a right, is exacting, enforcing, 
imperative. To be perfectly good is a higher virtue 
of character than to be perfectly just, inasmuch as 
a self-moved spirit ranks higher than one impelled 
from without. On the other hand, justice is a more 
sacred duty in society than goodness ; because when 
rights are disregarded, wants will go unrelieved. 
To be wanting in justice imports looser morals than 
to be wanting in goodness. 

§ 125. Beneficence is the exact cor- 
bene\tknc e e 0f relative of benevolence. The benevo- 
lence seated in the soul as subject cf 
duty appears as beneficence in the object of duty. 
Love felt in the subject is expressed as good effected 
in the experience of the object. 

The two may be correctly regarded as the oppo- 



DETERMINED FROM OBJECT OF DUTY. 155 

site sides of the same duty. The consideration of 
our own moral nature enforces upon us the obliga- 
tions of benevolence ; the consideration of the na- 
ture of our fellow-man enforces the obligations of 
beneficence. The subjective virtuous disposition 
and endeavor of benevolence must, in order to its 
own perfection, have its outcome and full maturity 
in beneficence. 

§ 126. Beneficence is, in a true sense, 
vn-uie imvmnc; tne crownm & virtue. To do good is god- 
like. The ultimate and comprehensive 
end to be realized in the experience of man is good. 
In doing good the doer brings to himself his high- 
est happiness. " The way to be happy," says Bar- 
row, " is to do well." 

§ 127. In the exercise and culture of 
Species. beneficence the view is to be turned out- 

ward on the object. The specific duties 
here involved are sympathetic contemplation of hu- 
man wants ; kindly disposition to relieve them ; 
positive acts of bounty. 

§ 128. The modes of beneficence are 
Modes. as various as the ways in which we can 

affect any of the interests of our fellow- 
men in their persons, character, or condition, by 
our habits and modes of life, by our words, by our 
actions. The disposition and the determination to 
be beneficent should be so formed and fixed within 
as to be ready to flow out in any appropriate way 
which occasion may open. 

§ 129. The measure of benevolence is 
Measure. given in the golden rule : " Do unto 



156 DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

others as you would that they should do unto you." 
The instinctive craving for good in them is to be 
ranked with the craving for good in ourselves, equally 
and alike to be satisfied, with like sympathetic in- 
terest and with like earnest and hearty endeavor. 
The principle of nearness of relationship by nature 
or occasion must of course come in to determine the 
measure of the endeavor. Our own well-being is 
our nearest concern ; and the opportunities to do 
good, which are given us under the divine rule as 
calls to duty, are more to ourselves than to any other 
being. But to exalt our own cravings for happiness 
above those of others around us, and especially to 
exclude or depress them from their due considera- 
tion, is selfishness. Kindred and neighborhood 
possess lower degrees of demand on our beneficence 
than our own well-being, but yet higher than those 
which belong to strangers. We are to do good only 
as we have opportunity. The principle of oppor- 
tunity thus, as a rightful measure of beneficence, 
determines its degree in reference to ourselves, to 
kindred, to neighbors, to foreigners. 

§ 130. The one object in true benefi- 
ts one object. C ence, in real goodness, is the relief of 

want in a fellow being, the satisfying of 
his craving for good. To confer benefits for trie 
sake of procuring his favor or for any other purpose, 
or even for the mere purpose of strengthening the 
principle of beneficence in our own hearts, is not 
true beneficence. This virtue looks exclusively to 
the good in the experience of the receiver of the 
benefit. It does not seek as its motive even grati- 



DETERMINED FROM THE OBJECT OF DUTY. 1 57 

tude in return ; although favor may rightly be with 
held simply on the ground of a heartless or un- 
grateful reception of it. It may be wrong to encour- 
age such a disposition, just as it is wrong to encour- 
age profligacy or indolence by beneficence. The 
type and model of true beneficence is given to man 
in the example of Him who " is kind unto the un- 
thankful and to the evil." 

§ 131. Justice is the satisfaction of 
justice defined, rights. It supposes rights in the object 

of duty and aims at good only as it 
recognizes a right to claim it. Its immediate motive 
is a right to be satisfied in the experience of the ob- 
ject of duty. 

The elements of justice as a duty are ready rec- 
ognition of the rights of others, and ungrudging 
satisfaction of them. Impliedly, also, justice re- 
quires all reasonable protection and upholding of 
the rights of others. Hardly less atrocious than in- 
cendiarism would be the refusal to extinguish a 
kindling fire that threatens the destruction of an- 
other's dwelling ; hardly less atrocious than down- 
right murder, a refusal to rescue, when in our 
power, a human life from peril. 

Justice has been regarded by moralists as two- 
fold : (1). Distributive, as it awards what is due to 
merit or demerit : (2). Commutative, as it practically 
recognizes what is equal and right in exchanges and 
in promises and contracts. 

§ 132. Justice has for its sphere all the 
p ere * rights of men, whether they respect per- 

sonal enjoyments, condition, reputation, or property. 



I58 DUTIES TO PERSONS. 

It enjoins a practical recognition of the right to 
be and to be happy ; and forbids all wanton and all 
inconsiderate harm to any interest of our fellow man. 

It recognizes his right to place — in roads and 
walks, in conveyances and at inns, in the family, in 
the schools, m the assembly, at work and at play. 
It recognizes his rights in time also, to labor and 
to rest, to speak and to be silent, to be in public or 
in private. 

It requires the vindication of his good name ; and 
forbids any direct or indirect, any intentional or 
thoughtless sullying of his fair reputation. It con- 
demns the idle gossip which plays with a man's 
good name as if he had no rights, as well as the 
malignant slander which would banish him from the 
courtesies of social life. 

It enjoins equity in our dealings, equal balances 
for his and for our interests ; and forbids all con- 
cealment that would hinder satisfaction of actual 
rights, all double-dealing, all substitution of the let- 
ter for the intention in covenants, all use of superior 
vantage-ground for enforcing or exacting rights. 

Inasmuch as rights often change in their specific 
form with change of condition or of circumstances, 
with lapse of time and change of place, the law of 
justice requires that the literal and specific right 
acquired in any way be not allowed in any such way 
to work a higher. injury. The exact justice is some- 
times the worst wrong: — Summutn jus injuria 
summa. Not the letter, but the spirit of the law is 
to be regarded. 



DUTIES TO PERSONS, ETC. 1 59 



CHAPTER IV. 

DUTIES TO PERSONS DETERMINED FROM THE ACT OF 
DUTY. 

§ 133. Duties looking more directly to 
Two species. tbe ac t f duty constitute the third class 

of duties to persons. They may be dis- 
tributed into species, according as they are viewed 
in their own nature or in relation to other duties. 

§ 134. Of the first species mentioned 
1. straightfor- are the duties of having an aim in our 

wardness. g ° 

conduct, of keeping our aims ever true 
to the ends proposed in our actions, and of being 
straightforward in carrying out our aims in fulfil- 
ment to their ends. 

These several species are given at once in an 
analysis of rectitude as distinguished from love and 
from goodness. Rectitude or rightness in action 
implies an aim or intention, an end or object, and a 
direct motion from aim to object. 

§ 135. It is the duty of every man to 
Governing aim. have a governing aim or purpose in his 

living. 



l6o DUTIES TO PERSONS, 

The first dictate of man's nature as rational is 
that he regulate his conduct ever by such a govern- 
ing aim. An aimless life is so far a wasted life ; an 
aimless act is an irrational act. It should be borne 
in mind that in the formation of character our great 
duty is to bring even our automatic or spontaneous 
life under the rule of a rational aim. 

§ 136. It is the duty of every man to 
True to its end. k ee p hi s a i m true to its end. 

Inconceivable as it is in physical 
nature, it is unhappily true in moral history, that a 
man often aims one way while his action somehow 
terminates elsewhere than in that purposed way. 
The aim is feebly held or the end is faintly dis- 
cerned ; and aim and end fail to meet. There is 
such a thing as to have a sinister end in an action ; 
it is a vice to be shunned. Men often confer bene 
fits not to relieve wants but to procure merit or 
favor, or to hush conscience, or to win esteem. They 
have an aim, but it looks to something else than its 
proper and rightful end. 

§ 137. It is the duty of every man to be 

Direct in pur- straightforward in execution of his pur- 
suit. & i 
pose. 

Uprightness in life we recognize as a virtue in 
which not so much the loving spirit or the bene- 
ficent effect, but the rectitude of the acting, is re- 
garded. The straightforward, upright life is the 
efficient life for all life's purposes. The devious 
walk is tardy or fails altogether of its purpose. The 
habit of directing all our action unswervingly to its 
designed end not only gives confidence and minis- 



DETERMINED FROM ACT OF DUTY. l6l 

ters to energy, but more than almost anything else 
in ourselves ensures success. 

§ 138. Of the second species of duties 
^vMentilfrule. to persons indicated by the essential 
nature of rectitude in action, are the 
several duties involved in keeping our life and con- 
duct in harmony with the divinely ordered course 
of nature and of events. 

All duties are parallel ; they never cross one an- 
other. It is good ground of suspicion that we are 
wrong, when our actions clash with the rightful ac- 
tions of other, or with the equal flow of Providence. 
The man that is ever chafing from his collisions 
with the progress of events may well question 
whether his own course is not cross to the will of 
his master. Guizot well argues that mere duration 
in society proves the presence and power of order 
and truth and justice. If, therefore, in settled social 
life a man finds his way perpetually obstructed or 
'crossed, it is a sign that his course is oblique and 
tortuous. Virtue, so long as man is imperfect, 
must, of course, at times antagonize itself with vice. 
Hence even virtuous acts may be often in conflict 
with settled customs. Still the truth remains that 
order and rectitude rule human affairs ; and to be 
ever in accord with the divine will, as it manifests 
itself in the disposition of things and the course of 
events, is man's highest privilege and unfailing duty. 
It is a vice in him to put himself in disharmony 
with things around him ; to distrust the divine 
order. His duty lies in perfect harmony and paral- 
lelism with this outward ordering. The correction 



102 DUTIES TO PERSONS. 

of existing abuses in the community is generally- 
best accomplished by imparting greater energy to 
what is right ; weeds die when overshadowed by the 
thrifty plants. 

Involved in this duty of directing our actions in 
parallelism and harmony with the divine ordering 
of things is the duty of regulating them as to de- 
gree, so that relatively to the condition and course 
of outward things our actions be allowed to be neither 
excessive nor deficient. 

The particular maxims of uprightness in duty are 
then these two : — Be straightforward — having an 
aim, keeping it true and level to its end, and acting 
unswervingly towards it ; and Be in harmony with 
all lines of rectitude without, maintaining parallel- 
ism in direction and moderation in degree. 



THE FAMILY INSTITUTION. 



I6 3 



PART II. 



DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 



CHAPTER I. 



THE FAMILY INSTITUTION. 



§ 139- 



The Family is an organized 



The family de- 
fined. 



of man. 



community divinely established for the 
continuance and traininsr of the race 



A divine insti 
tution. 



That the family constitution is an ap- 
pointment of the Creator we should 
believe on the simple ground that 
families come to be in the natural course of 
things. The very nature of man, also, in its in- 
stincts, its consultations for its comfort, peace, and 
well-being generally, its necessities and its spon- 
taneous activities, leads him into the family. Reason 
and revelation agree in teaching that the family is 
a divine ordinance. 

The twofold end of the family is the 
its twofold end. continuance of the race of man and the 
training of it to its best and highest 
condition. 



I64 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

The distinguishing feature of the fam- 
pistinctivefea- [\y SO ciety as compared with other so- 
cieties existing among men, is that its 
membership is constituted by community of blood. 
It is by virtue of this participation in a common 
origin and line of descent — a participation so far in 
the same blood — that the peculiar duties arise to 
kindred and to persons not in the family proper but 
yet of the family. It is this community of blood in 
which originates the prohibition of marriages with- 
in the near lines of consanguinity. It is hence that 
inspiration, history, instincts of man, agree in the 
reprobation of transgressions of such inter-mar- 
riages. It is this community of blood from the 
original singleness of the primitive parentage and 
the consequent unity of the race, that brings all 
mankind — men as men — into true relation of broth- 
erhood. 

As a permanently established community, the 
family society needs for its most salutary working 
to be organized ; to be constituted under the rela- 
tions of higher and lower in moral order. It de- 
mands a head and implies subordinates in its mem- 
bership. 

§ 140. Inasmuch as the duties incum- 
Rise of duties bent on men follow them into every de- 

in it. J 

partment of their free activity, duties 
arise at once on the organization of the family 
state, — on the simple rise and coming to be of a 
family. 

As morality must exist in the family, as there 
must be order, and as the family is a community 



THE FAMILY INSTITUTION. 1 65 

of moral persons, there must be duties and there 
must be correlative rights. The ground of ob- 
ligation here is in the nature of man as made for 
duty, both as subject of duty and object of duty, 
in connection with the accompanying fact that 
the family is a divinely instituted sphere of man's 
free activity. 

§ 141. As instituted by God, and as 

Moral in its made UD of moral persons bound tO- 

character. x ■ L 

gether in a community of life, which 
embraces the interests, the sympathies, and the en- 
deavors of all the members in a singleness of ex- 
perience and of destiny, the family life must be ac- 
cepted as being truly moral. 

In addition to his personal responsibility, each 
member of the family participates in a joint respon- 
sibility, attaching to the whole membership. Most 
important moral interests are bound up in the family 
life. The character of each member is shaped by 
the influences that rule in the household. Each 
family has a character of its own by which it is 
recognized by others, and by which it influences 
others. The peace, order, refinement of a well 
ordered household radiate all around light and 
blessing ; the abode of ignorance, strife, vice, is 
a moral curse to the neighborhood. Each mem- 
ber helps to form the character, and shape the 
experience and life of the whole. Each mem- 
ber has a sense of shame in the moral discredit 
of the family and a satisfaction in its moral thrift. 
Indeed this unity of the moral life in the family 
is such that each member feels this shame or satis- 



1 66 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

faction in the moral failure or success of every other 
member. 

The family life is thus a true moral life, specific- 
ally differing, indeed, from the personal moral life, 
as the social differs from the individual, but posses- 
sing like that the great determining attributes of a 
proper moral life, being under a divine constitution, 
engaging largely man's free moral activity, and 
charged throughout with a true moral respon- 
sibility which reaches both to the joint and in- 
dividual character and action of the members. This 
is further witnessed in the sense of pride or of 
shame that is felt by them as the family life moves 
in the line of a pure morality or otherwise, and in 
the ready praise or censure bestowed by other men, 
and also in the ordinary retributions visited in the 
course of Providence on the family life as moral or 
vicious. 

§ 142. The seat of authority in the 
Seat of author- family, while it is primarily and pre- 
dominantly in the will of God,is seconda- 
rily and subordinately in the parental head. 

As a derived and subordinate seat of authority, 
parental rule is never legitimate when it violates the 
law of God, that is, when it contravenes the settled 
principles of morality. The parent is yet presump- 
tively the rightful interpreter of the law ; and no 
disregard of that authority can be justified unless 
such authority is in its exercise clearly subversive 
of morality. 

§ 143. The classes of duties in the 

Classes of. 

duties. tamily are determined trom the consti- 



THE FAMILY INSTITUTION. \Gj 

tuent relationships of the members. They are 
three in number: i. Marital duties between the 
parents ; 2. Parental duties between parents and 
children ; and 3. Fraternal duties between the 
children. 

We will consider these classes in their order, and 
in connection with their correlative rights. 



1 68 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 






CHAPTER II. 

marital rights and duties. 

§ 144. Marital rights and duties 
Nature ana subsist between the husband and the 

ground. 

wife as the joint head of the family com- 
munity. These rights and duties have their foun- 
dation in the covenant of marriage. 

The marital life has its proper origin in 
origin. j- n j s covenant in which one man and 

one woman unite themselves in recipro- 
cal affection and helpfulnefs for life. 

§ 145. Polygamy is forbidden most 
Monogamy. clearly in the divine ordering of the 

equality in number of males and females 
in the human race. 

There could be no" more authoritative ordinance 
than this which is written in the very constitution 
of the race — that there be in the family institution 
one man and one woman as its constituents. 

That polygamy is morally wrong, is also infer- 
rible from the consideration that it necessarily de- 
grades woman and is incompatible with a true 
family life. 



MARITAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 1 69 

§ 146. The marriage covenant as a recip- 
Marriage cove- rocation of affection and interest, must 

nant. 

be freely entered into by the parties in 
the exercise of their best intelligence and heartiest 
determination. 

They must hence be of suitable age to act with 
discretion and a full understanding of the engage- 
ments by which they bind themselves. They should 
be guided by parental counsel rather than coerced 
by parental authority and constraint, that their 
perfect freedom be not overborne. It imports a 
moral imperfection in the customs of society that 
children should be betrothed in their mental imma- 
turity or be contracted to strangers for whom there 
has been given no opportunity for the rise of a free 
affection, or be urged into matrimonial alliances in 
any way or for any object which do not admit the 
exercise of a free intelligent affection. 

§ 147. The marriage covenant is moral- 
indissoiubie. \y indissoluble but by death. 

The marriage union is the closest and 
most inviolable that can be formed between human 
beings. Even the filial relation, we are emphatically 
taught in the Scriptures, must be held in subordi- 
nation to it. The parties in it must leave father 
and mother, if need be, to perfect the union which 
is to be as that of " one flesh," in the thorough 
blending of interest, of affection, of ministry. Im- 
porting, as it does, a full reciprocal devotion of each 
to the other, it utterly forbids the thought of the 
union being other than for life. Its obligations 
hence continue upon each party as long as fulfil- 



170 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

ment is practicable, that is, till either the death of 
the other party or his annulling of the covenant by 
actual marital alliance with another party. Hence 
the allowance of divorce by civil tribunals on 
grounds less conclusive than those of death or 
marital alliance with another person is to be depre- 
cated as hostile to a pure and sound morality. Ab- 
sence, estrangement of affection, cruelty, may justi- 
fy separate living ; the old common law divorce 
from board and bed — a mens a et thoro — may be ad- 
missible, while yet the sanctity of the marriage vow 
be maintained by withholding a full divorce from 
the bonds of marriage — a vinculo matrimonii — dur- 
ing the life of the parties, except for the one cause 
mentioned — marital alliance with another. The 
covenant, it should be remembered, like all cove- 
: ants, may be dissolved by reason of essential fraud 
in the making or by reason of its being made be- 
tween parties within the forbidden lines of consan- 
guinity. The fraud which shall be allowed to annul 
the formal covenant must pertain to the essential 
nature or end of the covenant — to the natural com- 
petency of the parties to the marital union. Parties 
within the lines of consanguinity are incompetent 
to make the covenant. Such covenants, although in 
a true sense null and void, yet leave the parties 
not altogether free from obligations. They are of 
the nature of unlawful vows. See § 280. 

§ 148. The marriage covenant, as being 
ious ratification vitally related to the highest interests of 

civil society, as also of morality and re- 
ligion, is worthily solemnized by established formali- 



MARITAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. I / 1 

ties which evidence its ratification and the open 
public entrance upon the new life which it begins. 

These formalities are very properly both of a 
civil and religious character. They are imposed in 
part by the state, for its protection, and in part by 
the church, that the new life may be pursued under 
the sanctities and benedictions of religion. This 
solemnization is, however, but the outer indication 
or evidencing ; the true life of the marriage compact 
is in the free covenanting of the parties. It is in close 
analogy to the entrance upon civil office, which is 
evidenced under established formalities, including 
religious sanctions in the oath that is administered 
and in the proper religious rites that often accom- 
pany it, the true authority of the official life, never- 
theless, being derived, not from the formal inaugura- 
tion, but from the election or appointment that has 
gone before. 

§ 149. The rights and duties of hus- 
Parity of rights, band and wife in relation to each other 
rest upon a basis of perfect moral equal- 
ity and reciprocity. 

As equally endowed with full moral attributes 
and having a like origin and destiny under the same 
moral rule, they are bound to render each to the 
other the same sympathy and affection, the same 
courtesy, truthfulness, beneficence, and justice, 
which their equal personality requires. 

§ 150. As the united head of the family 
^ 01 autiK)rit ntal communr ty, their authority is joint and 
indivisible. 

In the guidance and control of the family inter- 



172 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

ests their participation is equal and common. The 
obedience which is exacted is due, not to either 
party, as separate, but to the united head. If the 
specific command be given by either, it is given 
only as the utterance of the concurring authority of 
both. Disobedience to one must be held to be dis- 
obedience to both. It is in this light and in this 
spirit, that parental authority is ever to be adminis- 
tered and to be obeyed. The parent offends if he 
seeks to enforce his rule by his own right, inde- 
pendently of the other parent ; and the child offends 
if he seeks to please one of his parents in opposition 
to the known will of the other. It is one of the 
puzzling questions in casuistry how to act mor- 
ally when the conditions of moral action in the case 
are immorally determined, as when the commands of 
the parents are in opposite directions. The general 
principle of morality here is, however, indisputable ; 
parental authority is a joint authority ; the adminis- 
tration of it by one parent must be accepted as hav- 
ing the sanction and support of both ; disobedience 
to one is disobedience to both. It is too often the 
bane of family discipline and rule that it is exercised 
and submitted to as the several rule of one of the 
parents, and not as legitimately but the joint au- 
thority of both. 

§ 1 5 1. While the basis of marital rights 
Ri mentarT 16 " and duties, as between the husband and 

the wife, is that of equality and reci- 
procity, these rights and duties are yet, as they may 
in perfect consistency with this idea of their equality 
be held to be, truly complementary of each other. 



MARITAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 1 73 

The rights and duties of the husband towards the 
wife are not the same, although of like rank and re- 
ciprocal obligation, as those of the wife towards the 
husband. The antithesis of sex, which runs through 
the physical and spiritual constitution, and which is 
the occasion and condition of the marriage cove- 
nant, gives rise to separate functions and duties and 
rights under that covenant. The physical superiority 
of man in respect to muscular force and endurance, 
and the masculine characteristics of spirit corre- 
sponding to them, clearly indicate his to be the 
sphere of the sterner, the severer, the bolder virtues ; 
while the gentler, tenderer, more sympathetic nature 
of woman indicates for her the sphere predominantly 
of the graces of trust, tranquil acquiescence in the 
orderings of Providence, and cheering hopefulness. 
It is rather his part to lead, her's to follow ; his to 
provide, her's to economize and encourage ; his to 
attend to the outer duties of the family, her's to min- 
ister in the offices of indoor life ; his to protect, her's 
to sustain and soothe and cherish. Summarily, 
these relative offices of husband and wife are to be 
regarded as properly complementary, one to the 
other ; each party ministering to the needs of the 
other and to the common wants of the household, 
according to the respective capability, convenience, 
and general suitableness of each. 



174 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 



CHAPTER III. 

PARENTAL AND FILIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 

§ 152. The duties of parents and of 
Origin. children, as also their correlative rights, 

have their origin in the family. These 
duties and these rights are, consequently, to be 
measured and determined in the light of the family 
relation. They rank as secondary and subordinate 
to the general rights and duties subsisting between 
the family as a whole and the ■ individual members. 
The true interest of the family must not, therefore, 
be sacrificed for the supposed good of individual 
parent or child. On the other hand, the general 
good may require the sacrifice of the individual in- 
terest. It is a worthy spectacle when a father or a 
child intelligently and freely resigns plans, hopes, in- 
terests, dear to himself, for the good of the other 
members of the household. 

Parental authority and direction are, accordingly, 
to be administered in the general interest of the 
family ; and the good of the individual is to be se- 
cured through the well-being of the family. All the 



PARENTAL AND FILIAL RIGHTS, ETC. 1 75 

duties of children to parents and to one another, 
also, are to be discharged under the felt obligations 
coming upon them from the family as a whole. The 
individual interests should be harmonized as parts 
of a whole comprehensive interest. When doubt 
arises as to which should be preferred, the family 
welfare, rather than that of the individual member, 
should have the benefit of the doubt. The family 
rights and interests are the paramount rights and 
interests, and must measure and shape those of the 
individual members. 

§ 153. The duties of parents to their 
UriSSL ^r- fil " childrep are the correlatives of the 
relative. rights of children in respect to their 

parents. In the same way filial duties are correla- 
tives of parental rights. 

What the parent owes to the child, the child has 
a right to receive from the parent. The parental 
duty of protection, for instance, is the filial right of 
protection. Even in earliest infancy, the child has 
rights-; for it is a person, not a thing, no mere 
animal. It has a right to protection in itself, and 
not merely because the parent owes it to his own 
self-respect or to the interests of society to protect 
his own offspring. 

§ 154. While the comprehensive duty, 
Parental duties, alike of parent and of child, towards 

each other is sympathetic affection and 
good will, to be expressed in all appropriate ways, 
the specialty of the relation marks out some special 
duties arising from it, in which this love is to be 
chiefly shown. This relation, as the basis of rights 



I76 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

and duties, is characteristically the relation of de- 
pendence. The duties on the part of the parent, 
founded on this relation of dependence in the child, 
are the following : 

First, Protection from all physical and moral 
harm ; • 

Secondly, Provision of whatever is needful for the 
well-being in body or in mind of the child within 
the resources of the parent ; 

Thirdly, Counsel in all cases of perplexity or 
doubt ; 

Fourthly, A training and education, physical and 
mental, suited to the condition of the family and the 
prospective relations of the child to society and to 
life here and hereafter ; 

Fifthly, A wise, loving, yet authoritative rule, to 
which obedience shall be enforced by suitable sanc- 
tions — by rewards or by penalties — in physical good 
or evil, or by some proper retributions through the 
conscience of self -approval or of remorse and shame. 

The rights of the child correlative to these 
parental duties are those of protection, support, 
counsel, education, and rule, on all occasions when 
needful. 

§ 155. The filial duties, springing out 
Filial duties. f the relation of dependence, to a cer- 
tain extent correspond to these duties 
of the parent. They are : 

First, Grateful affection in return for parental 
kindness ; 

Secondly, Cheerful trust in parental mainte- 
nance and care ; 



PARENTAL AND FILIAL RIGHTS, ETC. 1 77 

Thirdly, Willing obedience to parental authority ; 

Fourthly, Faithful service in the interest of the 
family ; 

Fifthly, Reverence to parents as superiors. 

The rights of parents correlative to these filial 
duties, are those of gratitude, trust, obedience, ser- 
vice, and reverence. 

§ 156. The obligations subsisting recip- 
i?mited tlonS rocally between parents and children 
are far from being absolute. They are 
limited by the finite nature of the relation ; by the 
incapacities and the delinquencies of the parties, 
who, at best, are b'ut imperfect men ; and by other 
relations which the parties sustain to society and 
to God. 

First, the relation itself is finite ; it 
ness of relation, morally ceases with the maturity of the 
child, elevating him above the condi- 
tion of dependence. The duties themselves, on 
both sides, change, and gradually modify themselves 
with the advance to this stage of maturity. Less 
assiduous protection and supply of wants and 
instruction and authority, are required, as the child 
grows in physical and intellectual and moral 
strength. But the child, if life is continued, ulti- 
mately becomes a man, and is invested with the 
rights and responsibilities of a man. Infirmities, 
too, creep along with years, and ultimately change 
the relations of dependence ; the aged parent comes 
to depend on the vigor of the child. The child is 
then called to care for the parent. Grateful love 
and reverence still bind, but bind to other duties 

8* 



178 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

than those incident to dependent childhood ; they 
are the duties of affectionate and respectful care 
and solace and help. 

The line which bounds this relation of filial 
dependence cannot be drawn in moral strictness. 
It varies with the peculiarities of families and of 
individual members of them. The usages of society 
and the necessities of civil order, have fixed upon a 
certain age, which shall be generally accepted as 
determining when the child enters upon his majority 
— his freedom and right to act for himself. This 
age in this country is twenty-one years, at which 
time the child becomes free and' is liberated from 
the control of the parents. Persons under this age 
— minors — have no legal rights of property or of 
covenant, except in cases specified by statute, or 
through the medium of parents or guardians or 
trustees. 

Secondly. The incapacity, or the cul- 
2. By imperfec- pable remissness or violation of duty, in 

tion of parties. x J 

either party in this relation, so far im- 
pairs the rights, and relieves from the duties imposed 
by it. The father who neglects to maintain and 
educate his son, cannot rightfully claim his son's 
full service ; and the undutiful child so far impairs 
his rights to support. Love withheld by the one 
party so far hinders the responsive affection of the 
other. Immoral authority on the part of the parent 
is not obligatory on the child. When, however, 
there is doubt as to the morality of an act that is 
required, the dependent child may rightfully pre- 
sume that the parent is right, and so be held to 



TARENTAL AND FILIAL RIGHTS, ETC. 1 79 

obedience, on the ground of the positive authority 
of the parent, although not on the perceived morality 
of the act itself. 

Thirdly. The rights and interests in 
to society ^nTto tne family are all circumscribed by the 
God - higher and broader relationships of man 

to society and to God. The state may take the 
child from the care of its parents for training, or for 
service, in cases of exigency ; and all parental rule 
must be subordinate and subservient to the divine 
rule. There are rights of conscience belonging to 
minors which override parental control. 



180 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 



CHAPTER IV. • 

FRATERNAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 

§ 157. The rights and duties between 
mSsure? brothers and sisters, as they have their 

root and origin in the family, are to be 
measured and determined in the light of the family 
relation. 

The children are but a part of the household ; 
their relations to each other are the relations of 
parts. Their rights and interests are subordinate 
to those of the family, and cannot morally be exalted 
above them, but must ever be kept in harmony and 
subservience. As a class, fraternal rights and duties 
rank lower than the parental and filial. When 
collision arises, if there is no other ground of 
decision, parental right must override the right of a 
brother or sister ; and the duties of children to their 
parents outrank those which they owe to one 
another. 

§ 158. Fraternal rights and duties rest 
Parity. upon a general basis of moral equality 

and reciprocity. 



PARENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 161 

Age and sex, individual capacity to serve on 
the one hand and need of service on the other, only 
modify these general claims of duty based on natu- 
ral equality, as in all human associations the 
functions of the respective members should aim to 
be complementary of one another. 

§ 159. The special duties of this class 
Special duties. are sympathetic affection and kindness 
in all the forms of courtesy, truthfulness, 
trustfulness, equity, and beneficence. 

The obligations here are closer and faster and 
more enduring, than those between neighbors. The 
grounds for this are in the natural instincts in the 
subject of duty predisposing to sympathy and affec- 
tion ; in the readier and larger receptivity on the 
part of the object of duty for fraternal kindness ; 
and in the more abundant occasions for acts of good- 
will and service, supplied in the ordinary condition 
of brothers and sisters of the same household. 



1 82 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 



PART III. 
DUTIES IN THE STATE. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE STATE ITS END AND MORAL NATURE. 

§ 1 60. A State may be defined to be 
Defined. a na tural society, organized among men 

occupying a denned territory, for the 
furtherance of their common secular interests. 

The definition embraces some leading attributes 
of a state, which require separate consideration. 

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE. 

§ 161. The state is a natural society. 
sodety. ral ^ comes to be under the orderings of 

Divine Providence, in exact analogy 
with the unfolding of the flower from the bud, or of 
the branches from the trunk. The first glance over 



THE STATE ITS END AND NATURE. 1 83 

human history and condition discloses to us the 
great fact that men were made to live in a morally 
organized society. The moral order which his 
nature demands is attained for the smaller circle of 
the family under the parental authority. But as 
men increase in numbers, the parental home 
becomes too scanty ; the crowded members swarm 
into new homes, families multiply, and the moral 
relationship, that human nature requires ever to be 
recognized and that at first directly bound only 
individuals in the same family group, now extends 
to the different family groups themselves. The 
tribal condition generally has followed the first 
stage of expansion from the family ; but the ten- 
dency is strong and constant in the continued 
increase of numbers — the multiplication of tribes, it 
may be, as well as of families — to the full mature 
condition of a morally organized state — to the 
national condition. This is a law of the human 
race. It is established in his nature as social. 
Political society — the nation — the state — is thus 
truly and fully an ordinance of God, who so consti- 
tuted men, and determined the conditions of their 
existence. " The powers that be are ordained of 
God." 

II. THE STATE AN ORGANIZED COMMUNITY. 

§ 162. The state is not a merely aggre- 
socie°ty gamze gated mass of individuals or of families, 

without any common bond holding them 
fast together in the pursuit of a common interest. 



184 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

It involves a unity of aim, in reference to which the 
collected mass is ever acting ; a relationship 
between the members, which binds them together 
and which originates certain rights and imposes 
certain corresponding duties ; a common participa- 
tion in hopes and fears and in a common destiny, 
prompting a reciprocal sympathy and enforcing 
reciprocal ministries. It involves a diversity of 
functions, corresponding to the diversity and magni- 
tude of the particular interests which are combined 
into the single whole, with successive gradations 
from higher to lower, but each ministering in its 
place and* in its way, to the realization of the one 
common aim. 

As is true of living things generally, the begin- 
nings of the state-life are germinant, nascent, from 
rudiments hardly recognized. Yet a number of 
men can not be brought together into permanent 
relations without being sensible that a kind of moral 
order enfolds them, and constrains and regulates 
and animates them. The fully developed political 
organism appears as the social life of the commu- 
nity advances, and the state proper — the nation — at 
last comes to be, with its manifold offices and minis- 
tries, forming a single body with many members, 
all under a more or less perfect subordination, and 
performing their several functions in reciprocal 
helpfulness and sympathy. In a true and most 
important sense, the state has a proper life ; it is 
truly called a body politic, being organized with 
appropriate official appointments, in their several 
ways co-operating for the common good. 



THE STATE ITS END AND NATURE. I 85 

3. THE SPHERE OF THE STATE. 

§ 163. The state is a community of 
Locality of persons living in contiguous territory. 

sphere. r , , . . , 

Its proper boundaries are territorial. 
All persons living within its proper territory are 
parts of it. Generally, indeed, they have had a 
common origin ; the family has expanded into the 
tribe, and the tribe into the nation. But commu- 
nity of blood only helps to the state ; it is not the 
principle of its proper unity and being. Nations 
have arisen from the union of peoples of different 
races. They readily receive into their common life 
strangers of other lineage. All residents in the 
recognized territory are subject to the national rule 
that is established ; they are made to contribute 
their support to it ; they share in its protection and 
care ; their social activity is ever going out into the 
common life around them ; their interests and hopes 
and destinies are bound up in the common experi- 
ence. The bond of the family is identity of blood : 
that of the nation is identity of residence. 

4. THE STATE A POWER. 

§ 164. As the essential nature of the 
A power. individual man distinguishing him from 

a thing is, that he is the source of action 
— a power — ,so the state, as the collective man, is pre- 
eminently and essentially a power. It is, indeed, the 
aggregated power of its people, organized into single- 
ness of movement and action. All our conceptions 



1 86 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

of the state thus regard it as a power. It is so abso- 
lutely in its essence, as being but the collective 
power of individual men, and also relatively to that 
of individuals. It is accordingly a common thing 
to speak of states as powers — as the powers of 
Europe, — states being so preeminently powers, as 
compared with individuals, that they are assumed 
to be the only powers. State and power are used 
synonymously. 

The state exists simply because it is needful as a 
power. It is not mere condition ; not mere rela- 
tion ; it is a substantial power, for it is power which 
is needed to protect, sustain, and effectively further 
the interests of beings like men. As a power, its 
being is to act ; and as aggregated power, its action 
is to be commensurate with the community of men 
whose power is collected into it. 

§ 165. Political power — state-power — 
Seat of its \[]^q a u rational power, has its seat and 

power. r 

source in the free-will. States thus act, 
as individual men act, by willing. The strength of 
the state is measured by the strength of the collec- 
tive will. Its particular actions are expressed in 
the terms of will: they are resolutions, determina- 
tions, orders, statutes, and laws, which are expres- 
sions of purpose, and are addressed to other wills 
who are to obey and execute. 

State-power, as the aggregation of the social sec- 
ular power of the community, is consequently the 
predominant power ; as the predominant will-power, 
it is the ruling, governing power in the community. 
Its power should accordingly be the prevailing 



THE STATE ITS END AND NATURE. I 87 

power, mightier than that of any one man in the 
political community, or of any portion of the com • 
munity. 

Political power, like that of the individual man, 
works itself out necessarily and legitimately through 
-'material instrumentalities. It avails itself of their 
ministry. It hoards up its accumulated power in 
them. It acquires .and holds, that it may use, all 
kinds of material possessions needful for the pur- 
poses of its existence. 

§ 166. As collective power, political 
its organs. power can express itself only through 
individual organs — its officials. Even if 
this power be devolved in part on collective bodies, 
as legislatures, these bodies are yet composed of 
individuals that speak though the lips of individual 
men. All such officials represent, it is true, the state ; 
they bear its name, are invested with its insignia, 
wield its authority, and act solely for its interest ; 
the world sees the state only in their persons and 
acts. But they are more than mere representatives ; 
they are proper organs through which the state acts 
and lives, receives and imparts, assimilates and gives 
forth all that ministers to the secular social life or 
nourishes and expresses that life. Officials may be 
imperfect, unfaithful, corrupt, as bodily organs may 
be more or less paralyzed or diseased. But as 
organs are necessary to the physical body, and 
through their right discharge of their respective 
functions the body maintains its proper life, so 
these officials, representing the state, are real and 
necessary organs of the body politic. Unfaithful- 



1 88 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

ness and corruption no more disprove this organic 
relation to the one collective life of the state, than 
do partial paralysis and disease disprove the living 
connection of the hand or the foot with the physi- 
cal body. 

5. THE END OF THE STATE-LIFE. 

§ 167. The state exists for the security 
its end is the an d furtherance of those secular interests 

furtherance of 

secular interests which are common to its members. The 

common to . , . ,,.,.,.. 

members. immediate end which its legitimate activ- 

ity respects is the well-being of its mem- 
bers in their collective outward or worldly relations. 
If we assume the family, the state, and the church 
as the three coordinate classes of permanent social 
organisms which naturally come to exist in the pro- 
gress of the human race, we have, first, the family, 
distinguished by having its end in the well-being of 
the immature and dependent among men — the chil- 
dren still in their minority ; next the state, by its 
having its immediate end in the secular well-being 
of the mature man, — the interests pertaining more 
properly to the body ; and last, the church, by its 
having its immediate end in the religious well-being 
of the mature man — the interests that pertain to his 
nature as immortal. 

That the proper end of the state-life is to be 
found in this furtherance of the secular well-being 
of men is apparent from the considerations, first, 
that the state exists only for man while in the body — 
it has no immortality of its own ; secondly, its sphere 



THE STATE — ITS END AND NATURE. 1 89 

is bounded by purely geographical boundaries, and 
its notice and its care can reach directly only 
outward things ; thirdly, its proper activity has 
in all history been of this secular character, so 
that, when transcending this, it has been regarded 
as acting out of its sphere and with injurious 
results. 

The secular interests of men regarded by the 
state, embrace more than those interests which are 
purely material ; more than those which pertain to 
outward person — to body or limb or to material pos- 
sessions. The state, it is true, can act on man only 
as one man can act upon another, through the me- 
dium of outward sense. But its action may indi- 
rectly reach other than material goods. A man's 
reputation, a good name, is a secular interest of 
exceeding value to him ; it is one, in fact, properly 
guarded by the state ; but it cannot be measured nor 
weighed ; it is not material. Intelligence, morality, 
religion, are immaterial interests ; they pertain not 
to the body but to the immaterial spirit. Moreover, 
there are interests which pertain to man's immortal 
being, and shape his condition through his eternal 
future. Yet so far as secular, so far as they pertain 
to the present life, they properly come within the 
regard of the state. The decisive reasons why the 
state should abstain from the religious supervision 
and control of its subjects are not at all that religion 
in itself is absolutely outside of the province of the 
state, and excluded by the essential character of the 
state. It is impossible that the state should let 
religion entirely alone, as will be shown in another 



19° DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

more suitable place ; the state in manifold ways 
does and must recognize religion. The legitimate 
limitation of its action here, as determined by the 
very idea of the state, is given in the secular bear- 
ings of religion on men. Every thing secular, com- 
mon to the political community, is rightfully within 
the province of the state. But weighty reasons 
may be given why the state should have extremely 
little to do with religion. It can rightfully have to 
do with religion only so far as it is secular — for this 
life and its interests — which is the least considerable 
part of religion, whose main concern is the immor- 
tality of man. The entire care of religion is better 
entrusted to other hands, where even for its secular 
bearings it will be better cared for than it can be 
by the state. It is eminently wise, therefore, in the 
state to abstain from all religious direction and 
control, except as most demonstratively shown to 
be necessary for the secular interests of its people. 

Morality, much more than religion, demands the 
attention of the state, inasmuch as all secular inter- 
ests are more directly affected by it. Public peace, 
public security, hopeful industry, all secular thrift, 
depends directly on the morals of the community. 

Intelligence, as necessary basis of morality and 
religion, and as indispensable to a people for the 
right exercise of its proper sovereignty in the state, 
bears a still more significant relation to the secular 
well-being of a political community. — Just so far as 
this secular well-being requires, education is a legit- 
imate object for the care of the state. 

Every thing thus of a proper secular nature affect- 



THE STATE ITS END AND NATURE. 191 

ing the well-being of the people, comes within the 
purview of political action. 

But besides the limitations to state-action even in 
regard to secular interests already intimated, is the 
further limitation that this secular interest must be 
a common interest. The state is for no individual ; 
it is for the community. It is for each individual 
only as a member of the community. Its action, if 
ever directed to an individual, as must indeed often 
be the case, should be not from any private favorit- 
ism, but such as would be taken for any other indi- 
vidual or class placed in like relation to the state. 

This characteristic of proper political activity 
indicates the wisdom and propriety of making all 
legislation as general as possible. To bestow on an 
individual, or a class, or a section, what in like 
conditions is denied to others, is in violation of a 
fundamental principle of political morality. 

But although the immediate end of the 
spiritual activity. n ^ e aR d activity of the state is thus sec- 
ular, it by no means follows that this 
life and activity are in no relation to moral and 
spiritual interests. In the first place, as the body 
is for the spirit and the secular for the spiritual, the 
state, whose immediate concern is the bodily and 
the secular, must ever act in subordination and in 
subservience to the moral and spiritual interests of 
men. Its action does not directly aim at these 
interests, but its action, to be legitimate, must ever 
be helpful to them. As with the heart in the natu- 
ral body, while it beats only in order to propel the 
blood, its pulsations must yet ever be influenced by 



I92 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

the condition of the whole body for whose nourish- 
ment the blood which it propels is designed. The 
circulatory system exists only for the well-being of 
the whole body ; it acts only in sympathy with its 
condition ; it measures its action by it. So the 
state, whose ministry is directly for the bodily or 
secular, yet indirectly serves the spirit for which 
the body exists ; it must keep itself ever in true 
sympathy with the demands of this higher nature 
and measure its action by it. 

Secondly, the state is a community of persons — 
of moral and spiritual beings — who can never lay 
aside these higher attributes. The moral nature 
breathes forth and acts in all the bodily life. The 
entire free action of the state, even although aimed 
directly at merely worldly ends, is, therefore, so far 
morally determined and characterized. 

Thirdly, the action of the state, although its end 
is to be found properly in secular interests, must 
sometimes seek the furtherance of those interests 
by the enlistment of the moral and spiritual. Just 
as the art of medicine, which aims only at the 
healthy condition of the body, must needs often 
address itself to the mind, prescribing the measure 
and mode of its action in order to bodily health, so 
the state often finds itself under the necessity of 
legislating in regard to the religious condition of the 
community while still seeking its highest secular 
well-being. In this indirect way it is called upon 
to foster intelligence, the culture of the fine arts, 
the moral and religious improvement of the people. 

Thus the outward social life of man is held like 



THE STATE — ITS END AND NATURE. I93 

the personal life of the body, to a strict subordina- 
tion to the collective moral well-being of the indi- 
vidual members. 

6. THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE STATE. 

§ 168. From what has been said it is 
its action moral, clear that the state is in a proper sense 

within the sphere of morality. Its action 
is exclusively human action, which is essentially 
moral ; its immediate end and object is in subordi- 
nation and subservience to the higher moral nature 
of the individuals composing the national commu- 
nity ; it has to do with beings whose natures are 
moral, and whose outward welfare depends greatly 
on moral conditions. It is accordingly by no mere 
figurative use of language that we speak of " a na- 
tion's conscience." The collective action of the 
state is felt to be free as truly as the action of the 
individual ; there is a sense of right and wrong in 
reference to it which is impelling and constraining ; 
a feeling of shame among the people, also, for na- 
tional wrong-doing ; and an expectation of just retri- 
bution for the right or wrong in the life or actions 
of the body politic. Just as the individual man, in 
laboring for mere secular interests and in the true 
secular sphere, must bear his moral nature with him 
and penetrate his whole outward carriage and con- 
duct with a truly moral shaping and coloring, so the 
collective man — the state — even in its secular sphere, 
must evince everywhere the moral nature which 
characterizes in common all its constituent members. 

9 



194 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

The ends and objects which it proposes to itself 
in its action, the general policy by which it gov- 
erns itself, as well as the particular measures which 
it adopts in carrying out this "policy," must all 
be consistent with a pure and sound morality. Its 
legislation, its adjudication under the laws of the 
rights of the citizen, and its administration of the 
law as thus adjudicated, must in every step be con- 
trolled by moral principles and rules. An immoral 
law, an unjust sentence, a corrupt or wrongful ad- 
ministration, every man disallows and reprobates. 
Everywhere, thus, in its ends or objects, and in its 
modes of accomplishing these ends, the state is held 
to act morally — to recognize itself as subject to 
moral control, and to yield itself freely to this con- 
trol. It can never drop from its proper life this 
moral attribute. There is no difficulty in conceiving 
how the state may thus be a truly moral organism 
while its end is purely secular, any more than in 
conceiving how a carpenter who in his calling aims 
only at the finished building, must yet appear as a 
moral man in all he does, building only for uses 
approved in morality, building honestly in accord- 
ance with moral requirements, investing his handi- 
work with the dignity and beauty of his own moral 
nature. 

§ 169. The state has been defined by 
j^raAodety 7 an able writer— Dr. Francis Lieber, in 

his Political Ethics — to be a jural so- 
ciety, being founded on the relation of right as the 
family is founded on the relation of consanguinity, 
having for its principle of action that of right, as 



THE STATE — ITS END AND NATURE. 1 95 

the family has that of love for its animating prin- 
ciple, and, moreover, including only jural relations. 
To this view of the state there are grave objections. 
In the first place, the relation of right is not the 
characteristic basis of the political society, for it is 
not exclusively proper to the state. It exists as 
truly in the family as in the state ; indeed, in every 
possible association of men, the so-called jural rela- 
tion — the relation of right — underlies and pervades 
its whole being and action. In the next place, purely 
jural relations are not the exclusive relations sub- 
sisting in a state in any sense of the statement in 
which it is not true of the family. The relation of 
the state to the " great ends of humanity " origin- 
ates a relation of right, a proper jural relation ; but 
precisely as the relation of the family to the same 
great ends of humanity originates certain jural 
relations between it and its parts, which we desig- 
nate as marital rights, parental and filial rights, and 
fraternal rights. Strike out this relation of the 
state or the family to these ends and all jural rela- 
tion disappears ; it has nothing to stand upon, and 
has no support, no definable limits, no sanctions. 
In the third place, if the jural relation is the proper 
relation originating the state, then, inasmuch as that 
relation exists in respect to religious matters as well 
as secular, the state must extend its rule and care 
as well to religious interests as to secular ; and thus 
we find all practical distinction between the spheres 
of the state and of the church obliterated. Once 
more, if the state and the family are distinguished 
from each other simply by this — that right is the 



I96 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

animating principle in one and not in the other— then 
the principle of love is excluded from the sphere of 
the state, and thus patriotism, loyalty, love of coun- 
try, are empty names ; they designate no virtues. 
This whole view, plausible as it seems as opposed 
to certain erroneous doctrines in regard to civil 
government, is thus logically fallacious and practi- 
cally most vicious and baneful. Mere legality, mere 
outward heartless conformity to governmental requi- 
sitions, does not fulfil the moral obligations of the 
citizen to the state, even were it true that the state 
can in no way directly enforce its claims be) ond 
the outward formal obedience. There is a true 
allegiance which is broader, deeper, earlier than all 
mere jural relations which " began before laws, con- 
tinueth after laws, and is in vigor when laws are 
suspended and have had their force." 

§ 170. As a true moral personality, the 
Bound as a state is obliged by the mere force of its 

moral person. ° J 

moral nature to cherish a sympathetic 
good-will, towards all the proper objects of its ac- 
tivity, to practice an effective beneficence in respect 
to them, and to carry out this sympathetic affection 
in this beneficence in strictest uprightness. 

The moral relationships of the state are of a 
threefold division : — to itself ; to its citizens : to 
other states. Its relationship to God properly comes 
into consideration in the division of duties pertain- 
ing to God, and is accordingly omitted here. 



THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES, ETC. 1 97 



CHAPTER II. 

THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A STATE IN RELATION 
TO ITSELF. 1. EXISTENCE. 

§ 171. As in the case of the individual 
Rights of the man so i n the case of the state we may 

state. •> 

properly speak of certain rights and 
duties as pertaining to it individually — to itself. 

The several comprehensive rights and corre- 
sponding duties of a state are those of : I, Existence ; 
2. Self-rule or autonomy ; and 3. Growth. 

§ 172. I. It is the right of a state to be : 
1. Of existence, ft i s it s corresponding duty to maintain 

its existence. 
It is not within the proper province of an existing 
state to raise the question whether its birth was 
legitimate. The fact of its existing has settled that 
point. 

§ 173. States come to be in fact in 
Threefold three ways : First by regular growth of 

origin. J . . 

the family into the tribe and then of the 
tribe into the state. Such was the rise of the ear- 
lier nations. 



198 duties in the state. 

Secondly, By separation from existing states. As 
to the question : what can legitimate a rebellion or 
secession, it may be answered that the law of the 
state from which the separation is proposed, must 
necessarily prohibit and resist it. No state can for 
light cause legalize self-disintegration. Further, 
nothing but extreme necessity can justify a part of 
a nation in dismembering itself from the political 
body to which it belongs. Such disruption natu- 
rally is in violence and brings inevitable distress. 
Intolerable oppression or hindrance of sound polit- 
ical life, with sufficient magnitude and strength to 
maintain healthy existence, alone can warrant dis- 
ruption. 

Thirdly, By aggregation of existing communities. 
Bodies of people conveniently situated for a proper 
state organization, whether tribal communities or 
dependencies of some one state, or of different 
states, may be drawn together into a legitimate 
state-union under the natural instinct of man crav- 
ing a social order for the nurture of common secu- 
lar interests. 

§ 174. But a state having under provi- 
Threefoid duty d en tial ordering come into being, it 

of self-mainten- ° _ ° 

ance. then has a right, as it is its highest 

duty to maintain its. existence. Sub- 
ordinate only to the supreme law of God and of 
universal morality, its maxim is to preserve itself — 
Sains populi, suprema lex. Its right and duty, here 
are threefold : 1, of support ; 2, of defense ; 3, of 
enforcing its rightful mle. 

§ 176. The support required for the state 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. Kjcj 

2. of support, comes from the public resources or from 
the citizens. Of its right and duty to 
employ itsown resources in self-support there'canbe 
no question. Equally beyond question is its duty, as 
the general rule, to use these resources of its own be- 
fore having recourse to the individual citizen. Of the 
necessity or the expediency of requiring the help of 
the citizen, the state is sole and supreme judge. It 
has the right, and if it judge it to be necessary for 
its own existence it is its duty, to appropriate the 
property and the service of its citizens. 

Of the extent and the mode of bringing into its 
use individual property and service, the state is 
sovereign arbiter. It is bound, however, by the 
principles of political morality to make no exactions 
beyond the public necessity ; to distribute the bur- 
den as nearly as possible equally and fairly, accord- 
ing to ability ; to proceed with all practicable 
tenderness for the individual interest; and to have 
a steady regard to the general interest of the com- 
munity. 

§ 177. The state has a right to take, if necessary 
and in proper ways, any of the property belong- 
ing to the citizen. (1). It has thus the right, so 
called, of eminent domain — of superior right above 
the individual to appropriate any of the lands or 
other estate of its citizens, giving, of course, reason- 
able compensation. (2). It has the right to tax its 
citizens for its support. (3). It has still further the 
right to the personal service of its citizens for war 
for the suppression of insurrection or other crimes 
against the peace and order of the community, and 



200 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

for civil office. Its right is founded in the very 
nature of civil society which is but the organized 
social secular life of men and enfolds all public 
secular interests and rights. The property which 
it legitimates and protects, and the personal service 
which it upholds and fosters, are in moral reciproc- 
ity bound to minister to its necessities, asthe mem- 
bers of the physical body must minister, even to the 
extent of entire self-sacrifice if necessary, to the 
common life from which they spring and thrive. 

§.178. Generally the chief reliance of 
Kinds of tax- the state for Jts support } s on taxation, 

which may be direct — taxes proper, — or 
indirect — duties. Direct taxation is upon the per- 
son — capitation or po//-ta.x, — or on the property 
of the subject — property tax. Indirect taxation is 
either upon property produced within the state 
— excise duty, — or upon property imported from 
abroad— imposts or customs ; or upon business — as 
by stamps ; — or upon income. 

Of the relative amounts to be levied by the state 
from these several sources of revenue, as has been 
already stated, the state is sole arbiter. Its judg- 
ment must vary in different communities and under 
different conditions. Some general considerations 
may be stated which will influence the selection 
and distribution. 

§ 179. 1. Direct taxation is more sensi- 
i._ Direct tax- Wy felt than indirect j t therefore gives 

rise to friction between the state and 
the subject, and also to temptation of concealment 
and false valuation, and consequent unfairness in 






THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. 201 

the listing of property. On the other hand it keeps 
alive and active the sense of the state-life in the 
subject, and a feeling of responsibility in the legis- 
lator, restraining him from excessive levies. Where, 
as in the United States, the nation and the more 
local communities — the several states and territories 
— collect their revenues separately, it is a wise dis- 
tinction, as far as may be, to allot to the nation all 
indirect duties — customs — and to the local commu- 
nity — the state — all direct taxes. A twofold system 
of appraisal and assessment in the same territory 
must necessarily give rise to much chafing as well as 
occasion a twofold expenditure. Moreover, a fun- 
damental provision in the constitution of the United 
States requiring that all direct taxes shall be dis- 
tributed according to the census, such taxes would 
work unequally between the states by reason of the 
unequal distribution of wealth. 

Indirect taxes are less felt by the payer ; they are 
more fairly laid and more fully collected ; and con- 
sequently give less occasion for chafing and fraud. 
False valuation of merchandise and smuggling are 
the two chief temptations to be guarded against. 
Impost duties, however, hamper foreign commerce, 
and are therefore held in disfavor by some advocates 
of free trade. 

§ 1 80. 2. Capitation taxes are legiti- 
taxes Pltatl ° n mate, inasmuch as persons, alike with 
property, enter as constituents into the 
body politic, sharing in its protection and care. It 
is well, moreover, that every citizen be reminded in 
some sensible way of his personal relationship to 

9* 



202 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

the state. Only a moderate portion of the neces- 
sary revenue of a state, however, can be realized in 
this way; and the great burden must rest on the 
property of the subjects. 

§ 1 8 1. 3. Excise ditties, being levied on 

3. Excise duties, the products of home industry, are ob- 

jectionable as burdensome to production, 
which it is a leading duty of the state to foster. 
But articles of which there is danger of excessive 
or injurious or wasteful use, such as distilled liquors 
and tobacco, are not liable to this objection, and are 
therefore wisely taken to bear the burden of taxation 
to the full extent which they will bear. 

§ 182. 4. Imposts ox customs, levied on 

4. imposts. imported commodities, constitute a lead- 

ing source of revenue in the general ad- 
ministration of governments. The considerations 
that favor this selection, especially for national as 
opposed to municipal revenues, are manifold. The 
collection of it is more in the immediate control of 
the government. In maritime countries it inciden- 
tally furnishes a nursery for a naval force, and also 
a ready instrumentality for furthering commerce, 
as by affording aid to vessels in need, furnishing 
protection to the coast, and a watchful supervision 
over the needful provisions for safe navigation, such 
as lights, beacons, removal of obstructions, and the 
like. It necessarily brings the whole influx of for- 
eign goods under the inspection of the government, 
so that, the kinds and quantities all being made 
known, profitable suggestions may be derived for 
any needed governmental regulation — for repression 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. 2<Jj 

of injurious or increase of desirable products, and 
also for the encouragement and direction of the 
productive industry of the country. 

This kind of taxation is less sensibly felt by the 
tax-payer. He pays at his own pleasure and con- 
venience, just as and when he chooses to buy, and 
pays no more than he chooses. He does not come 
| into direct conflict with the government or its gen- 
erally unwelcome instrument — the tax-collector. 
This kind of taxation is therefore generally borne 
more quietly. 

Where the revenues for national and for state or 
municipal support are separately levied and collect- 
ed, the collection of imposts for national revenue is 
less expensive arid less annoying to the tax-payer. 

Further, a revenue from customs — by a tariff, as 
it is familiarly called — enables a government indi- 
rectly to foster more judiciously and effectively 
certain interests of more or less vital concern to the 
community. Every wise tariff system must be 
more or less discriminative. An exactly horizontal 
tariff, that is, a tariff of equal duties on all imports, 
is hardly practicable, and certainly would be most 
unreasonable. 

There may possibly, and probably will, be discrim- 
ination required in reference to the country from 
which the imports come — according to treaty-regu- 
lations with the different nations, reciprocating free 
or dutiable admission of products. 

Discrimination may be necessary in reference to 
the interests of revenue itself ; some desirable com- 
modities may not bear the full measure of a hori- 



204 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

zontal tariff. Indeed it must ever be a leading 
problem in adjusting a tariff, what amount of duty 
will afford the largest revenue. A tariff may be so 
high as to be prohibitory ; or it may so enhance the 
price to the purchaser that the sale, and conse- 
quently the importation, will be so far lessened that 
a higher duty will produce less revenue than a lower. 
Moreover, some commodities will yield too small a 
revenue for the cost of collection. A wise princi- 
ple in adjusting a tariff system is to make those 
commodities pay most that pay best. 

Discrimination may be required in the interests of 
public morals. Hurtful commodities may be kept 
out of the country by prohibitory duties ; and the 
introduction of dangerous or useless articles may 
be hindered or repressed by relatively high duties, 
as, for instance, distilled liquors and tobacco. 

Discrimination may be wise in reference to lux- 
uries, which will bear and justify a heavier duty 
than mere necessaries or comforts. Silks and wines 
are thus properly discriminated against by the im- 
position of higher than average duties. 

Discrimination should be made in the interest of 
classes in the community less able to contribute to 
the support of the state. A leading objection to a 
revenue by tariff is that no difference can be made 
directly between the rich and the poor. Wealth is 
not taxed as w r ealth ; but only purchase. If all the 
citizens purchased the same things, under a hori- 
zontal tariff the poor would contribute equally with 
the rich for the support of the state. There is 
weight in this consideration, although the burden 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. 205 

of this kind of taxation is more effectually propor- 
tioned to the ability of the payers than other kinds, 
inasmuch as it is regulated by what a man freely 
buys. Hence, as in equity property should be bur- 
dened according to its amount, it is requisite in an 
equitable tariff system that luxuries be taxed heavi- 
est, conveniences and comforts less, and the necessa- 
ries of life which all must have, least of all. 

Once more, discrimination may be needful in the 
interest of domestic production. As the augmenta- 
tion of its resources is one leading duty of a state, 
and as the resources lie mainly in the possessions 
or wealth of its citizens, resulting from productive 
labor, the fostering of all the legitimate modes of 
augmenting the wealth of the country should be 
a leading object with a government. It is its duty, 
therefore, in every department of its administration, 
and especially in the matter of its tariff system to 
see to it that in all its parts, and in its legitimate ef- 
fects, it shall not only not hinder but positively pro- 
mote all the productive and distributing industries 
of the country whereby its resources may be aug- 
mented. The relative condition of these differ- 
ent industries may reasonably require intelligent 
discrimination in favor of one rather than an- 
other. 

The objections to imposts as a source of revenue 
are: I. That they are a tax on the productions of 
foreign countries. But they are so only as for the 
profit of the producer they are consumed in the 
country. If the duty was prohibitory, he would 
have no right to complain : for every purchaser, 



20J> DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

whether nation or individual, has a right in the free- 
dom of trade to refuse to purchase. 

2. It hampers trade and intercourse between 
different countries. This is true and it is a valid ob- 
jection, so far as it goes ; but it suggests rather 
carefully considered modes of collection than repeals 
of tariffs. It is the frauds, the lawless exactions, and 
the discourtesies of collectors, rather than the duties 
themselves, that so exasperate commercial men and 
travelers. The outcries against a revenue by tariff 
are mostly from these classes and those immediate- 
ly connected with them and those whose special in- 
dustries happen in the unavoidable imperfections of 
any system of revenue to be more closely touched, 
and not from the great mass of the people, at least 
when free from political partisan bias and pressure. 

3. The collection of duties gives large occasion for 
corruption. This is true ; but the evil is an unavoid- 
able one in any system of revenue collection. 

4. It is a ground of international alienation and 
animosity. This is true, but only to a very limited 
and really inconsiderable extent. 

§ 183. 5. Stamps and all taxes upon 
5. stamps. business, while they may be justified in 

the extremities of a nation's need, are 
objectionable, not only because the national welfare 
imperatively requires that the ways of business 
should be as unobstructed as possible, but because 
they are generally inconvenient for the payer, and 
are relatively small so as to be unworthy of a great 
nation. 

§ 184. 6. Income taxes arc, perhaps, the most 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. 20y 

odious to the payers. Incomes are not 

6. Income taxes. & j^ mcasure Q f ability to pay . thcy 

are not easily ascertained ; they are apt to be 
disguised and understated ; they are matters of 
privacy into which it is very offensive that the pub- 
lic eye should penetrate ; they hinder the accumula- 
tion of capital. Income taxes thus lead to fraudulent 
returns ; disturb the free tendencies of investment 
by capitalists and of productive enterprise ; and oc- 
casion perpetual friction between, the tax-payer and 
state. They are the last modes of revenue to be re- 
sorted to by a state in its necessities. They are 
most tolerable in old and wealthy states where there 
is a large surplus of capital for investment. 

§ 185. Self-defense is a natural right 
11. Right of anc | duty of the state, while it may not 

self-defense. J _ J 

trespass on the rights of other states or 
of its own subjects so as to provoke aggression or 
rebellion. When assailed it is one of the fundamental 
laws of living being that it should defend itself. As, 
against the violences of natural forces — storms and 
earthquakes and conflagrations, — against the ma- 
raudings of animal and insect life, against all 
physical and animal force and harm, it is bound to 
protect its citizens, so equally against the force of 
men, against assault upon their liberties and good 
order and possessions, whether from foreign force 
or from insurgents at home. There should be 
patience, forbearance, as in the case of assault upon 
persons ; but there is a limit beyond which unresist- 
ing sufferance is an immorality. War should be the 
last resort — ultima ratio ; — but it may be righteous 



208 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

as such resort. As the spirit of philanthropy — good 
will among men — advances in the world, peace will 
more and more prevail ; the occasions and the jus- 
tifications of war will lessen. But while imperfec- 
tion remains, the liability to lawless oppression and 
to wars will continue. 

For its own defense, the state rightfully holds 
the entire community of resources within its do- 
main, subject to its use and control. Property and 
personal service being the very constituents of 
the united social interest, the ruling power in it 
must dispose of it according to its own sovereign de- 
termination. The usages of peace and the rights 
which have grown up under these usages, even 
statutes themselves, may be compelled to give way. 
Laws are dormant in war — inter anna leges silent. 
The state in war appropriates, or even destroys, the 
possessions of individuals ; it conscripts their per- 
sons. This great power it is, however, bound to 
exercise only so far as the good of the whole shall 
require on the clearest occasions of necessity, with 
the utmost forbearance and consideration, and with 
full compensation out of the public resources. 

§ 1 86. 3. The maintenance of autho*- 
iii. Of rule. ITY — the right and duty of enforcing its 

rightful rule — appertains to the state 
by virtue of its very being. The state exists as a 
ruling power ; it ceases when its rule ends. Its will 
in its sphere is rightfully supreme : it is its right and 
duty to exert that will and make it effectual, other- 
wise it would be preposterous to will or to claim 
the right of willing. The means and methods by 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. 20O, 

which it may rightfully enforce its will are precisely 
determined by the nature of its province, which is 
the secular interest of the community. As all secu- 
lar interests are incorporated into it, they are its to 
use in the fulfilment of its end. All secular power 
within its control to its utmost limit it may thus 
lawfully employ. The enforcement of its laws by 
penal sanctions to the extent of taking property, 
personal liberty, life itself, — all secular coercion by 
secular means — belongs to it by right of its very 
being. Only a perfect community can dispense 
with the use of physical constraint. To the good 
the constraints of civil authority will be no terror; 
in the sense of harm to their persons or property, 
the law is not for them ; but so long as there are 
lawless and disobedient members of civil society, 
there will be need and rightful use for the sword. It 
is a grand fallacy to reason from the immortality 
and the higher spiritual nature of men that none 
but proper spiritual and eternal motives should be 
addressed to them. This would be no more logical 
than to infer from man's being in civil society gov- 
erned by secular influences that there should be no 
family rule. The grand fact that man exists in a 
physical body, in time and in place on earth, places 
him in the secular sphere where he must in truth 
to his condition act in secular relations and be cor- 
respondingly acted upon by secular forces. Secu- 
lar ends are legitimately attained by secular means. 
As a secular power, the state rightfully employs sec- 
ular constraint — outward, physical coercion — in the 
enforcement of its rightful rule. 



2IO DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

§ 187. The legitimate and principal 
Sanctions of law. means f maintaining political authority 

are found in the sanctions of law. 
It should never be forgotten, however, that the 
very manner and spirit in which the government 
frames and executes the sanctions of its laws, are 
vitally concerned in the maintenance of its author- 
ity. Unjust, immoral, barbarous, partial, or capri- 
cious, arbitrary, reckless legislation and administra- 
tion are fatal to authority, which must rest mainly 
on the respect and confidence of the body of the 
political community. Wise and righteous laws are 
their own support with an orderly and intelligent 
people. 

The sanctions of law are either rewards for 
loyalty and obedience, ox penalties for disobedience. 

§ 188. Rewards express the lawgiver's 
Rewards. approval of loyalty and obedience. They 

are in the form of public recognition of 
patriotic service and acts, military and civil distinc- 
tions, monuments, bounties, abatements of dues, and 
the like. They constitute but an inconsiderable 
part of the sanctions found necessary for the en- 
forcement of authority. They are yet a needful 
help in encouraging the spirit of order and loyalty. 
Wisely distributed they win the sympathy and affec- 
tionate confidence of the people towards the govern- 
ment. 

§ 189. Penalties express the lawgiv- 
Penaities. e r's disapproval of disobedience and his 

corresponding determination to pre- 
vent it. 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE. 211 

They are a necessary part of law ; for, as it lias been 
forcibly asked : " What can be called law, which 
does not express supreme abhorrence of transgres- 
sion ? " Penal laws which are characterized by a 
spirit of indifference to loyal obedience or to the 
great ends of society for which laws are ordained, 
are a mockery of proper authority. If the lawgiv- 
er is indifferent, why should not the subject be so ? 
The moral sense of the community — its love of 
right, its abhorrence of wrong — must pervade all its 
legislation, and, most of all, its penal legislation. 
The one great end of penal laws is to discourage or 
prevent disobedience. 

Secondar - ends § I 9 a ^ ut wn ^ e the prevention of crime 
of penalty— in i s the primary immediate end of pen- 

teachmg. J 

alty, there are other ends to be sought 
by it. These ends are in entire harmony with 
that of prevention and to a large extent helpful to 
it. A second end in penalty is thus, the moral teach- 
ing of the community. All penal laws, as has been 
already observed, express the moral sense of 
the political community. Such expression should 
have its full legitimate effect on the minds of the 
people. It is an end to be had distinctly in view in 
framing penal laws. As legislation should be the 
expression of the highest wisdom of the state, penal 
laws may properly be somewhat in advance of the 
average morality of the community, while yet not so 
far as to be beyond their sympathy and respect. 
They should aim expressly at inculcating respect 
for rightful authority and for the majesty of law, 
love of order, hatred of wrong:. 



212 DUTIES IN THE FAMILY. 

§ 191. A third legitimate end of pen- 
in reforming. alty, to be applied in subordination to 
the two ends already named, is the ref- 
ormation of the offender. 

§ 192. The modes of punishment by 
Modes. states are by pecuniary fines, by im- 

prisonment, by personal suffering. They 
must vary with the state of society and with the 
character of the people. In early stages of hrstory, 
retaliation of the wrong done in mode as well as de- 
gree — wound for wound, tooth for tooth, life for life 
— was well nigh a necessity ; as it is an immediate 
suggestion of natural instinct, moreover, punish- 
ments were inflicted wholly or in part by the party 
wronged. Fines are collected even now in civil- 
ized states sometimes by the party suffering from 
the offense ; even prosecutions for crimes against 
public order are left to individual complaints. 
But in the progress of civilization, the law of exact 
retaliation — lex talionis — gives way and the pros- 
ecution of criminals and the infliction of penal- 
ties on the guilty are wisely taken from the hands 
of the individual and committed to the public 
official. 

The second end of punishment named — the moral 
teaching of the community — forbids all such modes 
of punishment as unnecessarily shock humane senti- 
ments or offend against public decency. More and 
more, with the progress of society, public inflictions 
of penalty on the person of the offender become of- 
fensive, and are wisely replaced by more private 
execution of the law. 



THE RIGHTS OF THE STATIC. 2 I 3 

§ 193. The degrees of penalties vary, 
witifhehioSness fi rst > w ^ tn tne nature of the offense. 
of the offense. y| ie p r i llLC ipi e f natural justice enjoins 

this ; — that, aside from all other considerations, the 
degree of the penalty should in some way measure 
the heinousness of the offense. 

§ 194. Secondly, the degrees of penalty 

2. with difficulty vary w ith the difficulty of detection and 

ot detection. , 

conviction of offenders. Those offenses 
which it is more difficult to detect, such for instance, 
as those committed in the night, must receive 
heavier penalties. 

§ 195. Thirdly, the degrees of penalty 

3. with preva- vary w i tn the number and strength of 

lence ot wrong. J ^ 

the offenders. Conspirators in the per- 
petration of a wrong are thus more severely punish- 
ed than individual offenders. 

§ 196. Fourthly, the degrees of penalty 

sentl'!enf ublic vai T witn tne moral sentiment of the 
community. As that becomes more 
pure, more firm, more pervasive, less severe inflic- 
tions are necessary. 



214 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 



CHAPTER III. 



POLITICAL AUTONOMY. 



§ 197. It is the right of a state to rule 
Defined. itself ; — to shape its own organic law, to 

enact its own statutes, to interpret and 
administer its own laws ; — generally to manage its 
own affairs without the interference of other powers. 
This is the right of self-rule — autonomy. 

§ 198. The right of self-rule is involved in 
Ground. the right to be. The very idea of a state 

is that it is the embodiment in a single 
organic whole of the power to rule all the secular in- 
terests of the community. Interference from with- 
out with the free exercise of this ruling authority 
must either reduce to provincial subordination or in- 
fringe on the integrity of a state. 

The right of autonomy is not necessarily impaired 
by a distribution of political authority into the more 
strictly national and the local or municipal rule. 
But in order to the unity of the organic life of the 
state, the municipal must be held ever subordinate 
and subservient to the national. With this subor- 



POLITICAL AUTONOMY. 2 I 5 

dination, it is wise policy to subdivide political rule 
so as to give to districts or provinces — States — the 
immediate rule over what of secular concern lies 
within the State or province ; to allot, moreover, to 
smaller districts, like subordinate rule over the 
political and civil concerns within such district, till 
the smallest convenient local community is reached. 
Indeed, it is in the same line of wise policy to leave 
ever to the individual citizen all of freedom to rule 
and manage his own concerns consistent with the 
good of the whole, § 208. 3. 

§ 199. It is equally the duty as it is the 
Autonomy as risfht of a state to maintain its own 

duty. & 

autonomy, The state owes it to its 
own prosperity and vigor, to the independence of its 
action and consequently to its proper relations and 
degree of responsibility, and to its own self-respect, 
with unyielding firmness and at any sacrifice to re- 
sist all dictation and all constraint from other 
powers. A subject sovereignty is a contradiction 
in terms and a monstrosity in being. 

§ 200. The autonomy of a state is ex- 
Spheres. erted chiefly in the distinct spheres of 

its organic law ; its legislation ; its judi- 
ciary ; and its executive administration. 

As all finite rule, while in freedom, is yet under 
responsibility, in these several spheres of autonomy 
there are respectively in part distinct modes of re- 
sponsibility in each. The people themselves who 
constitute the state are for their collective action 
responsible to God, and, in a certain degree, to the 
fraternity of states. The departments of political 



2l6 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

administration are responsible to the people and so 
far as courtesy and reciprocal respect are concerned, 
also to the co-ordinate departments ; as also more 
or less to the particular political power which 
creates or appoints the officials in them. The meas- 
ure and kind of responsibility vary with the relation- 
ship. There is no absolute autonomy among men. 
Accountability, in its ten thousand forms and de- 
grees, enters, as an element not to be got rid of, in- 
to all modes of human activity — personal or social. 
The only questions that can arise are : to whom, to 
what extent, and in what way, is this accountability 
to be recognized and enforced. 

§ 201. The organic law of a state is 
fined" aW e the expressed will of the political com- 
munity in reference to the principles 
and forms of its government. It is the fundamen- 
tal law by which the entire action of the political 
community is to be ruled, and which is ever to be 
recognized as supreme. From it there is no appeal 
but to the original seat of all political authority — 
the community itself. 

This organic law may appear in full and proper 
form as in written constitutions, or only in parts and 
fragments, as the advancing history of the people 
has developed them. In communities, properly free, 
it is drawn up under the direction of the people, or 
at least is formally ratified by them in such way as 
the circumstances may admit, so as to be recognized 
as the expressed will of the people. In older his- 
toric nations, brought together and constituted into 
a single political body, perhaps, by outward force 



POLITICAL AUTONOMY. 2\J 

and by degrees, it appears in the form of subsequent 
concessions, as in the case of the Magna Charta of 
King John of England, and the fuller charter of 
Louis XVIII. of France ; or in the form of com- 
pacts entered into by existing powers in the state 
between themselves or with the governed. Estab- 
lished usage, moreover, may stamp additional features 
on the fundamental law of the state, as implying 
the consent and will of the sovereign community. 

It is the purpose and object of the or- 
its purport. ganic law of a state (i) to confer the 

power of political rule possessed by the 
community on designated individuals or bodies of 
men ; (2) to define the limits within which, and 
also the modes and forms in which, this conferred 
power is to be exercised. 

All power not thus conferred, directly or by fair 
implication, is reserved to the community itself. 
The right to revoke, or alter, or amend its organic 
law or constitution is also reserved, although the 
mode by which such revocation or change is to be 
brought about may be properly or wisely prescribed 
in the instrument itself. 

The organic law thus creates and shapes the out- 
ward organism through which the social life of the 
community is so far to be expressed. 

There is a threefold division of the 
iciT S fun°ction 0lit " functions of the political organism 

adopted generally by the most mature 
and most highly perfected states. They constitute 
the other spheres mentioned of state autonomy — 
the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. 



2l8 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

§ 202. The function of the state legisla- 
function.' atlVe ture i s t0 ordain law for the government 
of its own action and that of its citizens. 
It is the seat of authority for the nation. Its 
enactments are binding on the conscience of the 
subject, unless contravening the higher authority 
of right morals or the fundamental law of the state 
— its organic law or constitution. 

In nations most advanced in civilization, the leg- 
islative power is commonly entrusted to the joint 
action with the executive of two distinct bodies of 
representatives' — one more popular, elected imme- 
diately by the people, and having a briefer tenure of 
office — the House of Representatives, the House of 
Deputies, the House of Commons ; and the other 
designed to be the more conservative body, having 
a longer tenure of office and appointed by other 
functionaries or organisms in the state. The union 
of the executive with these representative bodies is 
wisely required for a more perfect adaptation of law 
to the practical needs of administrative power, and 
to existing relations with foreign powers. 

The ordinances of the legislature, at least so far 
as pertaining more directly to the general welfare 
and for general observance, are called statutes. 
They constitute the great body of the written law 
of a nation — its lex scripta. 

§ 203. It is the proper function of the 
2. judicial. Judiciaiy to interpret in their applica- 
tion to particular cases the laws of the 
state — its organic law, its statute law, and its un- 
written law — lex non scripta. This unwritten law 



POLITICAL AUTONOMY. 7.ig 

— the common law as it is sometimes designated in 
distinction from the statute law — it interprets and 
declares out of the principles of natural justice as 
recognized and accepted in the usages of society. 

The only allowed occasion for the action of the 
judiciary is a case of question among citizens, offi- 
cials, or political communities. Its authority reaches 
no further than the points controverted in some ac- 
tual litigation.; its function being solely to inter- 
pret the law in its specific applications to existing 
occasions. Its decisions rank as precedents which 
are binding until set aside by higher authority. 
They are regarded with peculiar deference, not 
.merely because civil judges are expected to be both 
competent and upright, but because the controversy 
between interested litigants is supposed to bring 
out the full light of truth in the case so as to afford 
•the best possible opportunity for a just determina- 
tion. 

The sphere of the judiciary reaches to all kinds of 
-civil and political law — organic, statute, and common. 
It interprets all, harmonizing them with the higher 
principles of morality or the established usages or un- 
written law of the community. If it finds statute 
enactments irreconcilable with the organic law or 
with common morality, it declares it not to be law 
applicable to the government of the citizens. It is 
competent to enact no law ; its province is simply 
to declare what is law. 

§ 204. The judiciary recognizes a distinction 
between legal rights — rights existing under statute 
law or judicially declared common law — and equities 



220 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

— rights not covered by known law, which perhaps 
no general law could be framed to meet, but yet 
real and needing to be protected. Sometimes, the 
state creates separate tribunals for these two prov- 
inces of judicial action — courts of law and courts of 
equity or chancery. Sometimes the same tribunal 
is authorized to adjudicate cases both of law and of 
equity. A court thus may have its law side and its 
equity side. In either case it is governed by fixed 
principles of practice and of adjudication, so that no 
collision may arise. 

§ 205. It is the proper function of the 
3: Executive. Executive of a state to execute the 

statutes and ordinances of the legisla- 
ture and the decisions of the judiciary, so far at 
least as is not otherwise expressly provided As 
the political head of the state, it is the function of 
the executive officer to represent the state in all its 
intercourse with other states. He is properly 
charged with such general supervision of the con- 
dition of the community as will enable him to re- 
commend suitable measures to the legislature or to 
the people for their adoption. 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 221 



CHAPTER IV. 

POLITICAL GROWTH. 

§ 206. It is the right of a state to 
Right of growth. g row j to ca rry on its proper political 
life to its maturity and highest per- 
fection. The great comprehensive end of the state 
being the furtherance of the common secular wel- 
fare of a contiguous people, it is at once the right 
and the duty of the state to promote to the highest 
degree this secular well-being of the community in 
all its departments. 

Growth is an essential attribute of life. The pre- 
dominant instincts of a community are towards the 
extension of the common good, which the funda- 
mental laws of being require to be obeyed and grat- 
ified in suitable ways and within proper limits. No 
moral interest is necessarily harmed by such 
growth ; all moral interests, as perfectly harmonized 
and organized into a whole of universal good, under 
the divine direction and rule, demand this growth 
of every existing state. Its very existence imports 
increase, improvement, perfection. 

§ 207. This growth of the state is to reach all 



222- DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

Sevenfold de- departments of its being. There is no 
partments. good ground to be found in the essence 
of a state for excepting any. As finite, it is subject 
to manifold limitations ; but these limitations do not 
lie in the proper being of the state. The several 
departments in which this growth is to be sought 
and furthered are the following : 

I, Territorially ; 2, in population ; 3, in strength 
of political union ; 4, in wealth and material re- 
sources ; 5, in the sanitary condition of the people ; 
6, in public intelligence ; 7, in public morals. 

§ 208. Especially applicable to this 
Maxims. mode of political activity — the further- 

ance of the proper growth of the state — 
are certain maxims of political action which, while 
indeed of universal pertinence, may properly be ex- 
pressly stated here. 

1. All furtherance of political prosperity must be 
directed steadily towards the one end for which the 
state exists — the common secular well-being of the 
people. Only as requisite to this common good can 
personal or class or sectional action be justified. 

2. All political action must be within the lines of 
fundamental morality, as for instance of courtesy, 
justice, and beneficence. 

3. What can be, should be left to individual care 
and enterprise, to associations, or to local commu- 
nities. This maxim is founded on the principle that 
the highest perfection of the state lies in the richest 
right activity of its subjects. This activity should 
be therefore stimulated and encouraged in all prac- 
ticable ways. There are in support of this maxim 






POLITICAL GROWTH. 223 

the further considerations that individuals and local 
communities are better able to discern what the 
common good requires ; and that they are better 
qualified to devise the modes of execution, and gen- 
erally to act more efficiently, more wisely, more 
economically than mere official representatives of 
the state. § 221. The maxim laisscz faire — let the 
subject do what the public interest demands — is a 
sound maxim ; but it must ever be applied so as 
not to set aside the right and duty of the state to 
see to it that the public good is ever protected and 
furthered. It is a directive, not a supplanting 
maxim. 

SECTION I. TERRITORIAL EXTENSION. 

§ 209. The state has the right to grow territo- 
rially. 

The modes of territorial extension are 

taSK&S"*" threefold : b y annexation ; by acquisi- 

tion ; by conquest. 

1 . Annexation is of territory not belong- 
By annexation, ing to any other states. Unoccupied 

lands adjacent to its borders, a state 
may rightfully incorporate into its own domain. 
There may arise a question whether lands are oc- 
cupied or not. It is generally accepted that nomadic, 
wandering tribes acquire no permanent right of do- 
main. As they begin a settled life and give indica- 
tions of intention to hold and improve for permanent 
uses, they acquire rights which more powerful na 
tions are bound to respect. Only on the clear 



224 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

ground of the peremptory demands of universal 
humanity, as in a spreading conflagration the de- 
struction of a dwelling may be justified to save a 
city, can such deprivation by a powerful state of a 
weaker community be sanctioned. The earth was 
to be populated ; it is in violation of the natural 
law of increase, that . a few scattered barbarians 
should hold a relatively large territory, keeping it 
from occupancy and from improvement. But the 
case should be a clear one, a strong one, to justify 
the dispossession of the weak few in the interest of 
the mighty many ; and the gentlest means and the 
fullest recompense are enjoined, when such dispos- 
session is deemed necessary in the interests of the 
race. 

2. Acquisition is by purchase from 
By acquisition, bordering states. Dismembership, we 

have seen, § 173, is not, except for the 
welfare of the whole, allowable in morals, but such 
exceptional cases occur. Even an independent 
state may incorporate itself on stipulated conditions 
with another state. 

3. Conquest of territory is justifiable 
By conquest, only in case of war otherwise justifiable 

and in the way of compensation for 
losses suffered in rightful defense. 

SECTION II. INCREASE OF POPULATION. 

§ 210. The State has a right to grow in popula- 
tion. It may rightfully thus further in all suitable 
ways the natural increase of its people, by promo- 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 225 

ting the public health, and the conditions of com- 
fortable subsistence, with distinct reference to this 
remote end. It may also encourage immigration 
from other countries. The restrictions on its ac- 
tion in this direction are, that it should not harm 
by weakening other nations, and that it should not 
jeopard its own unity and strength by admitting 
elements that cannot be properly assimilated to 
its own life. Especially in free governments, where 
the participation in political rule by suffrage or 
otherwise is widely extended, the state owes it to it- 
self not to incorporate into the body of its citizens 
strangers, perhaps ignorant and indigent, unless 
with great caution. 



SECTION III. PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. WEIGHTS AND 

MEASURES MONEY MAILS. 

§ 21 1. The state has aright to grow in inter- 
nal strength, to promote the fullest union and har- 
mony and inter-communication between its own 
members. 

The leading specific modes of thus 

Threefold . . -. . , . 

modes. strengthening the union and organic in- 

teraction of its members are by the pro- 
vision of (i) thoroughfares of travel and traffic ; (2), 
of needful means of commercial exchange ; and (3), 
of methods for the intercommunication of intelli- 
gence among its citizens. 

§ 212. Public Improvements. Itisindis- 

Publk Improve- pensable tQ the fljfl {jfe Q f a community 

that the members be brought into the best 

rrv* 



226 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

possible communication with one another in respect 
both to person and property. While it is most true 
that the opening and maintaining of public roads, of 
canals, of railways, may generally be left to private 
or local enterprise, § 208, 3, it is still the right and 
the duty of the state in its relation to the highest 
good of the entire community to see to it that such 
thoroughfares are provided and maintained ; to ex- 
tend in clear cases of necessity its aid more or less 
directly ; and especially to see that the use of 
these public thorougfares be not hindered or mo- 
lested. 

§ 213. Weights and Measures. As need- 

2. Means of ex- *: . 

change-Weights ful for the interchanges of property as 

and Measures. , r , , , 

are roads ior persons, are standards and 
instruments of commercial exchange. Manifestly 
indispensable thus are national standards of weight 
and measurement, and a national currency. The 
determination of both is properly held as the pre- 
rogative of political sovereignty, 

Of the first mentioned means, it need only be said 
that the great requisites in regard to all state regula- 
tion are that the system of prescribed weights and 
measures be stable ; be uniform for the whole coun- 
try ; be simple and easy of use ; and, so far as may 
be, in accordance with the systems in use among 
other nations. The parts or denominations, as in the 
money system, have generally been determined by the 
convenience of the individual community, and have 
been gradually introduced in the progress of the peo- 
ple. The tendency in commercial states at present is 
to a general adoption of the decimal ratio, as one most 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 227 

familiar, most likely to be universal, and most con- 
venient. The standard — the respective unit in a 
system of weights and measurements — in order to 
stability and universality, it has been wisely sought 
to fix in reference to some dimension, obtained in 
physical or astronomical science, as that of an arc 
of a meridian circle of the earth, or the force of 
gravity on the equator. 

§ 214. Money. The right and duty of a 
Money state in reference to money grow out of 

its duty to promote the prosperity of the 
community to the utmost of its power. As the in- 
crease of wealth depends almost entirely on the 
facility for making exchanges of commodities, a con- 
venient instrument for this purpose becomes a ne- 
cessity. The term money, while having other as- 
sociated meanings, in its stricter sense denotes just 
this instrument. 

Money may accordingly be defined to be 
Defined. a representative medium for facilitating 

exchanges of commercial values. 
Money is a representative of value ; it is not a 
value itself, except as merely representative. A piece 
of money may have an intrinsic value of its own ; the 
mere material of which it is made may have such a 
value before it was made into money — before it was 
coined ; it may retain this intrinsic value, which 
may be equal to the value represented or less than 
that, after the stamp — the coinage mark — upon it 
has been effaced, and so it has ceased to be money. 
Gold may be coined, may receive a stamp, and be 
thus made into money ; the inconsiderable value 



228 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

which it has, irrespectively of this intrinsic and 
previous value, is its value as representative ; this is 
all the value which a gold coin has as mere money. 
This truth is fundamental to a clear and accurate 
notion of money, of its proper nature and use. Its 
sole value as money lies in its being representative. 
Hence the increase of money, the issue of more 
money, does not add to the wealth of a com- 
munity, as simply stamping a piece of gold weigh- 
ing 232 grains fine, or 258 grains with one-tenth 
alloy, and so certifying it to be an eagle of com- 
mercial value, makes no considerable addition of 
value to it. 

The sole function of money is as a medium — an 
instrument for facilitating exchanges of commercial 
values. The necessity for such a medium is easily 
shown. The farmer produces grain ; he does not 
produce clothes, sugar and tea, furniture, dwellings. 
He does not need all the grain he produces, and he 
does need these and manifold other things which he 
does not produce. He must needs exchange the one 
for the other. But to take to the tailor just so much 
grain as will be a fair equivalent for the clothes he 
needs, and to the grocer so much for the sugar and tea 
he needs, and so on, would be well nigh impracticable. 
If he can take his surplus grain to the flouring mill, 
or to the mercantile house, and get from the miller 
or the merchant what will enable him to use 
just what he needs of the price to take respectively 
to the tailor, the grocer, etc., his task is incalculably 
facilitated in getting just what he wants of clothing, 
groceries, etc., for his grain. Money does precisely 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 229 

this for him. This is its one function — an instru- 
ment of exchange. 

The exchange which money facilitates pertains to 
commercial values. By this is meant that money 
facilitates the exchange of anything having a value 
in the market for any other thing in the market hav- 
ing an equivalent value. 

§ 215. But money as an instrument of 
vafue dard ° f exchange presupposes a standard of value 

and a unit of value adopted by the state. 
A piece of money represents so much purchasing 
value ; that is, it represents what will be received in 
the market as equivalent to so much value in any 
other commodity in the market. It is clearly ne- 
cessary that there should be some standard by 
which things that are bought and sold or exchanged 
in the market should be valued. For this purpose 
something is taken in reference to which all other 
marketable things shall be valued. Different na- 
tions in different ages of the world have adopted 
different things to be standards. Gold and silver, 
called by reason of this use the precious metals, 
have more generally been selected. The value of 
a commodity depends ultimately on the cost of pro- 
ducing it. The relative value of gold and silver to 
each other has changed perhaps less than that of any 
other two things produced by men ; and the cost of 
producing either in reference to the average cost of 
producing other things generally has changed but 
inconsiderably for ages. Gold and silver are accord- 
ingly preferable as standards to any other product or 
products. It is the duty of the state in prescribing 



23O DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

the money standard to fix the value of the material 
selected, and obvious considerations require that 
this value should fairly represent the cost of its pro- 
duction relatively to that of other products generally. 
It will equally be its duty to determine precisely 
what quantity of this material shall constitute the 
unit of value ; to determine, for example, that, when 
that is the current coin, 258 grains of gold of nine- 
tenths purity, shall be rated as one eagle. If the re- 
lative cost of production should change, then it 
will easily change this quantity chosen to constitute 
the unit. The parts or multiples of this unit will 
form the several denominations of money, which 
convenience in use will require. Such a measure 
and unit of value are presupposed in every mone- 
tary system ; but obviously money is not properly in 
itself such a measure of value. It is the quantity of 
gold taken in the 258 grains with one-tenth alloy, 
which constitutes the standard, the unit, the meas- 
ure of value ; and the money, the coin — the eagle 
— is conformed to that. 

As money is properly representative 
The material, of value, it would seem at a first glance 

to be a matter of indifference whether 
the material for money be of more or less value— 
whether it be equivalent to the value to be repre- 
sented as gold, or comparatively of merely nominal 
value as paper. As a matter of fact, the most commer- 
cial nations have adopted both kinds — a gold cur- 
rency and in connection with it a paper currency un- 
der various forms and regulations. This has been 
the case in spite of the recognized and obvious dcsi- 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 23 I 

rableness in itself of a single kind of money. The 
objections to a currency having an intrinsic value, 
quite, or nearly, equal to the value it represents as 
money are : I, that the only material in nature hav- 
ing the requisite qualities for money — gold — is not 
furnished in quantities sufficient for the uses of the 
commercial world ; 2, it is costly ; and 3, it is for 
many commercial uses inconvenient, not easily or 
safely transmissible in large amounts, and liable to 
be stolen or lost. 

The objections to a material for money of a merely 
nominal value — to a paper currency — are: 1, that 
being confined to the state that issues it, the cir- 
culation is necessarily more local ; 2, that it is not 
so easily convertible into values for use in other 
states ; and 3, that it requires, for obvious consid- 
erations of security, precautionary regulations for 
its conversion into international equivalents which 
a state or its officers are strongly tempted to over- 
look or omit. 

§ 216. From this brief exposition of 

Ite needful quali- the ^^ q£ mQney ft ^ be eagy 

to determine what elements and attri- 
butes a wise and sound political economy pre- 
scribes to a state to incorporate into its monetary 
system. 

1. As a basis for its money or currency 
i^Fixed stand- ^ must fix upon a proper standard and 

unit of value, which shall be character- 
ized by stability, uniformity, and accordance with the 
usage of other nations, and be carefully estimated 
from its relative cost of production as to its relative 



232 



DUTIES IN THE STATE. 



2. Convenient 
denominations 



Material. 



value, as compared with other commodities gene- 
rally. 

2. The parts or multiples of this unit 
should be determined by convenience in 
use, preferably in decimal denominations. 

3. In respect to the material to be select- 
ed, when the intrinsic value is to equal the 
value it represents, the qualities to be 

sought are these: it should be stable in relative 
value ; durable ; receptive and retentive of distinct 
impression ; difficult to counterfeit : convenient for 
use ; and neat and attractive. 

The precious metals contain these qualities in a 
greater degree than any other material. But as no 
one material can equally well answer for all amounts 
of value, gold has been wisely selected for all 
larger values, silver for smaller, and some baser 
metal for the lowest denominations. 

4. If the two kinds of currency be adopt- 
ed, then divers provisions are needful ; as 
(1), the paper currency must always be 

readily convertible into the metallic money, or some 
international commercial equivalent, since otherwise 
it does not represent truly the value — it is false 
money. (2.) It accordingly must always sacredly 
be sustained by a considerate provision of means 
for conversion at the will of the owner into gold or 
some other commercial equivalent. (3.) Security 
from being counterfeited, durability, and neatness 
through frequent redemptions and re-issues, are 
especially requisite. 

5. The money system of a country must be 



4. Mixed 
rency. 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 233 

Legal tender, authoritative in all matters of dispute 
as to equivalents in commercial ex- 
changes. All legal money should be legal tender 
in adjustment of all commercial claims. 

6. The money system should be sub- 
6. stable. ject to as little change as is possible. It 

would be manifestly unjust so to change 
the value of the circulation as to oblige one party to 
an obligation to receive from the other party a less 
value, or to pay a greater value, than that contem- 
plated at the time of creating the obligation. 

7. The amount of currency should -be 
su P p?y. qUate adequate to the needs of commerce. 

This amount of course varies greatly. 
It varies with the varying prosperity of a country ; 
it varies with the population ; it varies with the sea- 
sons of trade. 

There is, however, no absolute necessity for 
determining upon a certain fixed amount. For if 
the currency of a country be in excess for the 
commercial wants, it must necessarily obey the law 
of all commodities and find its equilibrium. If 
gold coin be in excess, it will be melted up for use 
in the arts, or exchanged for foreign valuables. If 
the paper currency be in excess, it will be returned 
for conversion into its commercial equivalent. 
There is little danger of over-issue in the case of a 
true money. If it be of gold undebased, the coin- 
age will not exceed the quantity of bullion which is 
furnished to be stamped. If it be of paper, there 
is an analogous necessity of providing equivalent 
means of redemption or conversion. An unright- 



234 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

eous nation may debase coin or may issue paper 
money with no means of redemption, in each case 
for corrupt or profligate uses. The unrighteousness 
deserves a like reprobation in each case. The neces- 
sities of a state, as in time of war, may compel a 
resort to forced loans and a subsidizing of commerce 
and trade, just as they may compel' to the appro- 
priation of the property and the conscription of the 
person of the subject. Necessity has no law, is the 
loose maxim applicable to all these practices. 
When no necessity compels, simple justice requires 
that the money of a country be ever true money — 
a representative of a real value corresponding to 
its face or stamp. Of such true money there is no 
real danger of excess of issue ; all the principles of 
trade forbid any fear of it; 

. Nor is the evil of an under-issue so very formid- 
able. Commercial exchanges may still be effected 
by simple barter — commodity for commodity ; or 
through credits on accounts ; or through checks 
and bills of exchange. In the large emporiums of 
trade, commercial exchanges- and adjustments are 
mainly in these ways, even when there is an ample 
currency, nine-tenths and more of the aggregate 
settlements of dues being effected without the use 
of any money other than checks and bills of credit. 
The exact determination of the amount of money 
to be provided is accordingly not imposed by any 
necessity. The usages of trade easily suit them- 
selves to the monetary conditions under which they 
exist. The great requisites are security, uniformity, 
stability, with a medium of exchange in some 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 235 

reasonable approximation of amount to estimated 
wants. 

§ 217. Inter-communication of Intclli- 
Postai Fadii- gencc. — Indispensable to the highest 

social life of a people is the free com- 
munication of mind with mind, thought with 
thought. The sympathetic interest between the 
parts of a community depends on these exchanges 
of information ; and the means of mutual helpfulness 
are equally dependent on them. Sound political wis- 
dom at once dictates accordingly the provision and 
effective maintenance of all postal conveniences. 
If needful for the social well-being, the state may 
properly take the telegraph as well as the mail-ser- 
vice into its own care and control. How far it 
should assume the expenses of maintenance is a 
question of political expediency. 

SECTION IV. DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCES. 

§ 218. The state has a right to grow in 
powr. terial external power. 

The power of a state is necessarily 
purely secular ; it is such only as can be exerted 
in the interests of the present world. 

This secular power is of two kinds : moral and 
material. It lies in the state itself as one political 
body or is distributed among the citizens. It is 
the right of a state to seek, and equally its duty to 
secure, in all righteous ways, the steady increase of 
this secular moral and material strength, both as it 
properly pertains to itself and also as it may be 



236 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

possessed by its subjects. It will be convenient to 
consider this growth in external strength without 
exact discrimination, in all the particulars to be 
named, between these two repositories of power. 
The increase of moral power will be more readily 
presented under succeeding heads ; and our view 
will here be confined to the increase of proper 
material power — the increase of the material re- 
sources and wealth of the state. 

The natural resources of a state, 

Productive in- . . 

dustries to be whether lying beneath in the deposits 
of mineral wealth, — of coal and iron, 
the precious metals, and the like — or on the surface 
of the earth in forests or fertile lands under genial 
skies, are made available and are increased only on 
the condition of human labor. Political economy 
accordingly very justly assumes as a fundamental 
principle that material wealth is the product of 
industry and that the exchangeable value of par- 
ticular articles depends ultimately on the labor 
expended in producing them. The principle is of 
course general and subject to divers modifications. 
It is safe to assume, however, that productive 
industry is the condition and means of increasing 
material wealth. It necessarily follows that the 
state in effecting its growth in material power 
must foster the industries of the nation by which 
wealth is increased. 

§ 219. These industries are of three leading 
classes : — (1) developing ; (2) productive proper ; 
and (3) distributive. 

The Developing Industries are those which 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 23/ 

i. Developing simply extract from nature what is 
industries. valuable for man's use. They are 
chiefly applied to the extraction of mineral wealth ; 
and the principles of political morality are suffi- 
ciently illustrated in their application to this par- 
ticular species of developing industry — to mining 
and metallurgic industry. 

The Productive Industries proper 
ductlve. er pr ° embrace as the two leading species, the 

agricultural and the manufacturing. 

The Distributive Industries are those 
3. Distributive, which effect the needful exchanges of 

products and are sufficiently represented 
in the commercial life of the nation ; although here 
evidently belong all the activities of a people 
enlisted in the carrying business, in any way, on 
land or on water. 

We have then as the great representatives of the 
productive industry of a country, its mining, agri- 
cultural, manufacturing, and commercial industries. 
^ , , o . § 220- The ethical position of the state 

Duty of the State a r 

in respect to pro- in relation to all these departments of 

ductive industries. ..... . .- . . 

productive industry is easily determined 
from the nature of a proper state organic life 
viewed in itself and as illustrated in actual history. 
The state exists, as we have seen, for the common 
secular well-being of the community. All right- 
eous endeavors to secure this common secular wel- 
fare in the highest degree, are, therefore, politically 
right and obligatory on the state. There are 
no limits within its proper boundaries territorial 
and teleological — within its geographical sphere 



238 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

and that determined by the end for which it exists 
— to be prescribed to this increase, so long as no 
principles of morality are violated in effecting it. 
Nothing in the essential nature of a state, nothing 
in a constituted political organism, which makes 
it ethically wrong for a state to carry on any one 
or all of these productive industries itself — in its 
collective and organic capacity — or through its in- 
dividual citizens — or the smaller local communi- 
ties embraced within it. History reveals to us 
■instances of a government prosecuting mining 
industries in its own name and by its own direc- 
tion ; superintending and- cultivating its forest lands 
and indeed its pastures and its grain lands ; produc- 
ing fabrics needed for its own use in defense or for 
the necessities of the people ; and even effecting 
the distribution of commodities by providing thor- 
oughfares and conveyances, and directing the use 
of them for its own needs or for the benefit of the 
people. Nothing is more contradictory to reason 
or to the teachings of history than the proposition 
that the function of a political government is lim- 
ited to a mere negative, a mere protective sphere. 
On the contrary, the right and duty of every state 
is positively to promote and encourage and foster 
the entire productive industry of the political com- 
munity. » 

This positive fostering care must of necessity be 
directed, as occasion may require, to this or to that 
particular department of productive industry. The 
state is an organic whole whose welfare depends on 
the healthful condition and ministry of every member. 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 239 

If a particular member is diseased or weak, is 
suffering in any respect, it is the obvious duty of 
the state, as an active organism, to remedy its ills, 
to provide for the recruiting of its strength and 
the stimulating of its ministry. This is a plain 
principle of reason and of common sense, and 
equally the dictate of analogy and of experience. 

There are, however, two grand limita- 
lts limitations, tions of this duty of the state to promote 

the productive industry of the country. 
First, its aim and end in this must be solely the 
common welfare. Not for the sake of the par- 
ticular productive industry itself, but only for the 
health and vigor of the entire political body, may a 
state engage directly itself in mining, or agriculture, 
or manufacturing, or commerce ; nor may it extend 
special aid or stimulus to individuals, or associa- 
tions, or local communities in behalf of such 
particular interest, but only in the interest of the 
general welfare. 

Secondly, such special exertion or aid should be 
extended only in case of well ascertained inability 
or negligence on the part of individuals or local 
communities. The grand principle here, already 
stated in another application, § 208, 3, is : leave to 
individual or local enterprise all that safely can be. 
The sufficient reasons for this limitation, even under 
the full admission of the ethical right of a state 
to engage directly in the productive industries of a 
country, are : 

1. It is for the highest vigor and soundness of 
the whole political body that all the particular 



24O DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

members be enlisted in the active ministry to the 
common weal to the highest degree. It is better 
for the physical body that the blood vessels them- 
selves throughout exert their propulsive power 
than that the whole force in propelling the blood 
through the system be left to the pulsations of the 
central organ alone. 

2. Individual enterprise is more wakeful, more 
sagacious, more economical, more efficient than 
collective, especially than governmental, enterprise. 

3. The temptations to abuse, corruption, mis- 
management in the prosecution of public enterprises 
by a government are many and formidable, and 
difficult to prevent or remedy. So great are these 
temptations that the common weal may require of a 
government that it forego many enterprises unques- 
tionably of promise and utility rather than expose 
its officials to them. 

4. Governmental competition in productive in- 
dustry is discouraging and hurtful to individual 
enterprise. The mere fear of it, which would 
generally exist if governments were to engage in 
these pursuits except in prescribed limits and in 
special cases of necessity, would be repressive to 
individual undertakings. 

It is accordingly a sound maxim of political 
morality that a state should not embark in any 
productive enterprise unless it be clearly settled 
first, that individual or local enterprise cannot or 
will not assume it ; and secondly, that the public 
good requires the undertaking, even after full 
allowance shall have been made for the probable 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 241 

evils from official corruption or incompetency, and 
from the embarrassments to individual enterprise 
arising from governmental competition. Generally 
the presumption is against the government's under- 
taking any productive work ; a clear case of neces- 
sity should be made out to justify it. For the most 
part all proper productive industries may most 
wisely be left to individual or local enterprise. To 
this the progress of civilization has steadily tended 
to conform the practice among the nations. 

§ 221. The modes by which the state 
Modes. niay foster its productive industries 

through its citizens or local communi 
ties, are twofold — direct and indirect. 

The direct modes are in the form of 
boimtief bounties, as for the encouragement of 

certain desirable agricultural products, 
the preservation and increase of forests, the de- 
struction of predatory animals, or removal of obsta- 
cles to production, or of discoveries and inventions 
of useful processes and products. 

The indirect modes are by furnishing 
2. indirect. t h e conditions of safe and successful 

enterprise to its citizens, as by imposts 
on foreign competitive production. 

The state, thus, in the first of these 
t^twfencl! 011 ways, fosters individual enterprise by 

such legislation as shall afford adequate 
security to honest industry in its rights to its pro- 
ducts. This is the fundamental condition for 
healthful individual enterprise in a country. The 
legislation of every prosperous government is large- 



242 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

ly in the form of general laws securing the rights 
of productive industry. Special legislation also is 
common in the form of laws regulating patents for 
inventions, copyrights for books, etc. It may also 
with the same result open and maintain safe 
avenues for the exchange of products. Govern- 
ments thus stimulate and foster commercial industry 
by opening harbors, improving navigation, main- 
taining light-houses, providing help for vessels in 
distress, sending its navy to foreign waters for the 
protection and promotion of commercial enterprise. 
Probably no industry receives so much of the dis- 
tinctive protection of governments as the com- 
mercial, and none in a wiser economy. 

§ 222. In the second place, it may be 
By imposts. we rj f or a s tate to encourage special 

productive industries by impost duties 
on foreign productions. The general principles of 
political morality applicable here are the following : 
First, we have the fundamental maxim of political 
wisdom, that the choice of productions should be 
left to the individual, without interference on the 
part of the government. Generally, the generous 
policy dictated by the consideration that what is 
best for the world is best for each of the particular 
nations that make up the world, is the wise policy. 
The individuals. composing the respective political 
communities, left to their own choice, will, in the 
long run, fall into the production of those articles 
which they can produce best and at least cost. 
Freedom of commercial intercourse between the 
nations moreover is eminently desirable for the 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 243 

world's advantage in divers ways, and should be 
assiduously encouraged and promoted. Free trade, 
thus, is the wise policy of a state as the general 
rule. To this general principle, however, there are, 
as would naturally and reasonably be anticipated, 
exceptions in its practical application. 

Secondly, the principle of free trade should not 
be applied so as to work with relative disadvantage 
to home industries. If home products, thus, are for 
any necessity of the state, subjected to taxation in 
any form, the same products, when imported from 
abroad, should be subjected to at least an equal 
burden. 

Thirdly, special state necessities may require 
that certain articles should be produced at home, 
independently of foreign supply. Those things, 
thus, which are of indispensable necessity in war, 
it is a clear dictate of wisdom that a state seek to 
have produced within its own limits. Otherwise 
its very existence might be suspended on the pleas- 
ure of a foreign power. It may obviously be the 
clear duty of a state to secure the production of 
such necessaries for self-defense by its own sub- 
jects ; and the best, perhaps the only effectual way 
of doing this, may be by extending to them in this 
undertaking all needful protection from envious 
competition from abroad. The principle of free 
trade should sometimes give way in regard to the 
production of military supplies. So, also, in the 
same interest of self-defense, the maintenance of a 
vigorous commercial marine being the condition of 
an effective naval force, the state may wisely sacri- 



244 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

fice the inconsiderable advantage from free trade 
for the encouragement of those industries which are 
concerned in the building of ships. It may be 
wise, thus, to encourage the production of timber, 
or of iron, or other material required in naval archi- 
tecture, or the building of ships at home, by 
proper discrimination in a system of impost duties 
against importation from abroad. Dependence on 
a foreign power for its ships may be incompatible 
with self-security in these days of universal com- 
merce between the nations of the world. A clear 
case of state necessity, thus, may justify and re- 
quire a departure from the policy of absolute free 
trade. 

Fourthly, it is clearly supposable that exceptional 
cases may arise in which it may be the duty of a 
state seeking the complete development of its re- 
sources to encourage special productive industries. 
A new country, thus, with large undeveloped nat- 
ural resources, but in the conditions of insufficient 
capital, high wages, imperfect machinery, distant 
markets, and other hindrances to cheap production, 
may, in obvious duty of self interest, provide that 
private enterprise may move in reasonable security 
against being overwhelmed in its incipient struggles 
with stronger, more advanced, and better advan- 
taged producers abroad. Competition is, indeed, the 
life of trade — its needful stimulus, regulator, and 
check; but competition among men is often over- 
bearing, hostile, oppressive, and even destructive. 
The earliest productions of a new industry are in- 
variably costly; and even with vastly greater ad- 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 245 

vantage in natural resources, infant enterprise may 
yet be unable, if unsupported, to stand against 
jealous and unscrupulous rivals in trade. Wherever, 
therefore, there is good reason for the belief that 
temporary support may insure in the end develop- 
ment of resources that otherwise must be unim- 
proved, or may permanently cheapen production of 
commodities, the intervention of a state may be jus- 
tifiable for the help of private enterprise ; and, cer- 
tainly, it cannot be assumed that the particular 
mode of protection, by preventing, through a ju- 
dicious tariff of imposts, a ruinous foreign compe- 
tition, is forbidden by any just principle of political 
morality. A prohibitory duty may seldom be 
necessary ; a properly regulative duty, which shall 
simply secure against an excessive reduction of 
price, may be imposed in consistency with a wise 
political economy, applied under the dictates of 
common sense. 

SECTION V. PUBLIC HEALTH. 

§ 223. It is the right and the duty of 
5. Public health. t he state to care for the health of the 

community. 
Health of body is a fundamental blessing of the 
secular class. Care for it finds a place at once in 
the sphere of secularity occupied by the state. This 
care cannot always safely be left to individuals or 
to local communities. In divers ways the positive 
interposition of the state may be indispensable to 
the highest common welfare. Sanitary laws may 
not have been always judicious ; and they may have 



246 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

been badly administered. To a certain extent, 
nevertheless, they seem necessary. Quarantine 
regulations, to prevent the introduction of con- 
tagious diseases, as well as sanitary laws for the 
cleansing of streets, the ventilation of buildings, 
the removal of garbage, the establishment and 
maintenance of pest houses, hospitals, and dis- 
pensaries, the provision of trustworthy medical 
experts, the enforcement of universal vaccination, 
and the like, come clearly into that class of pub- 
lic necessities which cannot be trusted entirely to 
individuals. 

SECTION VI. EDUCATION. 

§ 224. It is the right and the duty of a 
6. Education, state to secure intelligence in its citi- 
zens. 

Intelligence is a crowning blessing in the present 
life of man. While it is a condition that must fol- 
low him into his immortal future, it is yet a true 
secularity within the proper sphere of the state. As 
such, a true secular good, so far as it is a common 
interest, it belongs to the state to care for it and 
foster it. 

This right and duty belong to it in its care for its 
own security and the safe and prosperous adminis- 
tration of the government. In free commonwealths 
the proper exercise of the elective franchise in- 
volves as its condition general intelligence ; and un- 
der all governments the needful check on power 
and authority under a sense of responsibility to the 
governed also involves general intelligence as its 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 247 

condition. General intelligence is necessary to the 
prosperity of the state in material resources. Skilled 
labor has been proved by ample experience to be 
immensely more valuable than unskilled in all de- 
partments of productive industry. In any occupa- 
tion a man is worth more than a mere animal. In- 
telligence is a means and condition of happiness to 
men ; and it is within the province of a state to pro- 
mote the present happiness of its subjects. Intel- 
ligence, moreover, is a prime element of man's im- 
mortal condition ; and inasmuch as the state is for 
man, not for itself, and as its sphere and function is 
to care for his secular condition in society so that 
the highest end of his being as a being of immor- 
tality shall be furthered, intelligence, it must be ad- 
mitted, is to be one of those secular interests which 
fall within the sphere of the state. 

It may be that in certain conditions the intei- 
ests of education may be better left to individual 
care. It is still the duty of the state to see to it, 
that these great interests are thus adequately sus- 
tained. If in any respect such individual care be 
inadequate, the state is bound to supplement it 
as well as always to supervise and regulate and 
encourage it. It is a fact of experience that these 
interests have not been fostered to excess by states 
hitherto. 

§225. The degree to which the state should 
Extent. seek to carry the general education of its 

subjects will vary on the one hand with 
the wealth and ability of the state, and on the other 
with the condition of the people. In an impover- 



248 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

ished community there may be inability to spare 
even the time and labor of children for an advanced 
education, or to support them while receiving it. 
There are few, if any, communities desiring to be 
recognized as states which are not able to educate 
the people generally to a degree of intelligence 
sufficient for the ordinary duties of a citizen — for 
voting safely and for laboring productively. But, 
in truth, no good reason can be given why the state 
should not seek, in wise consideration of its own 
strength and the competency of its subjects, to carry 
up the education of its peojole to the highest degree 
attainable ; to make this its ideal in its educational 
administration. Circumstances will sufficiently 
moderate all tendencies to excess. The mass will 
only reach the lowest stages of educational training ; 
fewer than could be desired will rise to the stage 
reached by what is known as skilled labor ; fewer 
still, and still less than could be desired, will find 
the time or the means to reach the highest attain- 
ments even with the most municifent educational 
establishment. The state maxim in regard to edu- 
cation is : Supplement private provisions for fur- 
nishing the highest and best and most universal 
education which the means of the state and the con- 
dition of the people admit. 

§ 226. In regard to the modes of action 
Methods. proper for the state in its care for edu- 

cation, it may be said, first, that it should 
enforce, as far as practicable, attendance on educa- 
tional means on its entire people. Compulsory 
education is within the legitimate province of polit 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 249 

ical action, as embracing the entire secular well- 
being of the community. It is as fitting that a 
state see to it that the children be decently edu- 
cated, as that they be decently clothed, decently 
housed, decently fed. 

Secondly, The state should encourage and foster, 
in all suitable ways, all endeavors on the part of in- 
dividuals and of local communities, in the interest 
of a sound general education ; as well as, in the man- 
ifold ways open to it, further the ends of general 
intelligence and sound learning. It should encour- 
age science and learning, literature and the arts, as 
its proper right and function. 

Thirdly, The state should endow and adequately 
sustain institutions for the training of men for its 
own needs, as for its army and its navy. An ad- 
vanced stage of national progress may render 
equally necessary schools for training in its civil 
and diplomatic service. 

Fourthly, The state should provide either direct- 
ly by its own agency, or indirectly through the lo- 
cal communities, schools for the education of all 
the children in the commonest branches of train- 
ing, and, as rapidly as circumstances shall allow, 
higher schools for training in the productive arts. 
Even proper professional training comes within 
its legitimate care and may call for its direct sup- 
port. IJ * 



25O DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

SECTION VII. — PUBLIC MORALS. 

§ 227. It is the right and the duty of a 
7. Morality. state to promote sound morals in the 
community. 

The state we have found to be a true mora) 
power. It is not less a power because a collective 
power. Its action has all the moral attributes that 
belong to individual action. It is free, above the 
constraint of physical necessity. It may be in 
sympathy with the welfare of others — of its own 
members and of other states ; it may be beneficent ; 
it may be upright ; or it may be the reverse of this 
according to its own free election. It is under 
responsibility ; men judge it, and approve or con- 
demn ; retribution is visited upon it in the estab- 
lished orderings of providence. This retribution 
is not less retribution because it is limited to this 
world. Retribution to a nation is necessarily secu- 
lar, inasmuch as the state is a secularity. 

As properly moral in its being, the state should be 
true to itself — should act out its own nature — should 
act morally. Its action, also, should be in harmony 
and sympathy with all that is properly of a moral 
nature like itself. It should, therefore, in obedience 
to the dictates of its own proper nature, promote 
morality everywhere and in all ways. 

Moreover, as the moral interest is the highest in 
man, and as the state exists for the furtherance of 
the highest interests of men so far as common, its 
action should ever regard this high ulterior end of 
its being. 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 25 I 

The interests of sound morals cannot safely be 
left to the sole care of individuals, or of the family, 
or of the local community. Even if this were the 
case it would still be within the legitimate province 
of the state, and therefore its proper duty, to see 
to it that this care be in fact exercised. But the 
world is far from having reached that state of per- 
fection in which the state may safely be exonerated 
from the duty of supplementing the action of in- 
dividuals and local communities in the interest of 
morality. 

§ 228. There are manifold ways in 
Methods. - which the state may legitimately and 

efficiently act in the promotion of sound 
morals. 

1. Its own action should be a safe and 
1. By example, influential example. Its legislation, its 

administration of justice, its execution 
of the laws, should be characterized as courteous, 
just, beneficent ; as forbearing, lenient, and merci- 
ful ; as unselfish, impartial, upright ; as kind, gentle, 
and helpful. Its selection of officials, — rejecting 
the base, the corrupt, the dissolute, and exalting the 
worthy, the honest, the pure in life ; — its control 
over places, — banishing all the incitements and in- 
struments of vice, and maintaining an atmosphere 
of purity in its legislative halls and surroundings, its 
halls of justice, its prisons and other state institu- 
tions of whatever kind, the streets and public places 
under its control ; — its action in respect to persons 
and places under its control ; should exemplify the 
principles of morality before its citizens and before 



252 DUTIES JN THE STATE. 

the world. In truth, the entire life of a state is of 
moral significance, and operates with incalculable 
power in the way of example on the lives of men 
and on the character and actions of other nations. 

2. The state should promote sound 
ition 7 prohll> morals by the exclusion from the com- 
munity of whatever tends to debase or 

corrupt the morals of the people. It may prohibit 
the publication of immoral writings and pictures ; 
it may disallow corrupting exhibitions ; it may sup- 
press gambling-houses, dram-shops, and brothels ; it 
may forbid open indecencies, brawls, and vicious 
amusements. It may discourage, by discriminating 
taxes and impost duties, even when it may not be 
wise to prohibit, the production at home and the 
importation from abroad of articles tempting to 
abuses or excesses, and hurtful to public sobriety, 
purity, and virtue, as well as the traffic in such arti- 
cles. The regulation of the traffic in liquor, by 
requiring the formal permission of public authorities 
and payment of stated fees — the licensing system, 
so called — may be in the interest of true morality, 
implying no sanction or approval of intemperance 
or of temptations to it, as the design of the legisla- 
tor may be wholly for its restriction or removal. 

3. The state may more directly and pos- 
encouragement. lively promote the interests of sound 

morals in the community by lending 
encouragement to all that is pure and virtuous in 
tendency or in fact in the manners, usages, and pur- 
suits of its citizens. It may reward acts of self-sac- 
rifice or heroism in the interest of the state or of 



POLITICAL GROWTH. 253 

humanity ; it may commemorate in monuments the 
lives of patriots and public benefactors ; it may 
seeond in manifold ways all efforts in the cause of 
virtue and philanthropy ; it may incorporate into 
its whole outgoing life a true sympathy and concern 
for whatever will make its people upright, pure, and 
virtuous. Limited to the secular sphere and to the 
use of secular means and instrumentalities, it cannot, 
indeed, look directly upon the heart and the con- 
science — the proper seat of morality ; it cannot take 
cognizance of the inner workings and intents of the 
spirit ; its action necessarily confines itself to the 
outward, the tangible. But all the outer manifesta- 
tions of the spirit, all that goes out of the heart into 
the external life, — all this is under its inspection 
and for its cognizance and regulation. Control here 
reacts upon the heart itself, inciting or depressing. 
Indifference here, unconcern for these highest in- 
terests of men, is disloyal to God, its providential 
master and judge, dangerous for its citizens, suicidal 
.to itself. The state must be moral, act morally, 
enforce morality in its community, or it must de- 
cline and die. History is predominantly the record 
of the retributions visited upon nations for its dis- 
regard of the public morals. 



254 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN. 

§ 229. The second grand department of moral 
relationships pertaining to the state is that which 
exists between it and its members. It embraces 
the rights and duties of citizens in respect to the 
state. 

The term citizen, in a larger but looser 
Citizen defined, sense, extend s to every resident, even 

every transient sojourner within the 
geographical limits of a state. In a stricter sense,- 
it is limited to persons either born in the country, or 
naturalized — accepted as citizens — by legal author- 
ity. The language of the constitution of the United 
States, as amended, is : — "All persons born or nat- 
uralized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the States wherein they reside." Women 
and children are included in this definition. In a 
still narrower sense, the term is limited to a person 
having the right to participate in the government of 
the country — the right to vote and to be eligible to 



THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN. 255 

office. The rights of citizens generally are denoted 
by the phrase civil rigJits. But sometimes the dis- 
tinction is drawn between the general rights of 
citizens and the special rights of voting and of being 
voted for ; the latter being designated as political 
rights and the former as civil rights in a narrower 
sense. Foreigners, and native women and children, 
thus, under the law of the United States, have civil 
rights, but not political rights. 

It is important to recognize here, as elsewhere, 
the double correlativeness between rights and du- 
ties, and between the subject and the object of duty. 
Every right implies a duty ; and every right or duty 
of the subject of duty implies a corresponding duty 
or n'ght in the object of duty. 

The entire field of the moral relationships between 
the state and its citizens will therefore come under 
review in a full survey of the rights and duties of 
persons in the state. 

SECTION I. THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE 

STATE. 

1. To pursue the § 230. The first right of the individual 
mottai bekfg lm- person in the state is the right to exist 
molested. an( j ^ p Ursue unmolested the great end 

of his being. 

Man was designed by his creator to exist within 
some state, inasmuch as states were designed to fill 
up the geographical limits of the earth. He was 
designed to live as organic member of the political 
community within whose bounds his lot is cast. 



256 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 



He can rightfully demand that this right be recog 
nized and be held inviolable. 

Farther, man was designed to outlive the state 
whose existence is purely secular — one of time and 
of earth, — to live into an eternal future. His highest 
and truest interests, indeed, lie beyond all secular 
confines in that endless hereafter. As social and as 
secular in a certain part and relation of his nature, 
his grand destiny must be wrought out in social 
and secular conditions, which in fact are in divine 
wisdom and goodness established simply for the 
purpose of furthering those immortal interests. 
The state is for man ; not man for the state. The 
state cannot therefore rightfully in any way obstruct 
or hamper the individual man in his paramount duty 
to secure his immortal well-being. He has the 
right to be exempt from all molestation by the state 
in his endeavor towards this high end of his being. 
It is clear that the state owes it to itself as well as 
to the individual not to interfere with this endeavor. 
The personality of the state is constituted exclu- 
sively of immortal natures, whose instinctive drift 
and tendency in the direction of their eternal well- 
being, it is unwise for the state to resist, as thereby 
it opposes its own proper aim, as well as hinders 
the highest common good of its members, and 
wastes its strength as well as moves counter to its 
proper aim. 

More than this is to be maintained. Man has a 
right not only to pursue unmolested this high end 
of his immortal nature, unmolested by the state, 
but he has the right to claim from the state that it 






THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN. 257 

sympathize with all his just endeavors in this pur- 
suit, and while not transgressing the limits of its 
secular and social nature, second and aid, as it may, 
those endeavors. This sympathy and aid are not 
necessarily to be extended in direct action designed 
to affect purely spiritual interests ; it is enough if 
the state keep its action ever in harmony with the 
aspirations of its citizens towards this higher life. 

S 231. Secondly, the citizen has secu- 

2 To pursue o J J> 

certain secular lar interests which lie outside of the 

ends unmolested. . r . . . . j . 

proper sphere ot the state, which, there- 
fore, he should be allowed to care for unmolested 
by the state. 

All those interests which pertain to him as an 
individual, in which there can be no community 
with others, even though of a secular nature, are 
thus outside the province of the state. It is his 
right to regulate and foster those interests in his 
own way, provided always, that he does not in his 
care of them, break over into the common secular 
field which belongs to the state, and in which he 
only shares with others in his degree and in his 
relation to them. Here are the strictly private, 
personal, rights of free thought, free opinion, free 
conscience ; here are the innumerable private acts 
of life in choosing avocations, companions, dwell- 
ing-places ; in determining food, dress, and physical 
regimen as well as the culture of the spiritual 
nature ; in ordering the particular steps of daily 
occupation. If he do not offend in these things 
against public decency, public morality, public inte- 
rest, he has a right to move on without molestation 



25 o DUTIES IN HIE STATE. 

from the state. Indeed, more than this : it is prac- 
ticable to a certain extent, and to this extent it is 
obligatory on the state, to maintain itself in sympa- 
thy and indirect helpfulness to the citizen in all 
these properly individual interests. The principle 
is all-pervading, that true state-life is in perfect har- 
mony with all true personal life ; their true interests 
are not colliding interests ; although their aims and 
ends may be diverse, their allotted paths run ever 
parallel. 

§ 232. Thirdly, more directly and pos- 

3. To protection, itively, the citizen has a right to claim 

from the state its protection of all his 
lawful interests from injury, whether by fellow-citi- 
zens, by state officials, or by foreign power. 

The citizen may claim this protection at home or 
in foreign lands. His rights of person — of life and 
limb and free movement ; his rights of property in 
acquiring, holding, and using ; his rights of reputa- 
tation and character, the state is bound to recog- 
nize, and to protect against all unlawful aggression. 
He may claim both protection against threatened 
injury and also redress for inflicted wrong. It is a 
paramount duty of the state to bring within the 
reach of all its members this protection and redress 
to the fullest extent practicable. 

§ 233. Fourthly, in case of absolute 

4. To succor, need he has a right to help and succor 

from the state. 
It is thus the duty of the state to provide for its 
poor and helpless, its deaf and its blind, its maimed 
and diseased. Its help and succor must, indeed, be 



THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN. 259 

secular, by outward means and instrumentalities, 
and for secular wants ; yet its ministry in this direc- 
tion may and should be in sympathy and indirect 
relief and solace in regard to the needs of man's 
whole nature. The bleeding spirit may be best 
healed in the sympathetic treatment directed im- 
mediately on the lacerated body. It would be in- 
human to withhold this higher cure when possible 
to bestow it ; it were most impolitic, contrary to the 
very design of a state to administer to the relief of 
physical necessities, in heartless indifference to 
mental distresses which attend on these outer 
troubles. 

SECTION II. THE DUTIES OF INDIVIDUALS TO THE 
STATE. 



1. Of loyalty. 



§ 234. The fundamental duty of the 
citizen to the state is genuine loyalty. 

Love of country is native to the human heart. 
Man is not a true and full man without this senti- 
ment in full and vigorous exercise. One's country, 
so far as its action is worthy of itself, is deserving of 
his true and warm affection ; its best support and 
thrift have their roots in the generous love of its citi- 
zens. Reciprocal sympathy and affection is a prime 
law of nature for state and subject. 

This fundamental affection on the part of the citi- 
zen, shows itself, in the first place, in the form of re- 
spect or reverence towards the state as superior, in all 
its organs or representatives, its acts and its rights. 
He is therefore forbidden to " speak evil of digni- 



26o DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

ties ;" he is required to " honor the King " as the rep- 
resentative and organ of the political community. 
In free governments the liabilities to offenses against 
this principle of morality are many and great. It is 
the more necessary in them therefore to inculcate 
the principle, and to insist that partisan zeal shall 
abstain from all abuse and disrespect towards those 
who represent the authority of the state. Measures 
of policy, acts of administration may be freely criti- 
cised, while due courtesy and respect are expressed 
to official persons, and due deference to all civil 
procedures. 

§ 235. A second specific duty of the cit- 
11. of obedience. [ ZQn to the state, involved in the fun- 
damental duty of loyalty, is obedience. 
The state is the rightful seat and source of au- 
thority. Its ordinances, so far as consistent with 
general morality, are to be obeyed with unhesitating 
obedience. In cases of doubtful morality, it should 
be remembered that the state is the higher judge 
and presumably is right. The case should be a clear 
one in which the civil law may be resisted because 
supposed to be opposed to the higher laws of moral- 
ity. Unless the conscience of the individual is posi- 
tively offended, obedience is due even to a law that 
may be deemed to be immoral and unjust. A war 
may be declared on supposedly unjust grounds ; the 
citizen may not therefore resist taxation or conscrip- 
tion for its prosecution. While he does all that as a 
citizen he may lawfully do in the interest of peace^ 
inasmuch as the moral responsibilities do not rest 
on him, his individual conscience is not necessarily 



THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN. 20I 

wounded in doing the duty of a subject. He can- 
not, where it is not his province to choose, inter- 
pose his private conscience as an excuse for declin- 
ing patriotic service Were this permissible, the 
individual judgment would be exalted above that of 
the community. All social order would be under- 
mined, if every man were left to do just what was 
right in his own eyes. It is not permissible ethic- 
ally, further, to find satisfaction of the public jus- 
tice in paying the penalty affixed to disobedience. 
The authority of the state is violated if the will 
of the state be resisted, no matter what may be 
true of the sanction, unless it be clear that the 
state intends. a free choice between compliance and 
the pecuniary contribution. Suffering penalty is 
not meritorious obedience. " To obey is better 
than sacrifice." 

§ 236. A third duty of a loyal subject 
in. Of support. i s personal support to the state. 

The state lives and acts and accom- 
plishes its end only as this support is yielded it 
from its members. They must pay the taxes and 
render the service necessary for its life and action. 
They must help along its policy and its measures. 
He is disloyal who opposes or obstructs the admin- 
istration of the government for the furtherance of 
personal or partisan aims. It is the duty of the 
citizen to aid in the detection and punishment of 
crime. His sympathy for the suffering culprit must 
be kept subordinate to the interests of political 
justice. There is indeed a liability to err in this 
very matter of patriotic zeal. Partisan support of 



262 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

an administration may be excessive, to the detri- 
ment of other interests, and in violation of other 
rights. It should never be rendered in immoral 
ways. Lying in politics is as wrong and as dis- 
graceful to the offender as lying in the market, or 
in the neighborhood, or the family. True loyalty 
will yield a ready, cordial, efficient support in all 
righteous ways to all the lawful actions of the gov- 
ernment, subordinating all personal and partisan 
aims and interests. He is a poor patriot, a disloyal 
citizen, who sinks his country into a means of pri- 
vate emolument, or of factious advantage, 

§ 237. It has been a disputed question 

Expatriation. 

between nations whether a subject 
may rightfully transfer his allegiance from his na- 
tive country to another. The maxim M once a sub- 
ject, always a subject " — nemo potest exuere patri- 
am — formerly was generally received. But in the 
advance of civilization involving progress in person- 
al rights and personal freedom, the maxim has 
been less favorably regarded ; and the right of self- 
expatriation is receiving recognition. A freer in- 
tercourse between the nations, a more settled inter- 
national law, a larger allowance of personal freedom, 
and, moreover, an expansion of national strength 
in increase of territory and of population, are re- 
moving the necessity of this* restriction on individ- 
ual choice. Inasmuch as it is simply living in cer- 
tain geographical limits which originates the rela- 
tion of subject and state, nothing in the nature of 
the relation forbids a change of citizenship with re- 
moval of person. 



THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN. 263 

There are, however, certain ethical restrictions to 
which the exercise of this right of self-expatriation 
should be held subject. It would be wrong to de- 
sert one's country in the time of its necessity or 
distress, when the support and help of every citizen 
must be counted upon. Much more base would it 
be to transfer one's domicile and allegiance in be- 
trayal of a trust, or in rupture of contracted obliga- 
tions. Moreover, citizenship is too high and sacred 
a relation to allow of fickleness and caprice in the 
change of allegiance. Considerable lapse of time is 
requisite in order to indicate that the residence in 
the new state is to be permanent, as also in order 
to fit for a right discharge of civil duties in a new 
community. It is also to be borne in mind that 
every state must be allowed the right to prescribe 
the conditions of naturalization. If the great rights 
and interests of humanity forbid a state, except in 
extraordinary emergencies, to shut its doors against 
immigration, the principle of self-preservation may 
require of a state to refuse admission to the full 
rights and privileges of citizenship. It has been a 
mooted point in international law, whether a man 
who has left his native land and been naturalized — 
admitted to citizenship — in another nation, may, on 
a temporary return to his native country, be held to 
his civil responsibilities just as if he had remained 
at home. The progress of international law in this 
respect is in favor of the freedom of the subject. 

It is worthy of remark, in this connection, that 
Cicero ranked among the strongest principles of 
Roman freedom, that every man should be allowed 



264 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

to retain or relinquish his jural relations at his own 
pleasure : — Hcec sunt enim fundamenta firmissima 
nostra libertatis sin quemque juris et retinendi et 
dentittendi esse dominum. Pro Balbo. 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 26' 



CHAPTER VI. 

INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 

§ 238. The third grand department of 
international moral relationships pertaining to the 
state, is that which exists between it 
and other states. 

The rights and duties between nations compose 
the subject-matter of what is called International 
Law — Jus gentium, or more exactly Jus inter 
gentes. 

International Law has been distributed 
Divisions. m t two divisions : Public, which re- 
spects the relations of states to one 
another ; and Private, which respects the relations 
between subjects and other states or subjects of 
other states. 

§ 239. As there is no secular authority 
Sources. above that of the individual state sove- 

reignty, there can be no proper legisla- 
tion over nations prescribing law to them in com- 
mon and enforcing obligations upon them. The 
principles and rules which make up the body of In- 
ternational Law are founded on reason and practice 



266 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

— on the essential nature of state organizations, 
and the usages and special acts of states. The 
more direct and specific sources are : (i) Text wri- 
ters of authority ; (2) Treaties ; (3) State Ordinances, 
particularly marine ordinances in respect to cruis- 
ers and prizes ; (4) Judicial precedents ; (5) Profes- 
sional opinions ; (6) History. 

From the nature of the case, international law 
must, in the advance of civilization, ever be subject 
to growth. As morality advances among men, par- 
ticular rules of morality must be modified to meet 
the relations arising under a more perfect practice. 
States have ever been growing into closer, more 
fraternal relations towards one another. The inter- 
changes of peace have been multiplied ; the atroci- 
ties of war have been mitigated. Reason has 
gained upon brute force in the arbitrament of na- 
tional disputes. The principles of international 
morality, too, have been brought into clearer light ; 
precedents have been multiplied ; and the aggrega- 
tion of international rules has become more organ- 
ized, growing ever into the form of a full, systematic 
body of law. 

§ 240. As a true moral personality, the 
Analogies of na- state i s t h e subject of rights and duties 

tional and per- J ° 

sonai morality, exactly analogous to those pertaining to 
individuals. The important points of 
difference are : (1) that the immediate ends and 
means of political life are secular, while the ends of 
personal life reach directly through time into the 
eternal future ; (2) political life is collective, while 
personal morality is of the individual ; and (3) the 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 267 

state is sovereign, while the individual is to a cer- 
tain extent subject to social rule. 

Subject to these modifications, the rights and du- 
ties of states may be systematically comprehended 
under the same specific heads as those of persons, 
already stated as given by the threefold constitu- 
ents of all duty — love, beneficence, rectitude, — and 
distinguished as one or the other of these elements 
is more predominant and characteristic. 

SECTION I. INTERNATIONAL GOOD-WILL. 

§ 241. States are subjects of those 
1. Good-will, rights and correlative duties which have 

their seat more predominantly in the sub- 
ject of duty — sympathetic interest and good-will. 

No nation lives or can rightfully live for itself 
just as no man can live for himself ; it must in duty 
seek the good of other nations. 

It must not look on other communities with in- 
difference. Laying aside jealousy and envy, it 
should rejoice in their true prosperity — in their 
successful prosecution of the great ends of national 
life as in perfect harmony with the ends of human- 
ity and conducive to them. Equally should they 
sympathize in their misfortunes and distresses. Pes- 
tilences, famines, conflagrations, in whatever lands, 
demand for the sufferers the commiseration of the 
world. To such observed and commiserated suffer- 
ings, states are under moral obligation to cherish a 
disposition to afford all practicable and reasonable 
relief. 



268 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

This sympathy and good-will is the rational 
ground and condition of all proper co-operation for 
the promotion of the interests of humanity. It is 
the ground also of such special alliances for each 
other's welfare as the exigencies of their changing 
condition may dictate. 

In this disposition of sympathetic affec- 
Resentments. t i on an( j good-will are embraced the re- 
sponsive sentiments — the resentments 
of gratitude for kindness received, and of retalia- 
tion and forgiveness for wrongs suffered. 

Ingratitude is as truly base in a nation as in an 
individual ; and forbearance and forgiveness as no- 
ble. Retaliation — redress of wrong or return of 
evil for evil — has a somewhat broader ground than 
in personal morality ; for states have no secular 
superior to redress their grievances. States, more- 
over, have no eternal future to which the individual 
man may safely defer retribution for present 
wrongs. 

§ 242. The principle of retaliation for 
Retaliation. wrongs— -jus tcilioiiis — can have no ap- 
plication in a perfect race. It is only 
because men are in a state of moral imperfection 
that relations come to be which can find no en- 
trance into a perfect condition, and which impose 
different obligations from those which exist in such 
a condition. 

The following considerations seem to 
Grounds. justify retaliation by states : 1. The of- 

fender cannot complain if his offenses 
are visited back upon him in equal justice. 2. It is 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 269 

due to the interests of morality, as also of human- 
ity itself, that some fitting protest be made against 
wrong-doing. 3. The instincts of the race prompt 
it and lend their sanction to it. 4. The divinely 
authorized antediluvian and Mosaic precepts en- 
joined it ; in itself, therefore, retaliation cannot be 
wrong ; vengeance cannot be exclusively the divine 
prerogative. 5. The evangelical principle of for- 
giveness, while admitted to be governing, cannot 
yet be proved to be without possible exception. 6. 
The safety of states seems to necessitate recourse 
to retaliation in certain exigencies. 

Retaliation, then, may be justified ; but the case 
should be a clear one and a strong one to authorize it. 
§ 243. Political retaliation — retorsio — 
r e ta i'ati C a n e is (i) properly vindictive or (2) amica- 
ble. 

Amicable retaliation is without violence, and 
consists in applying to a nation the rule of conduct 
which it has practiced towards others. 

In manifold ways may such retaliation be made for 
practices affecting unfavorably the interests of oth- 
er nations. Restrictions on free intercourse in 
trade or travel, as by passports, by port charges, 
impost duties, closing of ports of entry at home or 
in colonies, and the like, as well as hampering com- 
munication between state authorities themselves, 
and also partialities towards certain states or per- 
sons, may justifiably be protested against in exactly 
answering restrictions. So also the gathering of a 
military force which may be dangerous to a nation, 
at peace — the mobilization of armies and the ag- 



27O DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

gregation of fleets — may warrant, or even in the 
interest of public security necessitate a like pro- 
ceeding on the part of other nations. Such are 
examples of amicable retaliation. 

Proper vindictive retaliation is re- 
RetaHation tlVe sorted to as a forcible means of redress 

of national wrongs instead of regular 
warfare. It may be exercised in reprisals upon the 
persons or the possessions belonging to the offend- 
ing nation. The tendency of recent international 
law is to the exemption of innocent persons from 
such reprisals, and to the abandonment of the prac- 
tice of granting letters of reprisal to private citi- 
zens — to the restriction to the state of making 
reprisals, and to the allowance to it of reprisals 
upon the property only of foreign subjects, and not 
upon their persons. 

SECTION II. — INTERNATIONAL COURTESY, TRUTHFUL- 
NESS, JUSTICE, BENEFICENCE. 

§ 244. States are subjects of the rights and 
duties which have their seat more characteristically 
in the object of duty — Courtesy, Truthfulness, 
Justice, Beneficence. 

I. Courtesy, as a moral principle, re- 
Courtesy. spects more directly the outward deport- 

ment of nations in their intercourse and 
communication with one another. The conduct of 
nations may, like that of individuals, be character- 
ized as respectful or insolent, as cordial or repelling, 
as complaisant or cross and testy, as courtly or rude. 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 27 1 

There are manifold ways in which this 
So^' tyof na principle may be acted out in the inter- 
course of nations. In fact, many forms 
of it have been recognized in international law so 
as to make up a body of rules under the general 
designation of the comity of nations. 

In respect to superiors, in the form of respect, the 
general principle appears in certain distinctions 
accorded to the representatives of nations as supe- 
rior or inferior. The equality of sovereign states 
is indeed a fundamental principle of international 
law ; but this principle is not violated in according 
a certain deference to greater age, or power, or 
some other like attribute. Certain states in Europe 
are recognized, for example, as entitled to what are 
called royal Jw7iors y which accord to such states a 
precedence over all other states, with the right of 
sending public ministers of the first rank, as ambassa- 
dors, and also certain distinctive titles and ceremo- 
nial distinctions. European states have been rank- 
ed in their order of relative precedence, and serious 
contests have arisen between the sovereigns in ref- 
erence to it. 

§ 245. In the proper comity of nations, 
Rules of comity, resting directly on their equality or mor- 
al personalities, divers usages and prac- 
tices have been established which are recognized as 
law, the violation of which might be a just cause of 
war. Of these rules of comity the following are 
leading specifications : 

1. It is a rule of comity that the ex- 
i.of recognition, istence of every nation be recognized 



272 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

as such in all appropriate ways. In the case 
of a new nation coming to be, as when a portion 
of a state or a colony rebels and succeeds in es- 
tablishing its independence, other nations are bound 
in comity to recognize such independence. They 
are each, however, to judge for themselves whether 
independence is fairly established and the perman- 
ence and stability of the new nation assured. The 
same courtesy is required, when a change of gov- 
ernment or of ruler has been effected, in formally 
recognizing the new government or the new ruler. 
This right and duty of national recognition is a first 
principle of international comity. 

2. A second principle of international 

2. of legation, comity embraces the rights of legation. 

Every state has a right to send public 
ministers to any other state, and to receive minis- 
ters from it, and to this right pertains the correla- 
tive obligation. To suspend or to refuse diplomatic 
intercourse without good reason, is a rank discour- 
tesy that may rightfully be resented. The persons 
of all such accredited ministers, are, by comity, ex- 
empt from the ordinary local jurisdiction. 

The Congresses of Vienna (18 15) and Aix-la 
Chapelle (18 18), established the four following class- 
es of public ministers : 1. Ambassadors and pa- 
pal legates or nuncios ; 2. Envoys, accredited to 
sovereigns ; 3. Ministers resident, accredited to sov- 
ereigns ; and 4. Charge's d' affaires, accredited to 
the minister of foreign affairs. 

3. A third rule of international comity 

3. Of salute, requires that the national flag be prop- 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 273 

erly saluted whenever met at sea or in port. The flag 
is the symbol of the state ; and honors to it or insults 
to it are justly regarded as rendered to the state itself. 

4. A fourth principle of comity ac- 
fcmfSJtion. cords to the persons of sovereigns, and 

also to their armies or navies, exemption 
from local jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, 
when within the territorial limits of another state. 

5. A fifth principle of international 
LeaitTdhiws. comity accords to the executed laws of 

another country, their legitimate effect 
everywhere, so far as not prejudicial to the rights 
of other states and of their citizens. Wills made 
under the laws of the state where the testator is 
domiciled, are carried into their effect in regard to 
the disposition of personal or movable property in 
all the states of Europe, and in regard to real prop- 
erty everywhere on the European continent. So 
also, personal qualities, such as citizenship, majori- 
ty, bankruptcy, marriage and divorce, which have 
been judicially determined under the laws of one 
country, follow the perspn into other lands where 
they may come to reside. 

§ 246. II. Truthfulness in all com- 
Truthtuiness. munications between nations rests on 

the same moral foundation as between 
individuals. 

It has been the practice of nations to allow, to a 
certain extent, modes of deception towards enemies 
which would not be allowed to others. Ambus- 
cades, wooden cannon, false flags, are justified in 
war, on the ground that the enemies have no right 

I2 # 



274 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

to know the truth in such cases ; it is part of the 
very act of warfare which both parties expect and 
practice without complaint or protest. It seems 
clear, however, that if such acts of deception may 
be not blameworthy simply because there is no per- 
son concerned who has a light to know the truth, 
no practice can be justified which sullies the 
worthiness of man himself, and which cannot be 
allowed by his Creator. It is a nice distinction 
which moralists seek to draw between justifiable 
practices in deceiving an enemy, as by laying am- 
bush, displaying men so as to mislead as to the 
numbers engaged, and the like, on the one hand, and 
such practices, on the other, as decoying a foe into 
danger by false signs of distress, by white flags, 
and the like. It is difficult to apply perfect morals 
to a condition of moral imperfection ; to enforce 
the precepts of love and good will in a state of mur- 
derous warfare. 

§ 247. III. Justice, the practical recog- 
justke. nition of the rights of other nations and 

of the individual subjects of other na- 
tions, is equally enjoined on nations as on in- 
dividuals. 

The prominent rights which interna- 
possess?on P s! Ct t0 tional justice requires to be accorded, 

are the following : 
First, each nation has the right to claim that 
its ownership of its territory and other property 
acquired by original occupancy, by conquest, or 
by cession, be recognized by all other nations. 
As with individuals, lapse of time in the quiet 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 275 

use or occupancy — prescription — gives to na- 
tions a valid title to property. All the property 
within a state belongs by right of eminent domain 
to the state, § 177. Vessels at sea are construed 
as within the limits of the nation to which they 
belong ; and the same rights of property attach to 
them and the property on board of them as to 
property in the proper territory of the state. 
I Secondly, each state has a right to 

subtect e r nCe ° f the allegiance of its own subjects. It 
is in violation of this right that the sub- 
jects of one state are forced to fight against their 
own country. This right to allegiance may be ter- 
minated by self-expatriation ; but till this be the 
case, the right remains. 

Thirdly, each state has the right to 
3. At sea. unmolested travel and traffic over the 
high seas. The territorial jurisdiction 
of a state over adjacent waters is generally recog- 
nized in international law as extending to a line 
three marine miles from the land, and as embracing 
also waters lying within lines drawn from headlands 
to headlands. The right of visitation and search of 
vessels at sea is a recognized right of a belligerent 
in time of war ; but otherwise it is disallowed, ex 
cept under express treaty. 

§ 248. IV. The duty of beneficence 
Beneficence. [ s a principle of international as of per- 
sonal morality. It is indeed but the 
effect and result of expressed good-will. More and 
more in the progress of civilization have the ex- 



2/6 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

pressions of international good will, in sympathetic 
and courteous helpfulness, appeared in history. 

SECTION III. INTERNATIONAL INTEGRITY. 

§ 249. The class of rights and duties vested 
more directly in the act of duty, comprehended un- 
der the general designations of uprightness, hon- 
esty, rectitude, pertain as truly to nations as to in- 
dividuals. States owe it to themselves as well as 
to the world that their transactions with one an- 
other, and all their actions affecting one another, 
should be in the line of perfect rectitude, never 
transgressing the rights of any, and ever tending 
directly to their professed aim and end. 

SECTION IV. WAR. 

§ 250. A state of war introduces a peculiar class 
of rights and obligations between nations, called 
rights of war— jura belli. 

War has been defined to be a contest 
War defined. by force between independent sovereign 

states. 
The question has been mootecl : is war ever justifi- 
able ? In a condition of perfect morality, where good 
will towards men and among men universally prevails, 
certainly war could hardly be supposed to be possible. 
A war, therefore, implies a defect in practical moral- 
ity somewhere. But the same may be said of most 
civil litigation, even in cases where no special im- 
morality could be fairly charged upon either of the 
litigants. There may be, in a true sense, just wars, 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 2/7 

as there may be just civil litigation. All wars are 
wrong in the sense of being incompatible with a 
condition of perfect universal morality ; and yet 
some wars may arise in which no special blame can 
be charged on either party. Offensive wars may be 
as justifiable as defensive ; as aggressions may be 
made on the rights of a state which are not proper- 
ly acts of war, but which, nevertheless, are as offen- 
sive as declared warfare. Generally the same 
grounds may be alleged in the justification of war 
as have been stated in the case of retaliation, § 242. 

But if war may be defensible on the basis of the 
moral imperfections of the race, they are occasions 
of such stupendous evils that they are never to be 
resorted to except in the extremest necessity. Only 
on sore provocation or urgent need of self-defense, 
and not until all milder methods of obtaining jus- 
tice have failed, can a nation justify itself in expos- 
ing itself and its subjects to the incalculable losses 
and sufferings of war, or in inflicting these evils on 
other communities. War should ever be, as it has 
been said it is, the last argument of sovereigns — 
ultima ratio regnm. 

War is a fact ; the rights of war arise as soon as 
the fact exists. They do not depend on the suffi- 
ciency of the causes of the war, or on its righteous- 
ness. Certain things must indeed characterize a 
contest between nations, to make it properly a 
war to which the rights of war pertain. Thus 
it has been said with some authority : war must be 
characterized as a contest public, with arms, and 
just " Bellum est contentio publica, armata, justa" 



2?8 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

§ 251. War, accordingly, must, in the 

1. Must be public. fi rs t place, be public. It cannot exist 

between individuals ; only sovereign 
states can be parties to proper war. Hostilities 
may indeed exist, in which only parts of states are 
engaged, and when they are of sufficient propor- 
tions, in the interests of humanity, certain. belliger- 
ent rights may be recognized and enforced in these 
contests, such as the exchange of prisoners, the 
commissioning of cruisers by letters of marque 
which remove from the vessels and the crews the 
character and liabilities attaching to piracy. In 
modern warfare, partisan and guerrilla bands are be- 
yond the protection of the laws of regular warfare, 
and are regarded as outlaws and punishable as rob- 
bers and murderers. The individual subjects, in- 
deed, of a country in war, are construed to be in a 
state of hostility to all the subjects of the hostile 
country ; but they do not engage in the contest 
with force except under the regulations of the state. 
Private property on land, therefore, is exempt from 
the ravages of war. The use of arms against a de- 
clared public enemy by individuals acting of them- 
selves, without the authority of the state, on land 
is outlawry, and on sea is piracy, which invalidates 
all rights of protection. The sole parties in regular 
war are sovereign states. 

§ 252. War, in the second place, must 

2. with force b e w ith force of arms. The use of poi- 

of arms. x 

son, of destructive chemical agents in 
missiles which are designed to torture the person, 
the employment of savages, and generally the use 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 279 

of other than usual agents or instruments, are en- 
tirely disallowed or regarded with disfavor in the 
adjustment of rights in war. The very object of 
war is so to distress and disable the enemy as to 
force him to yield what is demanded ; but restric- 
tions on the means and instrumentalities to be em- 
ployed have been constantly growing up into the 
authorized customs and usages of regular warfare. 
The grounds of distinction between the lawful and 
the unlawful it is not always easy to perceive. 
Poisons and certain torturing chemical compounds 
are forbidden, while hot shot, explosive shells, tor- 
pedoes, are permitted. 

§ 253. Thirdly, — war must have, at 
3. just. least, an ostensible ground of being pro- 

secuted for some just claim. It must, 
in this sense, be just. A war for merely frivolous 
pretexts, a war for mere conquest, a war for mere 
entertainment, modern morality would reprobate. 
There must be some claim of right as the ground 
of war, which shall serve to limit its range and ef- 
fect ; and it must be prosecuted in fair and just 
methods. Certain arts of deception, as we have 
noticed, § 246, may not be condemned, such as 
stratagems, ambuscades, wooden cannon, and the 
like ; but proper fraud is prohibited. Flags of 
truce, demand of parley, offer of surrender, must be 
respected in good faith, as also all agreements for 
temporary suspension of hostilities, passports, safe 
conducts, licenses, and the like, are to be kept. 
Spies are recognized as permissible agents in war ; 
but, if captured, they are, from the necessities of 



2^0 DUTIES IN THE STATE. 

war, punishable with death, not, it is said, because 

they are morally unlawful agencies, but because 

they are dangerous. 

§ 254. Besides the parties immediately 

Belligerents and engaged in war, there are others affect- 
non-combatants. . 

ed by it. There is thus the distinction 

between the rights of combatants — belligerents — 

and the rights of non-combatants. 

Non-combatants are either individual subjects of 
a belligerent state, or neutral states and their sub- 
jects. 

The effect of war on the individual subjects of a 
belligerent is the immediate interdiction of com- 
mercial intercourse with the hostile nation and its 
subjects and allies. Private contracts with the 
enemy's subjects are accordingly unlawful. The 
property of the citizens of the hostile state is liable 
to be confiscated ; but the debts of the nation itself 
to an enemy's subjects are held inviolable. The 
lives of non-resistants and of captured prisoners 
are held to be inviolable, as well as the property of 
individuals on land. Buildings devoted to civil pur- 
poses, monuments of art, repositories of science 
and learning, are exempted from the general rav- 
ages of war. The ravaging of a country is permis- 
sible only as necessary to effect the general object 
of the war. 

§ 255. The existence of war of neces- 
Neutrais. s fty affects the interests of neighboring 

nations, to whom accordingly pertain 
certain rights and obligations. Generally the in- 
terests of a neutral power are\ so far as practicable, 



INTERNATIONAL MORALITY. 28 1 

to be protected. Its ships on the high seas are 
not to be molested, even although conveying the 
enemy's property, or even his ministers and muni- 
tions of war. But in case of a blockade, the right 
of visitation and search belongs to the belligerent. 
On the other hand, neutrals are bound to observe a 
strict impartiality between the contending parties. 
They must not allow the crossing of their territory 
by either belligerent ; nor the arming and equip- 
ping of vessels or enlistment of men in their terri- 
tory ; nor vessels of war to lie in wait in their 
ports ; nor cruisers to take prizes into their har- 
bors except under stress of weather or like neces- 
sity. All captures, moreover, on neutral territory, 
are unlawful. Such are the leading applications of 
international law to neutrals in time of war. 



2%2 DUTIES TO GOD. 



BOOK II. 



DIVISION III. 

DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER I. 

NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION. 

§ 256. Duties to God or Religious 
Nature. Duties are at once indicated in the light 

of the moral relationship of man to God. 
It is assumed that God exists ; that he is clothed 
with all the attributes of rational excellence in their 
highest degree, in infinite perfection — with omni- 
presence, omniscience, omnipotence, with perfect 
goodness, righteousness, and holiness ; that, more- 
over, he is the creator and the sovereign disposer 
and ruler of men. 

God thus exists in closer relations to man than 
is possible for any other being ; ever with him, ever 
upholding him, ever caring for him, ever loving him, 
ever ruling him. Emphatically in God man lives 
and moves and has his being. The infinitude of 



NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION. 283 

God's being, and the perfection of his character ex- 
alt this unrivaled intimacy of relationship to the 
highest degree conceivable. The duties which man 
owes to God are beyond all comparison first in rank 
and sacredness, deepest in obligation, and most con- 
stant in their claims. Such, indeed, is the relation of 
God to the entire universe as creator and governor 
that, in a true sense, duty to God comprehends im- 
mediately or remotely all possible duty. His moral 
nature, which we find expressed through his creative 
and providential will, is the foundation of all moral- 
ity — of all rectitude and goodness. As ail the 
capacities of man and all the relations of his being 
are established by God and controlled by him in 
his universal rule, all human duty must be cm- 
braced within his authoritative will ; — the divine 
law is the all-comprehensive law for man. Even 
the ordinances of civil authority are through his 
appointment and so receive from him their highest 
sanction. Love to man is deepest and strongest 
when rendered in the spirit o' the brotherhood of all 
men under God as the common Father of all. 

God is not only the original source of all morality 
by reason of his being the creator of all moral beings 
and of his endowing them all with their moral 
natures, but he is also the life and soul of all true 
morality. The consciousness of God as ruler, as 
sovereign and judge, is the best and highest induce- 
ment to a moral life, the most effective restraint 
from all immoral practice. A godless morality is 
shallowness and stagnancy ; it has little endurance 
against the heats of temptation, little vigor for heroic 



284 DUTIES TO GOD. 

virtue. Hoping in the favor of a personal God and 
fearing his displeasure, while resting firmly in his 
authoritative will, man is strong to bear and strong 
to do. Only as the will of God is regarded in it can 
there be full satisfaction to the conscience in the 
fulfilment of any duty. A consciousness of his 
presence and of his authority, must pervade all 
sound moral practice. 

§ 257. The authoritative will of God is 
How enjoined, promulgated in the moral relations which 

are discoverable in his works of creation, 
the dispositions of his providence, and his express 
revelations to man. 

The moral nature of man answers with exactness 
to these utterances of divine authority. Every re- 
quirement has its answering capacity ; the duty 
claimed is exactly commensurate with the ability in 
man to discharge. The divinely imposed sanctions 
of obedience are re-echoed in the consciences of 
men. 

§ 258. The particular duties which man 
Classification. wes to God show here, as before, their 

readiest distribution and classification 
when viewed from the threefold element in all duty 
— the subject of duty, the object of duty, and the 
act of duty. We will follow this order, considering, 
first, those religious duties which are more charac- 
terized by their being seated in the subject of duty 
in man as morally related to God ; secondly, those 
seated in the object of duty — the character and acts 
of God in relation to man ; and thirdly, those char- 
the act of duty itself. It may not be 



NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION. 285 

entirely superfluous to repeat that each of these 
enumerated duties implies the presence of all of the 
elements mentioned ; as we have before found that 
goodwill, rectitude, and goodness, necessarily imply 
each the others. § 21. 

We find here, moreover, the distinction of duties 
into personal and social. These two classes it will 
be convenient to consider separately. 



286 DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER II. 

PERSONAL RELIGION — PIETY TOWARDS GOD. 

§ 259. Piety denotes the right act or 
Piety defined, state of the subject of duty towards God. 

It is love to God viewed rather from the 
side of the subject of duty than from the object or 
act of duty. 

It imports a loving sympathy with all the mani- 
festations of God ; a loving disposition towards him 
— a true godliness of spirit ; and a loving purpose 
— a true devotion to God. 

1. Made in the image of God, man is 
it imports constituted by his very nature to be in 

1, sympathy. J . 

heartiest sympathy with all that is truly 
divine. It is only proof that his nature has be- 
come fearfully vitiated, if the spirit of man turns 
away in indifference or coldness from any manifes- 
tation of Divine power, or wisdom, or goodness ; 
much more if it is positively averse to recognition 
and contemplation of these manifestations of God. 
As everything that is, especially everything that 
moves or breathes, is of God and is a revelation of 



PERSONAL RELIGION. 287 

him, there is ground for perpetual sympathy and 
communion with him. For this was man made ; 
and to this he is called in duty. 

2. The sympathy which is awakened 

2. a godly dis- by every successive display of God 

position. J J J 

to the heart of man should pass in- 
to habitual disposition, so that the soul shall 
be the seat of a true godliness. The allowance of 
sympathetic pleasure in the works and ways of God 
on the several successive occasions of their entering 
into the experience, bends the spirit God-ward and 
determines its growth under the laws of habit into 
this shape and character. 

3. The embrace of this godly sympathy 

3. Love. anc i disposition with the free-will is love 

to God in its essential completeness — is 
true devotion to him. It is religion in the subject 
of duty. It is proper piety. 

All duty to God, all religious duty implies piety 
—implies a living agent in hearty sympathy, in lov- 
ing disposition, and loving purpose in respect to 
God. All other denominations of religious duty 
are but the outworkings of this pious sentiment 
and intention towards God. Devoid of true piety, 
all else is morally worthless. Religious profession, 
religious worship, religious rites and ceremonies, 
religious sacrifices, and religious endeavors, are, 
without piety, but emptiness and vanity, or worse, 
hypocrisy and mockery. 

§ 260. The responsive affection in relig- 
Gratitude. j on [ s gratitude : — it is the resentment 

of the divine goodness. The other re- 



288 DUTIES TO GOD. 

sentment, that which has by its predominating 
sway among men crowded out its sister affection 
from its proper recognition in common modern 
speech — retaliation for evil experienced — has no 
place in reference to God, since his work is all in 
perfect goodness. Evil comes, indeed, to man, and 
it comes from divine appointment. Yet is all 
physical evil from him essential love. Punitive 
justice is in the interest of a true universal benevo- 
lence ; and trials are disciplinary, tending to bring 
about the perfection of character in man which is 
the condition of highest blessedness to him. If 
God's gracious design in the visitations of sorrow is 
allowed to make its full and true impression on the 
heart, there will be such a sense of the divine good- 
ness in the experience of trial as will kindle a com- 
placent gratitude that shall be full of joy and satis- 
faction. 



PERSONAL RELIGION. 289 



CHAPTER III. 

PERSONAL RELIGION. REVERENCE PRAYER. 

§ 261. Of the duties to God, which are 
Reverence. more distinctly characterized by their 

reference to the object of duty, that 
class which are seated in the sensibility — the capac- 
ity and faculty of form — are comprehended under 
the general duty of reverence. 

As in the intercourse of man with his equals this 
class of duties take the general form of courtesy 
which towards his recognised superiors among men 
passes into respect, so in the intercourse of man, 
the finite creature with God, the infinite creator, 
they take this form of reverence. Every manifes- 
tation of God in his word, his works, his ways, should 
be responded to by man, the whole answering at- 
titude towards him should be, in this reverence. 
The higher stage of this emotion is reverential 
awe — an emotion not necessarily painful or repul- 
sive, but one, it may be, of the deepest joy and satis- 
faction, as the form in which the most loving and 
confiding affection may express itself. It is natu- 

J 3 



29O DUTIES TO GOD. 

rally inspired by the greater and sublimer demon- 
strations of the Divine character. 

The counterpart on the human side of 
Humility. this reverence is, on the divine side in 

the inter-communication between man 
and God, humility. The- one ever implies the 
other ; the spirit that is reverent towards God is 
ever humble in view of itself. 

§ 262. The reverential carriage and de- 
Prayer defined, portment which should characterize all 

the responses of the human soul to the 
manifestations of the divine preserver finds in prayer 
its more prevalent and familiar exemplification. 
Prayer is the address of the human spirit to God. 

Prayer embraces all the proper expressions of the 
soul to God. As the respective character of God 
and of men is regarded, reverence takes the form of 
adoration on the one side, of self-humiliation on 
the other. As farther, the relation of man to God is 
fundamentally and comprehensively that of de- 
pendence, the sense of this dependence express- 
es itself naturally in praise on the one side, and of 

supplication on the other. The natural 
Constituents, constituents of prayer as the form of 

address to God by man, are accordingly 
adoration, self-humiliation taking the form of con- 
fession under a consciousness of sin, praise, and 
supplication. 

§ 263. As God is omnipresent, to be 
^T^eSing. recognized in every place and at all 

times, and as man is ever dependent on 
him, prayer becomes the luiccasing duty of man. 



REVERENCE PRAYER. 2Q I 

The fundamental and most essential 

2. Reverential, quality of prayer is that it be reverential. 

Prayer might very well be defined as 
the outgoing of a reverential spirit in a sense of 
dependence and so of want. So far as this quality 
is in defect, prayer is imperfect or fails. All light- 
ness and flippancy are incompatible with true prayer. 

Another requisite of prayer is that it be 

3. Trustful. confiding and expectant. " He that 

cometh to God must believe that he is, 
and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently 
seek him." There is, of course, no prayer in any 
proper sense where there is no sincerity — a form of 
words does not constitute prayer. Only where 
there is true expression, actual address, of soul to 
God, is there prayer. The belief in God as he is, as 
real, as infinite, as good, is involved in all sincere 
address to him. Adoration and self-humiliation 
can spring only from a conscious sense of his 
greatness in compassion with human littleness ; 
praise and supplication can go forth only from a 
soul conscious of the divine goodness and of its 
own needs. This apprehension of God as infinite- 
ly good — compassionate, forgiving, loving — and of 
the soul's entire dependence on him and of its ur- 
gent necessities, must make prayer, not only earn- 
est, but believing — trustful and expectant. 

§ 264. The duty of prayer is enforced 
Duty enforced, by manifold considerations. 

First, it is natural and meet that man, 
being made in the image of God, should be in com- 
munion with him, as a son with his father. 



292 DUTIES TO GOU. 

Secondly, the addresses of God in his works and 
his ways to man continually call forth suitable re- 
sponse taking the form of prayer. 

Thirdly, such prayerful communion with God 
as the all-perfect one, is the necessary condition of 
growth into the highest perfection attainable by 
man. 

Fourthly, as dependent, as ever needy, supplica- 
tion to the only being who can supply the needs of 
man's spirit is a natural duty. To withhold 
prayer is to resist the most sacred instincts of 
man's dependent nature. If these instincts may 
be stifled for a time, occasions of distress and 
danger call them forth and give them their proper 
power over the human spirit. The habitual sense 
of dependence, equally with the habitual sense of 
the divine greatness ever encompassing them, 
should keep alive in the hearts of men a true spir- 
it of prayer that shall break forth in full and for- 
mal expression whenever the occasion shall allow. 

§ 265. The objections to supplicating 
Objections. ■ prayer founded ostensibly on the divine 
omniscience and goodness, or on the 
uniformity of his providence, are not valid. That 
God must know all our wants, and that therefore 
it is needless for us to tell them to him, and that as 
infinitely good, he will supply them so far as can 
consist with wisdom without our asking, is an argu- 
ment that would by necessary implication forbid all 
communion with God and all expression of our 
sense of absolute dependence on him for all good. 
It runs counter to the strongest instincts of the 



REVERENCE PRAYER. 293 

human spirit. The loving parent knows the wants 
of his child better than itself; it would be most 
unwise to hinder the communion that must consist 
in great degree of the expressions of felt wants, be- 
cause of this knowledge. Supplication is the nat- 
ural expression of the sense of dependence ; certainly 
that must be a most mistaken conception of the re- 
lations of God to man which would exclude the pro- 
priety of expressing this sense of dependence. In- 
deed, the good to man which may come through 
the communion with God as the proper expression 
of this sense of dependence may supposably exceed 
the good that could come from the granting of tie 
prayer. 

The argument against prayer in the form of sup- 
plication for blessings, particularly for blessings of 
a temporal and outward character, which is ground- 
ed on the alleged inviolable uniformity in nature, is 
equally invalid. It assumes, what cannot be 
proved, that the element of prayer cannot be incor- 
porated by infinite wisdom into uniformity with nat- 
ural sequences. It assumes without warrant that 
the sequences in nature cannot be changed from 
what they would have been but for prayer, by an in- 
terposition of God through natural causes and 
means without any violation of natural law. If the 
hand of a man may, without disturbing the uni- 
formity of nature, prevent the withering of a plant 
simply by conveying to its roots the needed supply of 
water, who shall dare to say that the hand of omnip- 
otence is incompetent to turn the cloud in answer 
to prayer from wasting itself on desert or ocean to 



294 DUTIES TO GOD. 

a field threatened with drought, without disturb- 
ing the uniformity of nature. The argument 
limits omnipotence, denies to divine power what is 
allowed to human. Answers to prayer, involving 
the greatest changes conceivable in physical se- 
quence that real human needs can demand, may 
be without miraculous power. Yet, who can pre- 
sume to say that miracles may not be wrought — 
works in nature that are beyond all known natural 
agency — by Him who created and gave laws to all 
that exists. 

But objections to prayer for temporal blessings 
overlook the fact that from the very nature of the 
case all true prayer is submissive to the higher wis- 
dom of God. " Not my will, but thine be done," 
is the essential characteristic of all true prayer. 
The real want that prompts the prayer may under- 
lie the specific desire and not be expressed in it but by 
implication. At least, the felt want may often be best 
relieved by the supply to the soul of a more funda- 
mental good. Not infrequently, doubtless, is the 
specific desire gratified in some such larger supply 
to a deeper and broader want. The feverish child 
asks for water ; the wise and loving parent withhold- 
ing the specific desire, bestows what cures the fe- 
ver which occasioned the thirst. 

§ 266. The sin opposed to reverence is 
irreverence irreverence. Like its opposite, irrever- 
ence rather indicates a habit, a dispo- 
sition than a specific act. The more common out- 
breaking form of it is profanity. It is a vicious 
indulgence to excess of the natural instinct, to em- 



REVERENCE PRAYER. 295 

phasizc certain of our utterances. Like all excesses 
in habitual character, what at first seemed strong 
and forcible, soon comes to seem but moderation ; 
and blasphemy becomes the ordinary utterance of 
the lips. It is an easily entrapping vice ; but its 
effect on the spirit is as hardening and debasing as 
the sin is offensive to God. 

A milder form of this vice is that of the indul- 
gence of ridicule ; and a still less heinous form is 
that of levity in respect to religious objects or 
themes. When not positively irreverent, these 
habits indicate at least a lamentable deficiency in 
the spirit of reverence. 



296 DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER IV. 

PERSONAL RELIGION. GODLY SINCERITY. 

§ 267. By sincerity towards God, is 
Defined. meant truth in our cherished and uttered 

thought of him. It has two sides, in- 
ward and outward ; truth in our views of God, and 
truth in our utterances to him, corresponding to the 
two forms cf truthfulness, before indicated among 
the duties to persons ; candor and veracity. § 119. 

§ 268. In the first place this duty in- 
true"hought. a volves a true thought of God. It implies 

a candid unbiased apprehension of his 
character, and of his works and ways. 

God manifests himself to man in such way that it 
is practicable to form a true notion of him. His 
eternal power and godhead are clearly seen from 
the creation of the world, and may be truly known 
by the things that he has made. His righteousness 
and his mercy are revealed in history and in his 
dealings with every human soul. The conscience 
testifies of him ; the native sense of dependence 
alike witnesses to him ; the experiences of his 
care and kindness and the cravings of his favor 
for the present life, but especially for the life to 
come, teach truly of him. It is man's duty to re- 






PERSONAL RELIGION GODLY SINCERITY. 297 

ceive into his thought these impressions concerning 
God just as they are made. Not only are there these 
manifestations of God in nature and providence, and 
through the personal experience ; more fully and 
impressively are they given in his express revela- 
tions through the written word. He is in these 
manifold ways set forth as not only the creator of 
men, but as their moral governor and judge; as, 
moreover, their gracious redeemer and sanctifier. 
Nature, history, personal experience, written revela- 
tion, harmoniously testify thus of God. This testi- 
mony it is the duty of men freely to receive ; and 
to allow it its lawful impression on the mind. 

But " truth in the inward parts " involves more 
than this — a candid reception of the testimony given 
respecting God ; it involves, besides, a candid con- 
forming of the whole thought to these impressions. 
What is suggested in these revelations is to be car- 
ried out in reverent contemplation into all its law 
ful results and conclusions and applications. 

Such is religious candor, embracing a free, hearty, 
unbiased reception of all the revelations of the 
divine greatness and glory, of his moral rule, of 
his gracious work, also, in the redemption of men, 
and a reverent thoughtfulness in respect to them, 
conforming the whole spirit to them, and applying 
them to all the specific phases of personal experi- 
ence. 

§ 269. In the second place, godly sin- 
expVssion~ ul cerity imports a truthful expression of 
our thought to God. 

It requires that in all communion with him the 
13* 



298 DUTIES TO GOD. 

addresses to him be more than empty sound or 
form ; be positively significant, and be expressive 
of the real thought and intent of the heart. All re- 
ligious forms, all religious acts and words, thus, are 
to mean something ; and this meaning must be the 
true meaning of the heart. 

§ 270. The vices opposed to inward 
idolatry sincerity are idolatry and superstition. 

Idolatry substitutes a false, an un- 
real, for the true God. 

In its grosser form, idolatry elevates creatures to 
the rank of the divine. Even to the creations of 
man's own hand, in its lowest form, it attributes a 
kind of divinity and acknowledges a kind of reli- 
gious dependence on them. In a less debasing form 
the idolatrous spirit, turning from God, who is the 
only satisfying portion for the human soul, seeks its 
supplies from lower springs ; from fellow men, or 
from its own resources ; from condition or circum- 
stance, or attainment other than in the line of virtue 
and religion. In a somewhat mixed form, it min- 
gles the recognition of Jehovah with the service of 
other gods ; it pays its devotions to the instruments 
or helps of worship ; or depends on the abundance 
or excellence of its own prayers or services. Idol- 
atry substitutes something, as object of worship or 
ground of dependence, in the place of the true 
God. 

§ 271. Superstition exaggerates the 
Superstition. r eal ; it fancies something specially di- 
vine in what is only the ordinary form 
of the divine operation. 



PERSONAL RELIGION — GODLY SINCERITY. 2<)') 

It misinterprets what is revealed of God in his 
common providence by imparting to it a higher sig- 
nificance and import than what belongs to it. 
Dreams that are but the vagaries of unregulated 
thought, are erroneously interpreted as of super- 
natural significance ; certain events, trivial as the 
thousand experiences of every-day life, are selected 
out of the great current and interpreted to be the 
■ channels of special divine warning or promise. All 
superstition is opposed to the truth concerning God 
and his ways. 

§ 272. The vices opposed to outward' 
Hypocrisy. sincerity are hypocrisy and formality. 

Hypocrisy is false expression ; it pro- 
poses to utter what it does not mean. It assumes 
the garb of religion ; it appears in the place of re- 
ligion ; it takes the attitude of religion ; it uses the 
ends of religion; while it knowingly simulates, and 
aims to deceive man if not God ; it utters religion 
while irreligion is consciously in the heart. 

§ 273. Formality is the mere negative 
Formality. opposite of outward religious sincerity. 

It is form without indwelling substance. 
It is empty sound. If hypocrisy is more the sin of 
the ungodly and the irreligious, formality is more 
the fault to which a really religious spirit is liable. 
Devotion must needs.be habitual; and what is 
habitual is liable to become merely formal. Re- 
pentance is the only cure of hypocrisy; God-fearing 
watchfulness is the great safeguard against for- 
mality. 



300 DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER V. 

PERSONAL RELIGION. RELIGIOUS TRUST, OBEDIENCE, 

AND SERVICE. 

§ 274. There are other cardinal reli- 
Threefoid duty mous duties which respect more imme- 

f rom attributes. ° # x 

diateiy the moral attributes of God, and 
which are analogous to that class of duties to per- 
sons which are characterized by having reference to 
the moral nature of men. They are Trust, Obedi- 
ence, and Service. 

These religious virtues severally respect the attri- 
butes of God declared in the three successive stages 
of the divine revelation of himself to men. To 
Abraham, God revealed himself as the Almighty: 
" I am the Almighty God." As possessed of all 
power, he holds the destiny of all his creatures in 
his own hands, and dispenses good or evil at his 
pleasure. He is, therefore, the one comprehensive 
source of all that can move the hopes and fears of 
men. As hope and fear are the fundamental in- 
stincts of man's moral nature, and as the good and 
evil which they respect are entirely at the disposal 
of God, reliance on him for the fulfilment of hopes 
and removal of fears, is a fundamental religious 



TRUST, OBEDIENCE, SERVICE. 3OI 

duty. Trust in Him is the primal virtue in re- 
ligion. It is presupposed in all riper graces ; it 
manifests itself earliest in the religious experience of 
man. It is the soil in which obedience and love 
fasten and nourish their roots. 

§ 275. The requisite qualities of reli- 

1. Trust. gious Trust are that it be, I, entire, since 

no good or evil is beyond the control of 
God ; 2, perfect, since God's disposition to bless 
with all good and to save from all evil is infinite ; 
3, directed upon God himself, as the giver of all 
good, not on the gifts themselves, since otherwise 
there is no religion in trust, and it sinks to selfish- 
ness or to idolatrous reliance on false gods or on 
creatures ; 4, loving, since all that is moral and re- 
ligious must be from a loving heart. God, as good, 
as loving, beneficent power, is the immediate object 
of religious trust, which penetrates through the good 
it craves or the evil it fears and fastens on him who 
holds both in his power. 

Religious trust regards God as the beneficent, 
all-wise, and all-powerful providential disposer of 
the interests of all created beings — it respects God 
as providential ruler. 

§ 276. To Moses, God, in the second 

2. obedience, stage of his special revelations to man, 

declared himself as the God of author- 
ity, " I am Jehovah " — the appellation significant of 
sovereignty and rule. To this attribute in God the 
duty of obedience in man is the proper correlative. 
As God commands, it is the part of man to obey. 



3Q2 DUTIES TO GOD. 

Obedience is a duty of natural religion. The 
conscience of man testifies of a law imposed on him 
from without. Not without some just ground in 
reason has the first proof of God's existence been 
found by some philosophers in this imperative 
which is felt in the conscience; so early and so 
commanding is this witnessing voice. The awe- 
inspiring words : " Thou shalt," or perhaps in the 
still earlier prohibitory form, " Thou shalt not," 
break upon the ear in early childhood. The voice 
of command stirs the heart through a presupposed 
trust — through the hopes and fears. Obedience, as 
already intimated, roots itself in trust. An indif- 
ference to one's destiny, recklessness in regard to 
the future, is as fatal to true obedience as it is 
foreign to man's true nature Obedience is fed up 
and made strong by trust contemplating the pos- 
sible evil to be averted and the possible good to be 
realized. The deeper and richer the trust, the more 
perfect will be the obedience. 

Religious obedience regards God as the sovereign 
of men, who has made known his will in a law that 
is perfect, wise, and good, reaching to every power 
and affection and condition of man, and that is sup- 
ported and enforced by infinite sanctions of good 
and evil — promises of good to the obedient and 
threatenings of evil to the disobedient. God is ad- 
ministering this law. over men, in perfect justice 
and righteousness and truth. Obedience respects 
this moral rule of God. 

§ 277. The requisite qualities of religious obe- 
dience are that it be 1, universal, since he that 



TRUST, OBEDIENCE, SERVICE. 303 

offends in one command offends in all, transgresses 
the authority of the whole law ; 2, whole-souled, 
with all the mind and soul and heart and strength ; 
3, directed upon God the law-giver himself, since to 
have a sole regard to the sanction of the law — 
the good of the promised reward or the evil of the 
threatened penalty — is not obedience but self-seek- 
ing ; 4, loving, since the law is good, and the law- 
giver is good in giving and administering it, and as 
thus good is worthy of a loving obedience. A 
constrained, a servile obedience contradicts both 
the free nature of man and also his filial relation to 
God. Only a free, filial, in other words, a loving 
obedience can be accepted of God or satisfy man's 
conscience. 

§ 278. In the third stage of God's 
3. Service. special revelations of himself to men, 
he declares himself as the God of grace 
and mercy, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and 
sin — " the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merci- 
ful." As having thus a gracious purpose in the ac- 
complishment of which he enlists his boundless re- 
sources and the infinity of his loving heart, in 
whose final and complete success lies his whole 
pleasure and the very glory which is the end of his 
whole rule and work, God presents to men the pos- 
sibility and at once the privilege and the duty of a 
most acceptable service and ministry. 

There is a service of God that does not so prom- 
inently reveal itself as an act of obedience. All 
service is, indeed, commanded ; the authority of 
Jehovah is beneath it ; and all service must be in 



304 DUTIES TO GOD. 

obedience as done with the authority of Jehovah 
and in deference to it. But, as religious duty may 
be characterized sometimes as obedience rather 
than trust, although all obedience must be in trust, 
so religious service is sometimes characterized not 
so prominently as rendered directly and exclusively 
in reference to the divine commands. God has an 
end which he seeks ; to this end man may directly 
minister. In so doing he may in truth be said to 
be ministering to the pleasure of God and to the 
glory of his name. God is building up a kingdom 
of grace among men. In the progress and ultimate 
triumph of this kingdom his pleasure and his glory 
are alike concerned. To this revelation of God as 
a God of grace, religious service is the proper cor- 
relative on the part of man. 

Religious service thus regards God as in his 
gracious economy seeking the salvation of men 
with an infinite mercy and compassion, with the 
enlistment of all the resources of heaven and earth, 
in the exercise of infinite wisdom and boundless 
power, as also of infinite goodness and love. Re- 
ligious service respects God as such a gracious 
ruler. 

§ 279. The requisite qualities of true religious ser- 
vice are that it be (1.) whole-hearted — that with all 
earnestness of zeal and full consecration in spirit in 
all the regulation of the life, in the choice of pursuits, 
the framing of plans, and in the performance of par- 
ticular acts, the interests of God's kingdom be held 
in paramount regard ; (2.) unquestioning — that it 
minister to those interests in whatsoever fiel'd they 



TRUST, OBEDIENCE, SERVICE. 305 

may require and in whatever way service may be 
effective ; (3) personal to God — that it be rendered 
to God personally in the particular interest to be 
advanced, not to the interest itself ; (4) loving — 
that it be in hearty sympathy with the will of God, 
and as securing his highest favor and thus placing 
the soul in that condition which brings to it its 
highest joy and satisfaction. 

§ 280. The formal engagement of one's 
Religious vow. self to this service to God constitutes 

the proper religious vow. But in the 
wider sense the vow includes all engagements to 
service whether to be rendered to God, or to one's 
fellow men, or to one's self. It is thus an engage- 
ment under religious sanctions. 

The special principles respecting vows are : 1. 
They should not be made rashly or inconsiderately 
nor on trivial occasions. 2. They should be sacred- 
ly fulfilled. 3. If the fulfilment should be unlaw- 
ful or impossible, the obligation is not of course to 
be regarded as satisfied, but is to be discharged in 
some other way that shall in its effect be equivalent. 



306 DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER VI. 

PERSONAL RELIGION RELIGIOUS INTEGRITY. 

§ 281. The last class of personal re- 
Division, ligious duties to be considered are those 

which have more characteristic refer- 
ence to the act of duty. Here are to be noticed 
those distinctions in duty which are marked more 
prominently by one or another of the leading ele- 
ments or constituent attributes of moral rectitude. 
They are of two species according as these attri- 
butes are essential or relative. 

The first species, embracing those duties which 
are marked by an essential attribute of religious 
rectitude or integrity, includes, first, singleness of 
Jiecxrt towards God ; and, secondly, unswerving 
directness in duty. 

All moral rectitude implies an aim which 
heart. n ° SS ° f is single and true. In religious duty 

this aim is directed towards God sin- 
gly. There are two mistakes here to which men 
are liable. One is in aiming only at the particular 
interest concerned in the duty, without a governing 
recognition of God in it. The aim, thus, may rest 



RELIGIOUS [NTEGRITY. 2>°7 

solely in the service rendered, the act of worship 
done. This aim may be a worthy one; for its 
accomplishment there may be worthy and success- 
ful endeavor ; but unless God be recognized in it, 
the act is religiously defective. The aim in all ac- 
ceptable religious duty must reach ever to him. On 
the other hand, the aim may reach beyond him to the 
good that may reward the fulfilment of the duty. 
This* may be truly worthy and desirable ; but it is 
to be sought only as the result and consequence to 
follow the fulfilment of the duty. To regard this 
following good as the immediate aim, vitiates the 
act. The aim in all religious duty must, thus, 
reach on the one hand beyond the immediate object 
to be accomplished to God, and on the other must 
rest in him as the one end in all religion. 

§ 282. Further, religious integrity im- 
dircctness rVmg P^ es unswerving directness in the per- 
formance of duty. It is opposed to all 
crookedness, indirectness, obliquity. True re- 
ligious activity must, to be perfect, be straight for- 
ward in its movement. 

§ 283. The second species of religious 
Harmony with duties, marked by a relative attribute 

other duties in . . . 

direction. of rectitude, embraces those of direc- 

tion and those of degree. 
In direction, all duty must be in harmony and 
parallelism with all other duty. The lines of duty 
are all laid in perfect wisdom, and can never cross. 
It is a sign of moral error when duties clash. 
When we clearly discern the boundaries of anoth- 
er's field of duty, we are admonished that if the 



308 DUTIES TO GOD. 

path we are pursuing trespasses upon it, we are in 
the wrong, and need to retrace our steps or bend 
our course. In the same way, when different spe- 
cific duties pertaining to ourselves collide, we may 
be sure there is moral defect somewhere. Reli- 
gious rectitude implies that all duty is harmonious 
and consistent ; — " her paths are peace." 

§ 284. Again, all specific duty has its 
Moderation in own j us j- me asure and degree ; to be 

degree. J ° 

perfect it must neither exceed nor fall 
short of its due limit. Religious zeal may be true 
and single, while it may be imperfect either through 
excess or through lack of fervor. 



SOCIAL RELIGION FAMILY RELIGION. 309 



CHAPTER VII. 

SOCIAL RELIGION FAMILY RELIGION. 

§ 285. Inasmuch as man is a religious 
Division. being, religion may legitimately find a 

place in all associations of men, even 
such as are temporary or accidental. But it is in 
the several spheres of the three great permanent 
societies existing among men — the Family, the 
State, and the Church — that social religion is best 
seen in its native and special obligations. We will 
consider it in the duties which it enjoins in these 
several spheres in order. 

§ 286. We must begin with a full and 
Religion in the distinct recognition of the close rela- 

tamily. ° 

tion which religion bears to all the 
great interests of man, and of its special influence 
on these interests through the family organization 
and life. The great interests of man lie in the 
eternal hereafter ; and to this future life his tem- 
poral life is to be made subservient. It is, more- 
over, in his relation to God that the highest inter- 
ests of man are centred: The family trains for 
this life and for the future. This training must be 
'radically deficient if religion does not enter into it 



3 TO DUTIES TO GOD. 

as the guiding and sustaining element. Indeed, an 
irreligious household, that is, a household where the 
relation of man to God is excluded from view, must 
lack a chief requisite for its own peace and well- 
being, as well as for its efficiency in effecting the 
training which is entrusted to it. It is in child- 
hood that character is shaped ; it is in the family 
that the germs of piety for the most part are start- 
ed ; it is there that religious culture should be be- 
gun and carried so far as permanently to determine 
the habits and the conduct. In the religious home, 
all unconsciously to itself, the spirit of the child 
breathes the atmosphere and receives the shaping 
influences which form character. The impressions 
of the earliest years are the deepest and the most 
ineffaceable. As the family is the great nursery 
for the state, and the character, and consequently 
the destiny, of the nation hang on the character of 
the families which compose it, the religious house- 
hold is a necessity of national as well as of individ- 
ual well-being ; while, in regard to the individual 
man, so long as it remains true that " Godliness has 
the promise of the life that now is, as well as of the 
life to come," religion in the family affords the most 
hopeful condition to him of success here and here- 
after. 

§ 287. The family life has its initiation 
fnmarrlage. i n marriage. Inasmuch as the family- 
sphere is inclusive of both secular and 
immortal interests, marriage must have both a reli 
gious and a secular side. Whether the state ard 
the church are united in one organization, and 






SOCIAL RKLIGION FAMILY RELIGION. 311 

whether the head, in that case, is properly civil or 
ecclesiastical, or whether they are separate and dis- 
tinct in organization and rule and duty, in every 
case, marriage must be both civil and religious. It 
is a civil contract which reaches to secular interests 
that properly lie within the domain of the state. It 
very properly, therefore, invites civil regulation and 
civil formalities. It is the ground of most import- 
ant civil rights — those of protection, support, in- 
heritance. But marriage not less vitally concerns 
spiritual and immortal interests. It is fitting, there- 
fore, that it take place under religious as well as 
civil sanctions. It is, indeed, in a true sense, a 
sacrament, in so far as it involves a covenant before 
God, under the order which he has imposed, direct- 
ly reaching to the highest spiritual, as well as to 
temporal and secular interests. The family life 
should begin in religion. 

§ 288. Farther, the plan and ordering 
in the house- f t } ie on-o-oing family life should be re- 

hold life. t 00 ... 

ligious. The dwelling in its arrange- 
ments, its furniture, its library, may fitly show that 
the home-life contemplated in it is not to be wholly 
godless. The ordering of this life from day to day 
may fitly give a place for religious observances. 
The collective life of the family circle may recog- 
nize God, and yet not infringe at all upon proper 
freedom of conscience. Even the mere outward 
and formal observance is better than none ; as we 
expect the outward deportment to be civil and dec- 
orous from even the boorish and base in spirit 
The form of virtue may invite the inward life. 



312 DUTIES TO GOD. 

§ 289. Moreover, the family life should, 
Positi re reiigi- j n its actual progress, exemplify relisri- 

ous training. L . . . 

ous duty. The training of children im- 
peratively demands this of the parental head. Just 
as the habitually profane will set a guard upon his 
lips when his children are by him, so may the out- 
ward respect for religion be evinced even when its 
spirit does not rule in the heart. A reverence for 
all things sacred, a candid and honest treatment of 
religious matters, a deference to religious claims, 
may be shown where the tremendous responsibili- 
ties of a parent's charge may not have inspired a 
true and full personal consecration to a godly life. 

Still further, family religion involves a faithful 
inculcation of piety on the subordinate members of 
the family. Religious instruction is a leading 
household duty. Parents are expressly enjoined in 
sacred scripture to bring up their children " in the 
nurture and admonition of the Lord." 

§ 290. The true religious life ever seeks 
Family worship. to express itself in outward rites. 

Family religion demands its observ- 
ances. It is sufficient to say here that in the 
family, religious rites should have a place in the 
regular order of the household ; they should be 
stated and regular-; they should be simple and 
familiar and attractive. They may well enlist all 
the proper elements of worship, the service of song 
as well as of prayer and meditation of religious 
truth. As the table is at the centre of the family 
life, bringing all the members together at stated 
and frequently recurring intervals, it seems to 



SOCIAL RELIGION — FAMILY RELIGION. 



J 1 J 



present the best occasions for the common religious 
services of the household. It suggests dependence 
and calls to gratitude for realized blessings, as well 
as awakens the spirit of trustful expectation for 
future good. The regular recurrence of sleep also 
brings along with it suggestions to devotion and 
affords convenient occasions for united service of 
religious worship in every well regulated household. 

14 



14 DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

SOCIAL RELIGION, — THE STATE. 

The state a re- § 2 9 l - The sphere of the state life, as 
hgious as well we h ave found, is purely secular. The 

as a moral per- ' ± j 

sonaiity. one immediate end of its action is the 

promotion of the common secular interest of its 
citizens. But we have also found that the state is 
a truly moral personality ; it must in its secular 
sphere act morally. Precisely on the same grounds 
must the state be admitted to be a religious per- 
sonality. Man, as already noted, is a religious 
being ; and this religiousness of essential character, 
like his moral nature, follows him every where into 
his social as well as his proper personal life. The 
being and the sovereignty of God are truths which 
concern man every where ; it would be worse than 
stolid in the state to ignore them. The state is 
subject to the providential rule of God ; and his 
righteous retributions wait on all political as truly 
as upon all personal action. The religious interests 
of men are their paramount interests ; the state, 
which is but a community of men acting in a 
political sphere, cannot wisely be indifferent to 



SOCIAL RELIGION — THE STATE. 3 1 5 

these highest common interests of all its members. 
Even the best secular ends common to them cannot 
all be attained except through religion. The sanc- 
tity of the marriage relation, the veraciousness of 
witnesses, the fidelity of officials, for example, 
invoke the sanctions of religion. The rights of 
religions freedom and of religious practice, which 
reach in all directions into the pursuits and the 
possessions of men, demand the protection of the 
state, equally with other rights. The state is ca- 
pable of religions action ; it may recognize its de- 
pendence on God in manifold ways ; it may admin- 
ister the sanctions of religion in oaths ; it may 
suspend civil administration on clays hallowed by 
religion. In divers ways, thus, it is under the ne- 
cessity of acting in reference to religion. 

The argument for the entire exclusion of all 
reference to religion by the state which rests on 
the ground that all such action must of necessity 
infringe on the rights of conscience of some of its 
citizens, is one of inconsiderable weight. In so far 
as the religion of the state only recognizes the 
being of God, his attributes, and his relations to 
men, as accepted by all who believe in a God, and 
these make up the great mass of the members of 
every civilized nation, there is no possibility of in- 
fringement upon conscience. For those who believe 
in God certainly have no grounds of complaint on 
this ground, and it is difficult to comprehend how any 
others can have any conscience at all to be troubled. 
History abundantly shows the practicability of a true 
religious freedom even under a national church ; 



3 l6 DUTIES TO GOD. 

certainly, it may exist where there is no ecclesiastic 
establishment. 

It is not necessary, it may be observed, however 
desirable it may be held to be, that the formal rec- 
ognition of the being and rule of God, be incor- 
porated into the constitution and organic law of a 
people, any more than a like formal recognition of 
the existence of neighboring nations. It is enough 
that the rights and duties in each case be faithfully 
observed in the actual working of the state. 

§ 292. The particular rights and duties 
special duties. pertamm g to the state in reference to 

religion, are substantially embraced in 
the following enumeration : 

First, The state must in no case act 
lateSigiou^ob. irreligiously-— in direct and positive vio- 
lations, lation of religious duty. Such practice 
must ever be needless, since all the lines of duty 
in all the spheres of human activity are parallel. 
It must, at least, ever be unwise and impolitic. 

§ 293. Secondly, the state is bound to 
reiiJious P rSts protect, so far as lies in its power, all 
of subjects. t i ie secu i ar rights of its members in the 
enjoyment of their religion. It must lend its courts 
to adjudicate and enforce all the secular obligations 
arising in their religious associations. It should 
hold itself in favoring sympathy with all the sin- 
cere endeavors and aims of religious men, not an- 
tagonistic to the well-being of the state. As, while 
men remain imperfect, it may be reasonably expect- 
ed that, with the best intentions, collisions of state 
interests and individual convictions may arise, the 






SOCIAL RELIGION — THE STATE. 317 

state should exercise the greatest leniency and con- 

siderateness towards the tender conscience. The 
state does wisely thus to accept pecuniary contri- 
bution in lieu of military personal service of those 
conscientiously opposed to war ; as also to allow 
solemn affirmation in lieu of the formal oath. 

§ 294. Thirdly, the state may, with true 

3. To hallow political wisdom secure, and therefore 

marriage. r 

may be regarded as bound in duty to 
secure, for the marriage relation, so vital to the 
best interests of the state, all the sanctions whicli 
religion can throw around it. If it have no minis- 
ters of religion of its own, it may accept the ser- 
vice of those properly accredited as such as if it 
were the service of its own officials. It may accept 
religious formalities in the consummation of mar- 
riage to a certain extent, in substitution for such 
civil procedures as the purity of the family life and 
the determination of rights in inheritance as well 
as of other secular rights, may require. 

§ 295. Fourthly, it may recognize the 

4. Appoint re- observance of certain religious seasons 

Jigious seasons. ° 

by forbearing the usual routine of duty 
required of its officials, by closing public offices, by 
refusing to enforce contracts made on such desig- 
nated occasions,* by prohibiting pursuits and prac- 
tices that may disturb the quiet enjoyment of those 
seasons on the part of a portion of the community.' 
Civilized nations have thus generally recognized the 
weekly rest — the Christian Sabbath — as a day on 
which public offices shall not regularly be opened 
for business, and civil service by its officials shall 



3 l8 DUTIES TO GOD. 

not be allowed. They have also refused to recog- 
nize contracts made on that day as valid, and have 
forbidden certain kinds of business to be prosecu- 
ted which hinder the enjoyment of the season by 
the mass of the people. The state, moreover, has 
wisely recognized other great religious days as legal 
holidays — that is, as days on which the ordinary 
secular activities are to be intermitted. Indeed, in 
this case, the observance of a weekly rest from 
secular care and labor has been found to be so 
closely connected with the highest secular prosper- 
ity of a people as to justify the recognition of it by 
the state on purely secular grounds. 

§ 296. Fifthly, the state wisely recog- 
depradence Z on S nizes its dependence on God as the su- 
God - preme arbiter of human affairs, and on 

occasions of signal successes in national endeavors 
or of general distress and fear, appoints special 
days of thanksgiving to God or of humiliation be- 
fore him to deprecate his displeasure. It wisely 
recognizes, too, the constancy of this dependence, 
in stated appointments for general religious service 
in praise or supplication. There is true political 
wisdom, also, in recognizing this dependence, on 
important occasions of administrative service, as 
the opening of legislative assemblies, of judicial 
proceedings, the beginning and the ending of im- 
portant enterprises, as of war, and the like. 

§ 297. Sixthly, the State may wisely 
feiigbus sani- ° f enlist the aid of religious sanctions on 
tions— Oaths, various occasions of political service, 
particularly in the form of religious oaths. 



SOCIAL RELIGION — THE STATE. 3 19 

The religious oath is a solemn appeal to God 
for the sincerity of a declaration or a promise. Its 
proper design and effect is to quicken the con- 
science by a solemn recognition of responsibilities 
being involved in relation to God, the All-seeing 
and the All-judging, as well as to men who are un- 
able to read the heart. 

§ 298. Oaths are of several distinguish- 
ciasses. a ki e classes. The most common are 

judicial oaths, taken by witnesses upon 
themselves in giving testimony before judicial tri- 
bunals. 

Another class of oaths are oaths of declaration, 
as in declaring the amount or value of taxable prop- 
erty, innocence of bribery in elections, and the 
like. 

A third class are oaths of engagement, adminis- 
tered to civil officers, binding them more solemnly 
to a faithful performance of their duties, or to trus- 
tees or administrators or guardians, binding them 
to a right discharge of the trusts confided to them 
Such oaths may be of general or more special en- 
gagement. 

A fourth class are oaths of allegiance, taken by 
those who are admitted to the rights of citizenship. 
§ 299. In • the interpretation of oaths 
interpretation. t} ie general principle is that the oath is 
to be taken as it is meant by the au- 
thority that imposes it — secundum animum imponen- 
tis — that is, by the state, and not in the under- 
standing of the person to whom it is administered. 
An oath of allegiance — that is, an oath to maintain 



320 DUTIES TO GOD. 

the constitution or organic law of the state- — will 
thus be interpreted by the state as to what is meant 
by any particular provision of the organic law. It 
is possible, therefore, that while before the tribunal 
of his own conscience one may be clear of offense, 
yet, by the civil tribunal, he may be held to suffer 
the penalties of perjury. 



SOCIAL RELIGION THE CHURCH. 



CHAPTER IX. 

SOCIAL RELIGION — THE CHURCH. 

§ 300. The religious nature of man 
Natural. seeks to express itself in his social life. 

A religious society is thus as natural 
among men as a political society. Their common 
religious interests require a care and support as 
truly as their secular interests. To suppress all re- 
ligious convictions and endeavors in social life 
would be to cramp and stifle man's highest aspira- 
tions, and his best and tenderest sympathies with 
his fellows. The secular and the religious have in 
their natures no formidable antagonisms to threat- 
en the peace of the community. If religious con- 
troversies have arisen and religious wars have oc- 
curred, they are to be attributed not to religion but 
to depraved passions, working in spite of religion. 
So ambition and cupidity have occasioned bloody 
contests ; but not, therefore, are fame and property 
to be exorcised from human experience. All the 
proper effects and influences of religion are to for- 
bearance, to peace, to order. The community in 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



which true religious convictions sway the lives of 
its members is that where the highest order and 
prosperity may be expected to prevail. 

§ 301. The forms of the social relig- 
Organization. ious organization will vary with the re- 
ligious system which is embraced and 
the general culture and condition of the communi- 
ty. The organization may reach to great detail of 
creed, of worship, of rules, or extend only to a few 
and almost inconsiderable common usages and ob- 
servances. The religious society may be incorpor- 
ated into the civil organization. Nothing in the 
nature of the case or in history forbids that the 
common head in such an event, should be either 
political or religious. Mohammedanism is primi- 
tively and essentially religious, yet is counted a sec- 
ular as well as religious organization. On the 
other hand, diverse European states have assumed 
to themselves the regulation of religion. Or the re- 
ligious society may exist side by side with the 
political, in entire harmony, and with reciproca- 
ting offices of helpfulness, yet in full independ- 
ence. 

The christian church is the best existing type of 
a religious organization, the leading characteris- 
tics of which may be instanced as type-forms of 
every permanent religious society. 

§ 302. Every fully organized society must 
have prescribed officials, times, places, usages. 
The church has in its organization, offices, religious 
seasons, places, and rites. 

The functions of religious officials are, besides 



SOCIAL RELIGION — THE CHURCH. 323 

officials. the general functions of representing 

and ruling, twofold : — those of teach- 
ing and of ministry — prophetic and liturgical. 
It belongs to them to preserve, to interpret, 
to proclaim, and to enforce the body of religious 
truth which is held by the community, and to ap- 
ply it and make it effectual in the life and practice 
of the members. It 'belongs to them also to min- 
ister in the public rites and ceremonies of the com- 
munity. 

§ 303. The religious society must have 
Social seasons, its social seasons for social religious ob- 
servances. 

These may be prescribed by divine or 
by merely human authority ; they may be tradi- 
tional or temporary ; stated or occasional. The 
church accepts also from the state, appointments 
for public religious observances, as has been already 
intimated. 

§ 304. The weekly Sabbath stands 
The Sabbath, conspicuous among all sacred seasons 
by reason of its antiquity, its divine or- 
igin, its general recognition, its proved necessity to 
all the interests of men. The principle of the 
Sabbatic law is that one seventh of the time be 
withdrawn from secular cares and pursuits and be 
consecrated to religious uses. The law does not 
prohibit necessary secular occupations, which in- 
deed, need not hinder the highest religious ends of 
the Sabbath any more than some religious obser- 
vances, as at morning and at evening and of taking 
of food, interfere with secular labor. The nature 



324 DUTIES TO GOD. 

of the institution does not fix the precise hours to 
be observed as sacred to religious uses ; it does in- 
volve a certain proportion of time ; and for obvious 
social necessities the same hours, to be fixed by 
some common standard, must be taken for the 
same local community. The Sabbatic law enjoins 
a consecration of this one day in seven to proper 
religious uses. It enjoins the duty on every man's 
conscience so to observe the day as to make it most 
promotive of these uses. The Sabbatic law is, 
moreover, a social institution ; its very object con- 
templates a general agreement in respect to the 
observance. 

§ 305. Divers considerations evince 
Grounds of the the obligatory character of this law for 

duty to observe g ° J 

the Sabbath. the entire human race. 

First, the religious interests of men de- 
mand this appropriation of time ; and the institu- 
tion must fail unless it be observed in the commu- 
nity generally, so as to secure it from all interrup- 
tion from secular pursuits. To avail to one, it must 
be observed by all. 

Secondly, the secular well-being of man demands 
it. Careful induction from large observation and 
experience, has demonstrated the necessity of this 
weekly religious rest in order to the best condition 
of worldly interests. 

Thirdly, the law was originally given to man as 
man in the earliest stages of the existence of the 
race on earth. 

Fourthly, it was subsequently incorporated by the 
express authority of God into the decalogue of Moses 



SOCIAL RELIGION — THE CHURCH. 325 

— which is a summary of the rules of moral and re- 
ligious practice of universal and permanent appli- 
cation to all nations and all generations of men. 

Fifthly, the law with a natural and justifiable 
modification as to the day of the week, yet with no 
infringement upon its spirit and design was univer- 
sally recognized and enforced in the Christian 
church. 

§ 306. Social religion requires its sacred 
Sacred places, places as well as its sacred seasons. The 
tabernacle for the yet wandering life of 
tribes, the temple for the fixed national life, is a 
necessity for a religious community in the expres- 
sion of common religious beliefs. The Church — the 
Lord's, as the etymology of the name indicates — is 
the place of meeting between God and his worship- 
ing people. It is worthily consecrated to him, and 
should be freed from all associations that hinder the 
highest reverence towards him. 

§ 307. Religious rites make up what is 
Rites. meant by religious worship. They are 

a necessity of social religion. 
Worship may be defined to be an act of 
Worship. communion between God and his peo- 

ple. God meets his people in a peculiar 
sense ; he listens to his people in their praises and 
their supplications ; he communicates his will and 
his favor to them. This manifestation of himself is 
made representatively through his recognized min- 
ister in the ministration of the divine word. The 
worshiping people express to God their thanks- 
givings and their entreaties of his favor, either rep- 



326 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



resentatively through the minister or personally in 
united voice harmonized in song by means of ac- 
cording time and tune. 

There may be a ceremonial worship, besides and 
beyond this proper rational worship, consisting of 
offerings of incense and the like. Especially arc 
offerings to God, expressive of consecration of ser- 
vice and of possessions to him, legitimate constit- 
uents of true religious worship. But in so far as this 
proper rational worship — merely through heart and 
voice — is concerned, all that is foreign to this act of 
rational communion between God and his people 
effected in the way just specified, is foreign to true 
worship. God addresses man ; man addresses God ; 
this is all. Collective address is possible, however, 
only on the condition either of a single mouth-piece 
— a representative head — a minister or celebrant 
leading the assembly — or of united voices harmon- 
ized and brought into unity by means of song and 
chant — by means of musical time and tune. Re- 
ligious worship, on the side of man's address to God, 
reaches its highest elevation in accordant ascrip- 
tions by the whole worshiping people of Glory to 
God. 



THE END. 



INDEX. 



PAGE. 

Act of duty, exemplified in the story 

of Regains, 7 ; duties determined 
from, 159-163 ; two species, 159 

Activity, requisite in a moral per- 
son, 1 1 
Aim in action, 159 
Anger, 140 
A sceticism, 99 
Attributes 0/ duty, 13 
Authority, 77-83, its seat, 77; ex- 
pressed in a two-fold way, 79 
Belligerents, 2 So 
Beneficence, 152 ; distinguished 
from justice, 153 ; correlative of 
benevolence, 154; species, 155; 
modes, 155 ; measure, 155 ; ob- 
ject, 156 
Benevolence, 112 
Bible, revelation of divine author- 
ity, 82 
Body, duties in respect to the, 96- 
106 ; ground, 96 ; of guarding, 98 ; 
nourishing, 100; ruling, 104 
Candor, 147 
Capitation taxes, 201 
Casuistry, 84-87 ; defined, 84 ; 

leading principles, 86 

Character, duties in respect to, 

t iS ; maxims, 121 

Church, nature, 321 ; organization, 
322 ; officials, 322 ; seasons, 323 ; 
places, 325 ; rites, 325. 
Citizen, relations to the state, 254- 
264 ; defined, 234 ; rights, 256 ; 
duties, 260 

Civil Rights, 255 

Comity of nations, 271 ; rules of re- 
cognition, 271 ; oi legation, 272 ; 
of salute, 272 ; exemption from 
jurisdiction, 273 ; respect for laws, 273 
Condition, duties in respect to, 107-H7 
Conscience, synonym of moral fac- 
ulty, 16 : includes three functions, 
to feel duty, to oblige to perform- 
ance, to praise or blame, 16-20 ; 
pleasure or pain attending", 19 

Courtesy to persons, its nature, 143 ; 
obligation, 144 ; sphere, 144 ; 
forms, 144 

Demerit, 21, 75 



PAGE. 

Desert, 21, 75 

Developing industries, 256 

Discourtesy, 144 

Duties, classified, 26, 88 ; to self, 92- 
134; to our fellowmen, 134; to 
persons, 135-162 ; to God, 2S2-326 
Duties in the family, 
Duties in the state, 1 82-28 r 

Duties to God, nature, 282 ; how en- 
joyed, 284 ; classes, 284 ; per- 
sonal religion, 286-308 ; family 
religion, 309-3:3; in the state, 
314-320; the church, 321-326 

Duties to persons, determined from 
the subject of duty, 137-142 ; from 
the object of duty, 143-158 ; from 
act of duty, 159-162 

Duties to self, nature and classes, 
92-95 ; '.'.round of obligation, 93 ; 
threefold law, 95 ; in respect to 
the body, 96-106 ; to condition, 
107-117 ; to character, 118-133 

Duty, act of, exemplified in the 
story of Regulus, 7 ; analyzed, 8 ; 
its three constituent elements, 9 

Duty, its attributes, 13 

Duty, object of, 22-26 ; a person, 22 
Duty, subject of, see moral person. 
Education in the state, 246-249 : a 

duty, 246 ; extent, 247 ; methods, 248 
Equities, 219 

Ethics, defined, 1 ; different meth- 
ods of the science, 1 ; founded on 
psychology, 2 ; one of the three 
departments of mental science. 3 , 
method pursued, 4 

Evil,' opposite of good, 44 ; natural 

and mora', 42 

Excise duties, 202 

Exec?itive, in the state, 220 

Exercise, 101 

Expatriation, 263 

Family, defined, 163 ; divinely in- 
stituted, 163 ; twofold end, 163 ; 
rise of duties in, 164 ; moral char- 
acter, 164 ; seat of authority, 166 ; 
classes of duties in, t66 ; marital, 
168-173 ; parental and filial, 174- 
179 ; fraternal, 180 

Family religion, 309-313 ; the mar- 

327 



328 



INDEX. 



PAGE. 

riage covenant, how far a sacra- 
ment, 311; in the household life, 
311 ; training, 312: worship, 312 

Filial rights and duties, 174-179; 
correlation of parental, 175 ; 
enumerated, 176 

Food, 100 

Forgiveness^ 141 

Formality, 299" 

Fraternal rights and duties, 180 

Free will, requisite in a moral per- 
son, 14 ; culture of, 130 
Friendship, duties in respect to, 116 
Good, essential in duty, 24 ; the end 
of all duty, 36 ; twofold sense, 
37 ; chief good, 39 ; good in it- 
salfj 42 ; as means. 42 ; good of 
condition and of character, 42 
Goodness or beneficence, 36 
Gratitude, 140 ; to God, 287 
Happiness, 37 ; gift of Creator 

alone, 42-44 

Hate, opposite of love, 35 

Hypocrisy, 299 

Idolatry, 29S 

Ill-desert, 21, 75 

Imposts, 202-242 

Income taxes, 207 

Industries, developing, productive, 

distributive, 236 

IntelligeJice, requisite in a moral 

person, 13 ; culture of, 126 

International morality, 265-281 ; 
divisions of international law, 
265 : sources, 265 ; duties classed, 
267; good-will, 267; resentments, 
268 ; retaliation, 273 ; courtesy, 
truthfulness, justice, beneficence, 
273 ; integrity, 276; war, 276 

Irreverence, 294 

Jus gentium, 265 

Justice, distinguished from benefi- 
cence, 153 ; defined, 157; sphere, 157 
Kindliness, 138 

Law, defined. 66 ; physical and 
moral, 67 ; expression of will, 70 ; 
harmony, 71 ; obliging power, 
71 ; imports responsibility, 72 ; 
sanctions, 73 ; natural and posi- 
tive, 79 
Love, as principle of duty, 32-35; 

defined, 33 ; stages, 34 

Marital rights and duties, 168- 
173 ; parity of rights, 171 ; joint 
authority, 171 ; rights comple- 
mentary, 172 
• Marriage covenant, basis of mar- 
ital rights and duties, 168 ; indis- 
soluble, 169 ; how ratified, 170 
Merit. 21, 73 
Money, defined, 227 ; function, 228 ; 



PAGE. 

standard of value, 229 ; material, 
230 ; mixed currency, 232 ; legal 
tender, 232 ; amount, 233 

Monogamy, 168 

Moral action, 27-31 ; defined, 21 ; 

diversely denominated, 28 

Moral faculty, defined, 16 

Mora'A'aw, 66-76 ; defined, 68 

Moral obligation, 60-65 5 defined, 

60 : ground, 61 

Moral person, defined, 10 > requi- 
sites, 10 
Moral Science, see Ethics. 
Moral Sense, synonym of moral 

faculty, 16 

Motives, 51-59; defined, 51; two 
classes, 53 ; subdivisions, 53 ; ul- 
timate and proximate, 56 ; not 
mora!. 57 ; wrong selection, 58 

Mutilation of body, 78 

Natural law, 79 

Nature, duties to, 10S 

Neutrals in war, 280 

Oaths, 319; classes, 319; how in- 
terpreted, 319 
Obedience, religious, 301 
Object of duty, 22-26 ; a person, 22 ; 
duties determined from, 143-158 ; 
three classes, 143 
Organic law of a state, 2 16 
Parental rights and duties, 174- 
179 ; origin, 174 ; correlative of 
filial, 175 ; enumerated, 175-175 ; 
limited obligations, 177 
Penalties, 210 ; ends, 210-212 ; 

modes. 212; degrees, 213 

Personal didies, 92-134 

Personal religion or piety towards 
God, 286-308 ; imports sympathy, 

286 ; godly disposition, 287 ; love, 

287 ; gratitude, 287 ; reverence, 
289 ; prayer, 290 ; godly sincer- 
ity, 296 ; religious trust, obedi- 
ence, and seryice, 300 ; integ- 
rity, 306 

Political aidonomy, 214-220; right 

and duty, 214; spheres, 215 

Political growth, 221-249; seven- 
fold departments, 222 
Political power, its seat, 186 
Political retaliation, 269 : ami- 
cable, 269 ; vindictive, 270 
Political rights, 255 
Polyga my. 1 6 S 
Positive law, 8 a 
Post a I facilities, 234 
Praise and blame, function of con- 
science, 19; sanctions of law, 76 
Practical morality, 88-326 
Practical reason, synonym of moral 
facultv, 16 






INDEX. 



329 



Prayer, its nature, 290 ; qualities, 
290 ; duty, 291 ; objections to, an- 
swered, 292 
Productive industries, 237 ; duty of 
the state to foster, 237; limita- 
tions, 230 ; modes, 241 
Public health, 245 
Public improvements, 225 
Public morals, 250-253 ; duty of the 
state to promote, 250 ; methods — 
by example, 251 ; by prohibition, 
252 ; by positive encouragement, 253 
Recreation, 103 
Rectitude, 46-50, implies an action, 
p. ; relation of action, yj ; titness, 
47 ; directness, 48 ; parallelism 
with all other duty. 49 
Regulns, story of, 7 
Religious duties, 282-326 
Resentments, 139 ; of gratitude, 

139; of anger and forgiveness, 140 
Rest to body, 103 

Retaliation, 140 

Rewards, 210 

Right, correlative of duty, 23 

Right of eminent domain, 199 

Sabbath, weekly, duty to observe, 324 
Sanctions 0/ law, 210 

.SV//-/t>rr,distineuished from selfish- 
ness, 93 ; its twofold nature, 95 
Sensibility, requisite in a moral per- 
son, 16 ; culture of, 123 
Service, religious, 303 ; qualities, 304 
Social religion, in the family, 309- 
313 : in the state, 314-320 ; in the 
church, 321-326 
Stamp duties, 206 
State, duties in, 1S2-2S1 ; defined, 
1S2 ; origin, 182, 197 ; an organ- 
ized community, 1S5 ; sphere, 
1 85 ; a power, 1S5 ; seat of power, 
180 ; its end, iSS ; moral attri- 
butes, 193 ; not a mere jural so- 
ciety, 194-196; bound morally, 
196 ; rights and duties, 197 ; of 
existence, 197-213 ; of support, 
198 ; self-defense, 207 ; mainten- 



PAGB. 

ance of authority, 208 ; autonomy, 
214-220 ; organic law, 210 ; 
lature, 218; judiciary. .? 1 s : ex- 
ecutive, 220; right of growth, 
221-242 ; sevenfold departments, 
222 ; maxims, 222 : territorial ex- 
tension, 223 ; increase of popula- 
tion, 224 ; public improvements, 

225 ; weights and measures, 226 ; 
money, 227 ; postal facilitie . 
development of resources, 235 ; 
health, 245 ; education, 246 ; mor- 
als, 250 ; in relation to the citi- 
zen, 254 : moral relationship to 
other states, 265-281 J religion in 
the state. 3 1 1 ; rights and duties 
of the state in reference to re- 
ligion, 316 
Station, duties in respect to, 1 1 4 
Straightforwardness, 159 
Suicide, 98 
Summum boninn, 37 
Superstition, 298 
Sympathy, 1 3 7 
Systems of morality, threefold, 29 
Taxes, 200 ; direct and indirect, 
200 ; capitation taxes, 201 ; ex- 
cise duties, 202 ; imposts, 202 ; 
stamp duties, 206 ; income taxes. 207 
Theoretical morality, 1-S7 ; reca- 
pitulated, 88-91 
Trust, religious, 301 ; qualities, 301 
1'rustfulness, 151 
Truthfulness, 145 ; twofold, 147 ; 
inward implies candor and impar- 
tiality, 147 ; outward or veracity, 148 
Veracity, 14S ; sphere, 149; modes, 150 
Vow, 305 
IVar, defined, 276 ; must be public, 
278 ; with force of arms, 2 78 ; 
just, 279 ; belligerents and non- 
combatants, 280 ; neutrals, 280 
Weights and measures, 226 
Worship, defined, 325 ; constitu- 
ents, 326 
Wrong, opposite of right, 49 



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